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Abstract
Deep Models for Improving the Performance and Reliability of Person Recognition

Sobhan Soleymani

Deep models have provided high accuracy for different applications such as person recognition, image segmentation, image captioning, scene description, and action recognition. In this
dissertation, we study the deep learning models and their application in improving the
performance and reliability of person recognition. This dissertation focuses on five aspects of
person recognition: (1) multimodal person recognition, (2) quality-aware multi-sample person
recognition, (3) text-independent speaker verification, (4) adversarial iris examples, and (5)
morphed face images. First, we discuss the application of multimodal networks consisting of
face, iris, fingerprint, and speech modalities in person recognition. We propose multi-stream
convolutional neural network architectures to incorporate person recognition traits
introducing three multimodal frameworks: multi-level abstraction, generalized com-pact
bilinear pooling, and quality-aware multi-sample multimodal fusion. Then, a novel crossdevice text-independent speaker verification architecture which consists of spectro-temporal
and prosodic features is introduced. Through intensive experimental setups the performance
of each proposed framework is studied.
Although biometric recognition systems are fast becoming part of security applications,
these systems are still vulnerable to image manipulations. To study the reliability of deep
models in person recognition, we focus on adversarial examples and morphed images. We
introduce adversarial examples for iris recognition framework with non-targeted and tar-geted
attacks and study the possibility of fooling an iris recognition system in white-box and blackbox frameworks.Then, we present defense strategies to detect adversarial iris examples. These
defense strategies are based on wavelet domain denoising of the input examples by
investigating each wavelet sub-band. Finally, we study the morphed face images in which a
facial reference image can be verified as two or more separate identities. Here, a novel differential morph attack detection framework using a deep Siamese network is proposed. Then, we
improve the performance utilizing landmark and appearance disentanglement through
contrastive representations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Machine learning is utilized in many aspects of life such as person recognition, web searches,
social networks, e-commerce, cameras, and smartphones by identifying objects in images,
transcribing speech into text, and selecting relevant results of search. However, conventional
machine learning techniques are limited in their ability to process natural data in their raw
form and require careful feature extraction. Deep learning aims to resolve this issue and
provide better performance [1, 2]. In this dissertation, we study the deep learning models
and their application in improving the performance and reliability of person recognition.
Identity verification is necessary in a wide variety of applications such as access control to systems, crime scene investigation, border crossing, and bank transactions. Person
recognition research efforts explore the possibility of automatically recognizing individuals
based on their unique physical or behavioral traits such as face, fingerprint, voice, iris, or
handwritting, which are referred to as modalities. The uniqueness of the features extracted
from these traits, have allowed biometric systems to be of great interest for identification
and verification applications in a wide variety of scenarios [3–5].
Deep learning models have provided high accuracy for different applications such as person recognition, image segmentation, image captioning, scene description, semi-supervised
learning, domain adaptation, and action recognition. Deep learning models are widely used
for extracting and representing discriminative features from the raw data, decision-making,
and increasing interpretability. A convolutional neural network (CNN) is a class of deep
learning models most commonly considered to analyze images. Compared to hand-crafted
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features, employing CNN as domain feature extractor demonstrated to be more promising
when facing different modalities such as face [6–14], iris [15–17] and fingerprint [18–21], as
well as multimodal classification [22, 23], attribute-enhanced classification [6, 9, 24], image
retrieval [13, 25], and many more [26–32]. However, these systems are vulnerable to image
manipulations such as adversarial examples [16, 17, 33] and morphed images [34–38].

1.1

Multimodal Person Recognition

Multimodal biometric models have demonstrated greater robustness to noisy data, nonuniversality, and category-based variations, and can help to lower recognition error rates
for challenging recognition scenarios when presented by low-quality and unreliable biometric
samples, such as latent fingerprints, face images captured at a distance, and low-resolution
iris images [39, 40]. However, the effects of the fusion at different levels of feature resolution
and abstraction and joint optimization of the architecture are not investigated for multimodal
biometric identification.
In order for a multimodal biometrics framework to provide better performance compared
to unimodal frameworks, when some of the samples are distorted, the multimodal framework
should be able to leverage the recognition information of the lower quality samples to enhance
the overall performance and provide reliable recognition. A multimodal recognition algorithm
requires selecting the discriminative and informative features from each sample, as well as
exploring the dependencies between features extracted from different samples in a multimodal
sample set. This framework should also determine the priority of features according to their
usefulness and reliability for the recognition task.
In Chapter 2, we propose a deep multimodal fusion network to fuse multiple modalities for person identification. The proposed deep multimodal fusion algorithm consists of
multiple streams of modality-specific CNNs, which are jointly optimized at multiple feature
abstraction levels. Multiple features are extracted at several different convolutional layers
from each modality-specific CNN for joint feature fusion, optimization, and classification.
Features extracted at different convolutional layers of a modality-specific CNN represent the
input at several different levels of abstract representations. We demonstrate that an efficient
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Figure 1.1: Multimodal Person Recognition.
multimodal classification can be accomplished with a significant reduction in the number of
network parameters by exploiting these multi-level abstract representations extracted from
all the modality-specific CNNs. We demonstrate an increase in multimodal person identification performance by utilizing the proposed multi-level feature abstract representations in our
multimodal fusion, rather than using only the features from the last layer of each modalityspecific CNNs. We show that our deep multi-modal CNNs with multimodal fusion at several
different feature level abstraction can significantly outperform the unimodal representation
accuracy. We also demonstrate that the joint optimization of all the modality-specific CNNs
excels the score and decision level fusions of independently optimized CNNs.
In Chapter 3, we propose to employ a bank of modality-dedicated CNNs, fuse, train,
and optimize them together for person classification tasks. A modality-dedicated CNN is
used for each modality to extract modality-specific features. We demonstrate that, rather
than spatial fusion at the convolutional layers, the fusion can be performed on the outputs
of the fully-connected layers of the modality-specific CNNs without any loss of performance
and with significant reduction in the number of parameters. We show that, using multiple
CNNs with multimodal fusion at the feature-level, we significantly outperform systems that
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use unimodal representation. We study weighted feature, bilinear, and compact bilinear
feature-level fusion algorithms for multimodal biometric person identification. Finally, We
propose generalized compact bilinear fusion algorithm to deploy both the weighted feature
fusion and compact bilinear schemes. We provide the results for the proposed algorithms on
three challenging databases.
In Chapter 4, we propose a quality-aware multimodal recognition framework that combines representations from multiple biometric traits with varying quality and number of
samples to achieve increased recognition accuracy by extracting complimentary identification information based on the quality of the samples. We develop a quality-aware framework
for fusing representations of input modalities by weighing their importance using quality
scores estimated in a weakly-supervised fashion. This framework utilizes two fusion blocks,
each represented by a set of quality-aware and aggregation networks. In addition to architecture modifications, we propose two task-specific loss functions: multimodal separability
loss and multimodal compactness loss. The first loss assures that the representations of
modalities for a class have comparable magnitudes to provide a better quality estimation,
while the multimodal representations of different classes are distributed to achieve maximum
discrimination in the embedding space. The second loss, which is considered to regularize
the network weights, improves the generalization performance by regularizing the framework. We evaluate the performance by considering three multimodal datasets consisting of
face, iris, and fingerprint modalities. The efficacy of the framework is demonstrated through
comparison with the state-of-the-art algorithms.

1.2

Prosodic-Enhanced Siamese Speaker Verification

In Chapter 5, a novel cross-device text-independent speaker verification architecture is proposed. Majority of the state-of-the-art deep architectures that are used for speaker verification tasks consider Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients. In contrast, the proposed Siamese
convolutional neural network architecture uses Mel-frequency spectrogram coefficients to
benefit from the dependency of the adjacent spectro-temporal features. Moreover, although
spectro-temporal features have proved to be highly reliable in speaker verification mod-
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Figure 1.2: Prosodic-Enhanced Siamese Speaker Verification.
els, they only represent some aspects of short-term acoustic level traits of the speaker’s
voice. However, the human voice consists of several linguistic levels such as acoustic, lexicon,
prosody, and phonetics, that can be utilized in speaker verification models. To compensate
for these inherited shortcomings in spectro-temporal features, we propose to enhance the
proposed Siamese convolutional neural network architecture by deploying a multilayer perceptron network to incorporate the prosodic, jitter, and shimmer features. The proposed endto-end verification architecture performs feature extraction and verification simultaneously.
This proposed architecture displays significant improvement over classical signal processing
approaches and deep algorithms for forensic cross-device speaker verification.

1.3

Adversarial Examples for Person Recognition

Adversarial examples, introduced in [41], are samples of input data modified such that machine learning classifiers are fooled. While, in many cases, these modifications are perceptually indistinguishable and cannot be noticed by a human observer [41, 42]. Adversarial
examples can be utilized to conceal the identity of a subject or fool the security system to
provide access to an unauthorized subject by matching the adversarial example to a specific or any other authorized subject. Adversarial examples are considered security threats
since an adversarial example that is designed to be misclassified by one model is often also
misclassified by the other models [43]. Therefore, adversarial examples can be generated
without the exact knowledge of the recognition framework.
Adversarial examples have recently proven to be able to fool deep learning methods
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Figure 1.3: (a) The benign example, (b) normalized perturbation, (c) adversarial example,
and (d) iris image that the adversarial example verified as.
by adding carefully crafted small perturbation to the input space image. In Chapter 6,
we study the possibility of generating adversarial examples for code-based iris recognition
systems. Since generating adversarial examples requires back-propagation of the adversarial
loss, conventional filter bank-based iris-code generation frameworks cannot be employed in
such a setup. Therefore, to compensate for this shortcoming, we propose to train a deep
auto-encoder surrogate network to mimic the conventional iris code generation procedure.
This trained surrogate network is then deployed to generate the adversarial examples using
the iterative gradient sign method algorithm [41]. We consider non-targeted and targeted
attacks through three attack scenarios. Considering these attacks, we study the possibility
of fooling an iris recognition system in white-box and black-box frameworks.
Deep neural networks have presented impressive performance in biometric applications.
However, their performance is highly at risk when facing carefully crafted input samples
known as adversarial examples. In Chapter 7, we present three defense strategies to detect
adversarial iris examples. These defense strategies are based on wavelet domain denoising of
the input examples by investigating each wavelet sub-band and removing the sub-bands that
are most affected by the adversary. The first proposed defense strategy reconstructs multiple
denoised versions of the input example through manipulating the mid- and high-frequency
components of the wavelet domain representation of the input example and makes a decision
upon the classification result of the majority of the denoised examples. The second and third
proposed defense strategies aim to denoise each wavelet domain sub-band and determine
the sub-bands that are most likely affected by the adversary using the reconstruction error
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Figure 1.4: (a) and (b) are gallery and probe bona fide images, and (c) are the morph images
construed from (a) and (d).
computed for each sub-band. We test the performance of the proposed defense strategies
against several attack scenarios and compare the results with five state of the art defense
strategies.

1.4

Morphed Face Images

Although biometric facial recognition systems are fast becoming part of security applications,
these systems are still vulnerable to morphing attacks, in which a facial reference image can
be verified as two or more separate identities. In border control scenarios, a successful
morphing attack allows two or more people to use the same passport to cross borders.
In Chapter 8, we propose a novel differential morph attack detection framework using a
deep Siamese network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research work that
makes use of a Siamese network architecture for morph attack detection. We explore the
embedding space generated by the contrastive loss using three decision making frameworks
using Euclidean distance, feature difference and a support vector machine classifier, and
feature concatenation and a support vector machine classifier.
In Chapter 9, we present a novel differential morph detection framework, utilizing landmark and appearance disentanglement. In our framework, the face image is represented in the
embedding domain using two disentangled but complementary representations. The network
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is trained by triplets of face images, in which the intermediate image inherits the landmarks
from one image and the appearance from the other image. This initially trained network is
further trained for each dataset using contrastive representations. We demonstrate that, by
employing appearance and landmark disentanglement, the proposed framework can provide
state-of-the-art differential morph detection performance. This functionality is achieved
by the using distances in landmark, appearance, and ID domains. The performance of
the proposed framework is evaluated using three morph datasets generated with different
methodologies.
Main Publications: The complete list of the publications is presented in the last chapter.
Parts of this dissertation are reprinted with permission from the following papers:
• Chapter 2: Soleymani, Dabouei, Kazemi, Dawson, Nasrabadi, Multi-level feature
abstraction from convolutional neural networks for multimodal biometric identification,
International Conference on Pattern Recognition (ICPR), 2018.
• Chapter 3: Soleymani, Torfi, Dawson, Nasrabadi, Generalized bilinear deep convolutional neural networks for multimodal biometric identification, IEEE International
Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), 2018.
• Chapter 4: Soleymani, Dabouei, Taherkhani, Iranmanesh, Dawson, Nasrabadi, QualityAware Multimodal Biometric Recognition, Submitted.
• Chapter 5: Soleymani, Dabouei, Iranmanesh, Kazemi, Dawson, Nasrabadi, ProsodicEnhanced Siamese Convolutional Neural Networks for Cross-Device Text-Independent
Speaker Verification, IEEE International Conference on Biometrics Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2018.
• Chapter 6: Soleymani, Dabouei, Dawson, Nasrabadi, Adversarial Examples to Fool
Iris Recognition Systems, IAPR International Conference On Biometrics (ICB), 2019.
• Chapter 7: Soleymani, Dabouei, Dawson, Nasrabadi, Defending Against Adversarial Iris Examples Using Wavelet Decomposition, IEEE International Conference on
Biometrics Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2019.
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• Chapter 8: Soleymani, Chaudhary, Dabouei, Dawson, Nasrabadi, Differential Morphed Face Detection Using Deep Siamese Networks. MultiMedia FORensics in the
WILD (MMForWILD), 2020.
• Chapter 9: Soleymani, Dabouei, Taherkhani, Dawson, Nasrabadi, Mutual Information Maximization on Disentangled Representations for Differential Morph Detection.
IEEE/CVF Winter Conference on Applications of Computer Vision (WACV), 2021.
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Chapter 2
Generalized Bilinear Multimodal
Identification
2.1

Introduction

The permanence and uniqueness of human physical characteristics such as face, iris, fingerprint, and voice is widely utilized in biometric systems deploying the corresponding feature
representation of these characteristics [3]. Multimodal biometric models have demonstrated
more robustness to noisy data, non-universality and category-based variations [39, 40]. The
multimodal networks can improve recognition task in cases where one or more of the biometric traits are distorted. A recognition algorithm using a multimodal architecture, requires
selecting the discriminative and informative features from each modality as well as exploring
the dependencies between different modalities. This architecture should also discard the
single modality features that are not useful in joint recognition.
However, employing a fusion algorithm is the most prominent challenge in multimodal
biometric systems [44]. The fusion algorithm can be performed at signal, feature, score,
rank or decision levels [45] using different schemes such as feature concatenation [22, 46,
47] and bilinear feature multiplication [48, 49]. Although score-, rank- and decision-level
fusion are studied in the literature extensively, since these levels are easier to access in the
biometric systems, feature-level fusion results in a better discriminative classifier [50] due
to the preservation of raw information [3]. Feature level fusion integrates different features
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extracted from different modalities to a more abstract feature representation, which can
further be used for classification, verification, or identification [4].
To integrate the features from different modalities, several fusion methods have been
considered [46]. The prevalent fusion method in the literature is feature concatenation, which
is very inefficient exploiting the dependency between the modalities as the feature space
dimensionality increases [44, 47]. To overcome this shortcoming, bilinear multiplication of
the individual modalities is proposed [48, 49]. Using bilinear multiplication, the higher-level
dependencies between the modalities are exploited and enforced through the backpropagation
algorithm. The bilinear multiplication is effective since all of the elements of the single
modalities interact through multiplication. The main issue in bilinear operation is the high
dimensionality of its output regarding the cardinality of the inputs. Recently, to handle this
shortcoming, compact bilinear pooling is proposed [51–53].
Convolutional neural networks are recently utilized for classification of multimodal biometric data. Although, CNNs are mainly used as classifiers, they are also efficient tools to
extract and represent discriminative features from the raw data. Compared to hand-crafted
features, employing CNN as domain feature extractors has demonstrated to be more promising when facing different biometric modalities such as face [6,7], iris [15] and fingerprint [18].
In this chapter, we make the following contributions: (i) instead of spatial fusion at the
convolutional layers, modality-dedicated networks are designed to extract modality-specific
features for the fusion; (ii) a fully data-driven architecture using fused CNNs and end-to-end
joint optimization of the overall network, is proposed for joint domain-specific feature extraction and representation with the application of person classification; finally (iii) weighted
feature fusion and generalized compact bilinear feature fusion are considered at the fullyconnected level.

2.2

Generalized compact bilinear fusion

Consider a fusion operation f : (X1 , X2 , ..., Xn ) → Y that fuses n modalities; Xi ∈ RHi ×Wi ×Di ,
i = 1, 2, .., n. The fusion operation results in Y ∈ RH×W ×D , where W , H and D correspond
b c

b

to width, height and depth of the feature maps. Fusion can be performed using the feature maps of the CNNs when the corresponding feature maps from different modalities are
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compatible. However, in multimodal biometric networks, the feature maps can vary in the
spatial dimension due to the different spatial dimensionality of the inputs. To handle this
issue, instead of utilizing convolutional layers feature maps for fusion, fully-connected layers
are considered in our architecture for ultimate modality-dedicated feature representation.
b =W
c = 1, and there is no condition
Therefore, in our proposed architecture, Hi = Wi = H
on D. We show that the fully-connected representation provides promising results in the
case of recognition applications.
In the proposed fusion algorithm, prior to the fusion, each modality is represented by
the output of a fully-connected layer which we call the modality-dedicated embedding layer.
In weighted feature fusion algorithm, the fusion function concatenates the modalityb
b =
dedicated embedding layers of the multiple modalities, in which Y ∈ R1×D , where D
P
T
i Di . In bilinear fusion algorithm, Y = X1 X2 . If Hi 6= 1, the outer product is applied

on two feature maps at the pixel level, followed by global average pooling over the spatial
dimensions [48, 49]. However, the bilinear fusion over fully-connected layers computes the
e
b =
outer product of the modality-dedicated embedding layers, where Y ∈ R1×D and D
Q
b
1×D
, projects all possible featurei Di . The resulting feature-level representation Y ∈ R

level interactions between the n modalities. In the case that the n is larger than two, in each
step the outer product is vectorized and then multiplied by the next modality.
Generalized compact bilinear feature-level fusion algorithm: Compact bilinear
fusion projects the outer product of two vectors into a low-dimensional sub-space with very
little loss in performance compared to bilinear fusion [51]. Random Maclaurin projection
and Tensor Sketch projection [51] are the most prominent algorithms proposed for compact
bilinear pooling. Here, we deploy the tensor sketch projection. This algorithm uses the count
sketch projection introduced in [54] to estimate the outer product of two vectors without
computing the outer product explicitly. The count sketch of the outer product of two vectors
can be expressed as the convolution of count sketches of the vectors [53]. However, this
convolution can be computed as the inverse Fourier transform of the element-wise product
of the count sketches in the frequency domain. Therefore, the bilinear outer product of
multiple modalities can be computed through element-wise multiplication of Fourier domain
count sketches. Let x1 ∈ Rc1 and x2 ∈ Rc2 be the modality-dedicated embedding layers:
y = FFT−1 (FFT(Ψ(x1 , h1 , s1 )) ◦ FFT(Ψ(x2 , h2 , s2 ))),

(2.1)
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where hash functions h1 ∈ Nc1 and h2 ∈ Nc2 are random, but fixed vectors uniformly drawn
from {1, 2, ..., d}, s1 ∈ {−1, +1}c1 , and s2 ∈ {−1, +1}c2 . The count sketch function is defined
as:
Ψ(x1 , h1 , s1 )) = {(Qx1 )1 , (Qx1 )2 , ..., (Qx1 )d },
where (Qx1 )j =

P

n:h1 [n]=j

(2.2)

s1 [n]x1 [n]. This algorithm can be expanded to fuse multiple

modalities as well.
In the proposed generalized compact bilinear fusion algorithm, single modalities and
all possible 2-,3-,..., n-compact bilinear products are concatenated to form vector y. For
instance, when n = 3, three modality-dedicated embedding layer, three two-modality tensor
sketch projection, and one three-modality tensor sketch projection are concatenated.
End-to-end training of the architecture: Generalized compact bilinear fusion algorithm consists of random, but fixed functions {si } and {hi }, Fourier and inverse Fourier
transforms. Since these transforms are differentiable, the error can be back-propagated
through the fusion layer, the end-to-end training of the proposed generalized compact bilinear fusion algorithm is possible, and the multimodal architecture can be jointly optimized.
For two-modality tensor sketch fusion algorithm, the error is back-propagated through the fusion layer using the equation below. Let L represent the loss function at the fusion layer [51]:
X ∂L
∂L
=
Td2 (x2 ) ◦ s1 ,
∂x1
∂y[d]
d
where Td 2 (x) ∈ Rc1 , Td 2 (x2 )[j] = Ψ(x2 , h2 , s2 )[d − h1 [j]]. Similarly,

2.3

(2.3)
∂L
∂x2

can be calculated.

Joint optimization of architecture

The multimodal CNN architecture consists of modality-dedicated CNN networks, a joint
representation layer, and a softmax classification layer that are jointly trained and optimized. The modality-dedicated networks are trained to extract the modality specific features
and the joint representation is trained to explore and enforce dependency between different
modalities. The joint optimization of the networks, discards the unuseful features.
Modality-dedicated networks: Each modality-dedicated CNN, consists of the first
16 layers of a conventional VGG19 network [55] and a fully-connected modality-dedicated
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network
input
layer
conv1 (1-2)
maxpool1

CNN-Face

224 × 224 × 3 512 × 64 × 3

kernel

3 × 3 × 64

3 × 3 × 64

3 × 3 × 64

2 ×2

2×2

2×2

3 × 3 × 128

3 × 3 × 128

2×2

2×2

3 × 3 × 256

3 × 3 × 256

2×2

2×2

3 × 3 × 512

3 × 3 × 512

2×2

2×2

3 × 3 × 512

3 × 3 × 512

2×2
2×2

conv4 (1-4) 3 × 3 × 512
maxpool4

2×2

conv5 (1-4) 3 × 3 × 512
FC6

224 × 224 × 3

kernel

conv3 (1-4) 3 × 3 × 256
maxpool3

CNN-Fingerprint

kernel

conv2 (1-2) 3 × 3 × 128
maxpool2

CNN-Iris

7 × 7 × 1024 2 × 16 × 1024

14

7 × 7 × 1024

Table 2.1: The modality-dedicated CNN architectures.
embedding layer (FC6) of size 1024. The fully-connected layers of the conventional VGG19
network are not practical for our application, since the joint optimization of the modalitydedicated networks and the joint representation layer is practically impossible due to the
massive number of parameters that need to be trained and the limited number of training
samples. The details for each modality-dedicated network can be found in Table 2.1.
Joint representation layer: The output of the modality-dedicated networks are fused
using one of the discussed fusion algorithm, then fed to a fully connected layer of size 1024
and finally, fed to the softmax classification layer.

2.4

Experiments and discussions

CMU Multi-PIE database: This database [56] consists of face images under different
illuminations, viewpoints, and expressions which are recorded in four sessions. Following
the setup in [5], we consider the multi-view face images for 129 subjects that are present
in all sessions. The available views are divided into three modalities of {−90◦ , −75◦ , −60◦ ,

Multi-Pie

BIOMDATA

BioCOP
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Train set

Test set

KNN

SVM

CNN

Face

6833

6960

89.68

88.76

98.14

Iris

36636

39725

70.52

79.26

99.05

Fingerprint

1822

991

91.22

90.61

97.28

Left iris

874

584

66.61

71.92

99.35

Right iris

871

581

64.89

71.08

98.95

Left thumb

875

644

61.23

63.96

80.15

Left index

872

632

82.91

84.70

93.43

Right thumb

871

647

62.11

63.52

82.63

Right Index

870

624

82.05

84.46

93.12

Left view

10320

30940

45.52

47.30

87.50

Frontal view

15480

38700

40.87

41.15

90.29

Right view

10320

30960

45.13

47.30

85.49

15

Table 2.2: The number of samples in training and test sets and rank-one recognition rate
for single modalities.
−45◦ }, {0◦ , ±15◦ , ±30◦ } and {45◦ , 60◦ , 75◦ , 90◦ }. Images from session 1 at views {0◦ , ±30◦ ,
±60◦ ,±90◦ } are used as training samples. Test images are obtained from all available view
angles from session 2.
BioCOP multimodal database: This database [57] is one of the few databases that
allows disjoint training and testing of multimodal fusion at feature level. The BioCOP
database is collected under four disjoint years; 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2013. To make the
training-test splits mutually exclusive, the 294 subject that are common in years 2012 and
2013 are considered. The proposed algorithm is trained on 294 mutual subjects in year 2013
dataset, and is tested on the same subjects in year 2012 dataset. It is worth mentioning
that although the databases are labeled as 2012 and 2013, the date of data acquisition for
common subjects in the datasets can vary between one to three years, which has also the
advantage of investigating the effect of age-progression. We also consider the left and right
irises as a single class, which results in heterogeneous classes for the iris modality.
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Modality

{1,2}

{1,3}

{2,3}

{1,2,3}

SVM-Major

53.18

54.47

57.61

62.95

SVM-Sum

51.15

53.84

55.43

69.30

SMDL

71.65

74.14

70.27

81.30

JSRC

68.16

66.42

64.53

73.30

CNN-Major

92.18

93.75

89.74

95.87

CNN-Sum

91.58

93.28

89.13

94.51

Weighted feature fusion

94.12

94.96

91.53

96.59

Generalized compact bilinear

94.67

95.53

92.18

97.27

16

Table 2.3: Accuracy evaluation for different fusion settings for Multi-PIE database. 1, 2 and
3 represent frontal, right, and left views, respectively.
BIOMDATA multimodal database: This database [58] is a challenging database,
since many of the samples are damaged with blur, occlusion, sensor noise and shadows [4].
Following the setup in [4], six biometric modalities are considered: left and right irises, and
thumb and index fingerprints from both hands. The experiments are conducted on 219
subjects that have samples in all six modalities. For each modality, four randomly chosen
samples are used for the training and the remaining samples are used for the test set. For
any modality in which the number of the samples is less than five, one sample is used for the
test set and the remaining samples are used for the training. A summary of the databases
is presented in Table 2.2.
Training and test phases: For each databases, the number of samples per individual
and per modality varies. Therefore, for the training phase, for each individual 250 sets of
modalities are randomly chosen from the training set. Similarly 250 sets are chosen from test
set for the test phase. For Multi-Pie and BioCOP databases, each triplet includes one sample
from each modality. Similarly, for BIOMDATA database each set includes normalized left
and right irises, and enhanced left index, right index, left thumb and right thumb fingerprint
images. For Multi-Pie database the number of triplets in training and test phases is the
same and equal to 32, 250. The number of triplets in BioCOP database and sets of six
images in BIOMDATA database for training and test phase are equal to 73, 500 and 54, 750,
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respectively.
Data representation: The face images are cropped, aligned to a template [59, 60],
and resized to 224 × 224 images. Iris images are segmented, normalized using OSIRIS [61],
and transformed into 64 × 512 strips. Each fingerprint image is enhanced using the method
described in [62], The core point is detected from the enhanced image [63], and finally a
224 × 224 region centered by the core point is cropped.
Implementation: Initially, each modality-dedicated CNNs is trained independently,
and each CNN is optimized on a single modality. For each modality, the conventional VGG19
network is pre-trained on Imagenet [64]. Pre-training helps with additional training data
when the number of domain specific training data is limited. For the CNN-Face networks,
the network is fine-tuned on CASIA-Webface [65] and the corresponding database (BioCOP
2013 or CMU Multi-Pie databases). The preprocessing algorithm includes the channel-wise
mean subtraction on RGB values, where the channel means are calculated on the whole
training set. CNN-Iris networks are fine-tuned on CASIA-Iris-Thousand [66], Notre DameIRIS 04-05 [67], and finally the corresponding database (BioCOP-Iris 2013 or BIOMDATA
database). For the BioCOP database, the CNN-Fingerprint network is fine-tuned on the
BioCOP 2013 right index fingerprint database. For the BIOMDATA database, the networks
are fine-tuned on the corresponding fingerprint databases.
A two-step optimization algorithm is utilized to train the joint optimization of networks,
where initially the modality-dedicated networks’ weights are frozen and the joint representation layer is optimized greedily upon the extracted features by modality-dedicated networks.
Then, all modality-dedicated networks, fusion layer, and the classification layer are jointly
optimized.
Comparison of methods: To compare the results for the proposed algorithms, with the
state-of-the-art algorithms, Gabor features in five scales and eight orientations are extracted
from all modalities. For each face, iris, and fingerprint image, 31, 360, 36, 630, and 31, 360
features are extracted respectively. These features are used for all the algorithms except
CNN-Sum, CNN-Major, and two proposed algorithms. Table 2.2 presents the results for
the rank-one recognition rate for the databases. The performance of the proposed fusion
algorithms is compared with several state-of-the-art feature, score and decision level fusion
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algorithms. SVM-Sum and CNN-Sum use the probability outputs for the test sample of each
modality, added together to give the final score vector. SVM-Major and CNN-Major chose
the maximum number of modalities taken to be from the correct class. The feature level
fusion techniques include serial feature fusion [68], parallel feature fusion [69], CCA-based
feature fusion [70], JSRC [3], SMDL [5], and DCA/MDCA [4] methods. Tables 2.3 and 2.4
present the results for different fusion settings. For all the databases we have considered
d = 4096. For BIOMDATA database, due to the vast number of possible outer products,
the generalized compact bilinear method only includes single modalities and three compact
bilinear multiplications (two irises, two index fingers and two thumbs). The reported values
are the average values for five randomly generated training and test sets for the training and
test phases.

2.5

Conclusions

In this chapter, we proposed a joint CNN architecture with feature level fusion for multimodal
recognition using multiple modalities. We proposed to apply fusion at fully-connected layers
instead of convolutional layers to handle the possible spatial mismatch problem. This fusion
algorithm results in no loss in performance, while the number of parameters is reduced
significantly. We demonstrated that the multimodal fusion at the feature level and joint
optimization of multi-stream CNNs significantly improve unimodal representation accuracy
by incorporating the captured multiplicative interactions of the low-dimensional modalitydedicated feature representations, by means of generalized compact bilinear pooling.
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Modality

{1,2}

{1,3}

{2,3}

{1,2,3}

SVM-Major

79.22

89.27

80.47

90.32

Serial + PCA + KNN

71.12

86.28

75.69

76.18

Serial + LDA + KNN

80.12

91.28

79.69

82.18

Parallel + PCA + KNN

74.69

88.12

77.58

-

Parallel + LDA + KNN

82.53

93.21

82.56

-

CCA + PCA + KNN

87.21

95.27

86.44

95.33

CCA + LDA + KNN

89.12

95.41

86.11

95.58

DCA/MDCA + KNN

83.02

96.36

83.44

86.49

CNN-Sum

99.10

98.85

98.92

99.14

CNN-Major

98.51

97.70

98.31

99.03

Weighted feature fusion

99.18

99.03

99.12

99.25

Generalized compact bilinear

99.27

99.12

99.16

99.30

(a) BioCOP database: 1, 2, and 3 represent face, iris, and fingerprint, respectively.
Modality

2 irises

4 fingerprints

6 modalities

SVM-Major

78.12

88.34

93.31

SVM-Sum

81.23

94.13

96.85

Serial + PCA+ KNN

72.31

90.71

89.11

Serial + LDA+ KNN

79.82

92.62

92.81

Parallel + PCA+ KNN

76.45

-

-

Parallel + LDA+ KNN

83.17

-

-

CCA + PCA + KNN

88.47

94.72

94.81

CCA + LDA + KNN

90.96

94.13

95.12

JSRC

78.20

97.60

98.60

SMDL

83.77

97.56

99.10

DCA/MDCA + KNN

84.16

98.1

99.60

CNN-Sum

99.54

99.46

99.82

CNN-Major

99.31

99.42

99.48

Weighted feature fusion

99.73

99.65

99.86

Generalized compact bilinear

99.79

99.70

99.90

(b) BIOMDATA database.
Table 2.4: Accuracy evaluation for different fusion settings.
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Chapter 3
Multi-Level Feature Abstraction for
Multimodal Identification
3.1

Introduction

Feature representation in the biometric systems can be unimodal or multimodal, where the
unimodal schemes use a single biometric trait and the multimodal schemes combine the
features extracted from multiple biometric feature representations. Benefiting from fusion
of features, multimodal biometric models have demonstrated more robustness to noisy data,
non-universality and category-based variations [39,40]. However, one of the major challenges
in multimodal biometric systems is the fusion algorithm [44]. The fusion algorithm can be
performed at signal, feature, score, rank or decision levels [45,71,72], using different schemes
such as feature concatenation [46, 47] and bilinear feature multiplication [23, 48, 49].
Compared to score, rank, and decision level fusions, feature level fusion results in a
better discriminative classifier [50, 73], due to preservation of raw information [3]. The feature level fusion integrates different features extracted from different modalities into a more
abstract and compact feature representation, which can be further used for classification,
verification, or identification [4, 74]. Recently several authors have exploited feature level
fusion for multimodal biometric identification. Among them the serial feature fusion [68],
the parallel feature fusion [69], the CCA-based feature fusion [70], JSRC [3], SMDL [5], and
DCA/MDCA [4] are the most prominent techniques.
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3.2

Relaed Works

To integrate features from different modalities, several fusion methods have been considered
in the literature [75, 76]. One of the major challenges in multimodal fusion is managing the
large dimensionality of the fused feature representations, which highlights the importance of
the fusion algorithm. The prevalent fusion method in the literature is feature concatenation,
which is very inefficient as the feature space dimensionality increases [44, 47]. Also it does
not explore features at different levels of representation and abstraction. To overcome this
shortcoming, the weighted feature fusion and multi-level abstract feature representations
of individual modalities are proposed in this chapter. Using multi-level feature abstraction, feature descriptors at different feature resolutions and abstractions are considered in
the proposed classification algorithms. Our proposed fusion method also enforces the higher
level dependencies between the modalities through the joint optimization of modality-specific
CNNs and backpropagation algorithm. Similar fusion methods have outperformed the conventional feature fusion methods in applications such as multi-task learning [77] and gesture
recognition [78, 79].
Convolutional neural networks have been used as classifiers, but they are also efficient
tools to extract and represent discriminative features from the raw data at different levels of
abstraction. Compared to hand-crafted features, employing CNN as domain feature extractor demonstrated to be more promising when facing different modalities such as face [6–9],
iris [15] and fingerprint [18,19]. However, the effects of the fusion at different levels of feature
resolution and abstraction and joint optimization of the architecture are not investigated for
multimodal biometric identification.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions: (i) rather than fusing the networks
at the softmax layer, the optimally compressed feature representations of all modalities are
fused at the fully-connected layers without loss of any performance accuracy, but with a
significant reduction in the number of network parameters; (ii) instead of spatial fusion
at the convolutional layer, modality-dedicated layers are designed to represent the features
for later fusion; (iii) the fully data-driven architecture using fused CNNs, is optimized for
joint domain-specific feature extraction and representation with the application of person
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identification; (iv) in the proposed architecture all the CNNs, the joint representation, and
the classifier are jointly-optimized. Therefore, a jointly optimized multimodal representation
of all the modalities is constructed. In the previous multi-stream biometric state of the
art CNN architectures, the modality-dedicated networks are optimized separately, and the
classifier is independent of the modality-dedicated networks, finally (v) multi-level abstract
feature fusion for biometric person identification is studied.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first research effort to utilize multi-stream CNNs
for joint multimodal fusion person recognition, which deploys multiple abstraction levels of
modalities face, iris, and fingerprint.

3.3

Multi-level feature abstraction and fusion

Our proposed multimodal architecture consists of multiple CNN-based modality-dedicated
networks and a joint representation layer, which are jointly optimized. The modalitydedicated networks are trained to extract the modality specific features at different abstract
levels, and the joint representation is trained to explore and enforce dependency between
different modalities.
In the CNN architecture, each layer represents different abstract feature representation
of the input, where deeper levels provide more complex and abstract features. To benefit
from different resolutions and abstractions generated by feature maps at different layers of
each modality-dedicated CNN, we propose to utilize the information within the feature maps
at different layers in our classification algorithm. One generic example for this approach is
presented in Figure 3.1, where deep and shallow level feature maps are contributing in the
classification algorithm. In this example, function f maps the feature map space to a onedimensional feature vector. Then, the combination of the vectors extracted from different
levels of abstraction are considered for the classification task.
In this chapter, maxpooling followed by a fully-connected layer is considered as the
function f . Another example for the function f is globalpooling, where each feature map is
averaged to construct the representative feature vector. These mappings drastically reduce
the number of parameters in the model. In this chapter, we focus on the first example where
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Figure 3.1: Our general scheme for the multi-level feature abstraction from a modalitydedicated network, where f maps the feature space to the one-dimensional feature vector.
Therefore, the modality-dedicated network is represented by the modality-dedicated embedding layers.
the feature space is mapped to a feature vector through maxpooling and one fully-connected
layer, as presented in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2.
In the proposed multi-stream CNN, different levels of abstraction from each modality
contribute to the decision making algorithm. Table 3.3 (b) presents one example for multistream multimodal CNN architecture, where each modality is represented in the decision
making algorithm by both its deep and shallow feature maps.

3.4

Modality-dedicated networks

Each modality-dedicated CNN consists of the first 16 convolutional layers of VGG19 [55]
and a fully-connected dimensionality reduction layer (FC6) of size 1024. The conventional
VGG19 networks are not practical for this application, since the joint optimization of all the
modality-dedicated networks and the joint representation is practically impossible, as the
result of massive number of parameters that are needed to be trained. Limitations in the
number of training samples, along with large feature dimensionality, result in different training phase complexities which require solutions such as Bayesian controlled sampling [80],
imposing common structural assumptions on features [81], and few-shot domain adaptation [82]. In the proposed framework, due to the limited number of training samples, it is
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network
input
layer
conv1 (1-2)
maxpool1

CNN-Face

224 × 224 × 3 64 × 512 × 3

kernel

3 × 3 × 64

3 × 3 × 64

3 × 3 × 64

2 ×2

2×2

2×2

3 × 3 × 128

3 × 3 × 128

2×2

2×2

3 × 3 × 256

3 × 3 × 256

2×2

2×2

3 × 3 × 512

3 × 3 × 512

2×2

2×2

3 × 3 × 512

3 × 3 × 512

2×2

2×2

2×2
2×2

conv4 (1-4) 3 × 3 × 512
maxpool4

2×2

conv5 (1-4) 3 × 3 × 512
maxpool5
FC6

224 × 224 × 3

kernel

conv3 (1-4) 3 × 3 × 256
maxpool3

CNN-Fingerprint

kernel

conv2 (1-2) 3 × 3 × 128
maxpool2

CNN-Iris

2×2

7 × 7 × 1024 2 × 16 × 1024

7 × 7 × 1024

Table 3.1: The modality-dedicated CNN architectures. Notation conv3 (1-4) represents all
four convolutional layers conv3-1,..., conv3-4, where each of these layers includes 256 kernels
of size 3 × 3.
not applicable to train a vast number of weights in the last layer of the architecture. Therefore, the number of kernels in the fully connected layer (FC6), compared to the conventional
VGG19, is decreased to 1024. The details for each modality-dedicated network can be found
in Table 3.1.

3.5

Fusion algorithms

In this section, we investigate the fusion of multi-stream CNN architectures. The main goal
for the fusion layer is to train the multimodal CNNs such that the ultimate joint feature
representation outperforms single modality representations. A recognition algorithm using
a multimodal architecture requires selecting the discriminative and informative features at
different levels from each modality, as well as exploring the dependencies between different
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modalities. In addition, the joint optimization should discard the redundant single modality
features that are not useful in the joint recognition.
Fusion can be performed on the feature maps of the CNNs, when the feature maps, corresponding to different modalities have the same spatial dimensions. However, in multimodal
architectures, the feature level representations can vary in the spatial dimension, due to different inputs’ spatial dimensionality. To handle this issue, instead of utilizing feature map
layers for fusion, fully-connected layers constructed from different CNN feature maps are
used in our architecture for ultimate modality-dedicated feature representation. Prior to the
fusion, each modality is represented by either the output of its last fully-connected layer, or
from multiple CNN layers representing abstract levels. We call these fully connected layers
the modality-dedicated embedding layers. We demonstrate that the fully-connected representation provides promising results in the case of recognition application. A generic scheme
for modality-dedicated embedding layers for a modality-dedicated CNN can be found in Figure 3.2, where deep and shallow level feature maps are represented by modality-dedicated
embedding layers.

3.5.1

Weighted feature fusion

In this fusion algorithm, the joint layer is built upon the weighted fusion of the last modalitydedicated embedding layers of the modality-dedicated CNNs. The number of features in
this layer is equal to the sum of the number of the output features in the last modalitydedicated embedding layers of the modality-dedicated networks. For instance, for BioCOP
database [57] which consists of three modalities, the three modality dedicated embedding
layers (FC6 layers in Table 3.1) build a layer of size 3072. Then they are fused together
using a fully-connected layer of size 1024. The output of this fusion layer is fed to the
fully-connected classification layer of size 294, as shown in Table 3.3 (a), while no non-linear
activation is performed at classification layer. Softmax function is utilized to normalize the
outputs of this layer. By training the whole architecture jointly, the first order dependency
is enforced between the modalities through backpropagation.
The BIOMDATA database [58], used in our experiments, consists of four fingerprint and
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network

CNN-Face

CNN-Iris

input(pool3) 28 × 28 × 256 8 × 64 × 256

CNN-Fingerprint
28 × 28 × 256

layer

kernel

kernel

kernel

pool3x

4×4

4×4

4×4

FC3

7 × 7 × 1024 2 × 16 × 1024

7 × 7 × 1024

Table 3.2: Additional layers added to each modality-dedicated network for multi-level feature
abstraction fusion.
two iris modalities. Considering the nature of this database, we propose to use a bi-level
weighted feature fusion. In this fusion algorithm, the four fingerprint modalities are fused
together using a fully-connected layer of size 1024. Similarly, the two iris modalities are fused
together using a fully-connected layer of size 1024. The outputs of these two fully-connected
layers are fused using the classification layer of size 219 as presented in Table 3.3 (c).

3.5.2

Multi-level feature abstraction and fusion

To benefit from the different resolutions generated by different layers of the modalitydedicated CNN, the pool3 layer is down-sampled using maxpool of size 4 × 4. Then, a
fully-connected layer of size 1024 is considered to represent the shallow level feature maps.
This modality-dedicated embedding layer, along with the last layer of the original modalitydedicated network (FC6), are employed as the modality-dedicated embedding layers for the
classification task, as presented in Table 3.3 (b) and (d). The details for the four architectures
considered in this chapter are presented in Table 3.3.

3.6

Experimental setup

To evaluate the performance of the proposed fusion multimodal architectures, two challenging
multimodal biometric databases are considered:
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Input

Input

FC6m1 , FC6m2 , FC6m3

fusion layer

1024

classification layer

294

FC3m1 , FC3m2 , FC3m3 ,
FC6m1 , FC6m2 , FC6m3

softmax

fusion layer

1024

classification layer

294
softmax

(a) Weighted feature fusion for BioCOP
database

(b)

Multi-abstract

fusion

for

BioCOP

database
Input

FC6n1 , FC6n2 ,

FC6n5 , FC6n6

FC6n3 , FC6n4
fusion layers

1024

classification layer

1024
219

softmax

(c) Bi-level weighted feature fusion for BIOMDATA database
Input

FC3n1 , FC3n2 , FC3n3 ,

FC3n5 , FC3n6 ,

FC3n4 , FC3n1 , FC6n2 ,

FC6n5 , FC6n6

FC6n2 , FC6n3 , FC6n4
fusion layers

1024

classification layer

1024
219

softmax

(d) Bi-level multi-abstract fusion for BIOMDATA database
Table 3.3: Joint representation architectures and modality-dedicated embedding layers for
BioCOP (a and b) and BIOMDATA (c and d) databases. m1 , m2 , and m3 represent three
BioCOP database modalities. n1 , n2 , n3 , and n4 represent four fingerprint modalities, and
n5 and n6 represent two iris modalities for BIOMDATA database.

3.6.1

Datasets

BioCOP multimodal database: The proposed algorithm is evaluated on BioCOP database [57].
This database is one of the few databases that allows disjoint training and testing of multimodal fusion at feature level. The BioCOP dataset is collected under four disjoint years;
2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013. Each label consists of different biometric modalities for each subject; face, iris, fingerprint, palm print, hand geometry, voice and soft biometrics. To evaluate
the performance of the proposed architectures, the following three biometric modalities are
considered in this experiment: face, iris, and right index fingerprint.
Under each label, the biometrics are acquired during either one or two separate sessions.
The 2012 and 2013 databases contain 1,200 and 1,077 subjects, respectively. To make the
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Figure 3.2: Our modality-dedicated network is a CNN which consists of the first 16 layers
of a VGG19 network and fully connected layers of size 1024. In our fusion algorithm, only
pool3x and FC3 of size 1024 are considered for the proposed multi-abstract architecture.
training-test splits mutually exclusive, the 294 subjects that are common in labels 2012 and
2013 are considered. The proposed algorithms are trained on 294 mutual subjects in year
2013 dataset, and are tested on the same subjects in year 2012 dataset. It worths mentioning
that although the databases are labeled as 2012 and 2013, the date of data acquisition for
common subjects in the datasets can vary between one to three years, which also adds the
advantage of investigating the age-progression effect. We have also considered the left and
right irises as a single class, which results in heterogeneous classes for the iris modality.
In both 2012 and 2013 databases, for each individual, the number of samples per modality
may vary. Therefore, in each database, for each individual, 250 triplet of modalities are
randomly chosen. Each triplet includes preprocessed face, iris, and right index fingerprint
images. The number of image triplets in both training and test sets is the same, and equal
to 73, 500.
BIOMDATA multimodal database: BIOMDATA database [58] is a challenging
database, since many of the image samples are damaged with blur, occlusion, sensor noise
and shadows [4]. This database is a collection of biometric modalities: iris, face, voice, fingerprint, hand geometry, and palm print, from subjects of different ethnicity, gender, and age.
Due to privacy issues, face data is not available in combination with other modalities. To
evaluate the performance of the proposed architectures, the following six biometric modali-

BIOMDATA

BioCOP
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Train set

Test set

Face

6833

6960

Iris

36636

39725

Fingerprint

1822

991

Left iris

874

584

Right iris

871

581

Left thumb

875

644

Left index

872

632

Right thumb

871

647

Right Index

870

624

Table 3.4: The size of the training and test sets for each modality in BioCOP and BIOMDATA databases.
ties are considered in this experiment: left and right iris, and thumb and index fingerprints
from both hands.
The experiments are conducted on 219 subjects that have samples in all six modalities.
For each modality, four randomly chosen samples are considered for the training phase and
the remaining samples are considered for the test phase. For any modality in which the
number of the samples is less than five, one sample is considered for the test phase and the
remaining samples are considered for training. The summary of the considered databases
is presented in Table 3.4. For both the training and test sets, for each individual, 250 set
of samples are randomly chosen, where each set includes normalized left and right irises,
and enhanced left index, right index, left thumb and right thumb fingerprint images. The
number of samples in both training and test sets is the same, and equal to 54, 750.

3.6.2

Preprocessing

For the face modality, the frontal images are considered. The face images are cropped,
aligned to a template [60], and resized to 224 × 224 images. Fingerprint images are enhanced
using the method described in [62]. The core point is detected from the enhanced images [63].
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Finally, the 224 × 224 region centered by the core point is cropped.
Iris images are segmented and normalized using OSIRIS [61]. Although OSIRIS software
does not mask eyelids and eyelashes, the segmented images do not contain much occlusion
due to eyelids [83]. OSIRIS algorithm finds the iris inner and outer contours. This two
contours are used to transform the iris area into a 64 × 512 strip.

3.7

Joint optimization of networks

In this section, the training of the multimodal CNN architecture is discussed. Here, we explain the implementation of each modality-dedicated network, the joint fusion representation
layer, and the concurrent optimization of the multimodal CNNs and the fusion layer. The
fusion layer can be either the weighted fusion layer or multi-abstract fusion layer.

3.7.1

Modality-dedicated networks

Initially, the modality-dedicated CNNs are trained independently and each CNN is optimized
for a single modality. As explained in section 3.4, each of these CNN networks consists of
the first 16 convolutional layers of VGG19 network with an added fully-connected feature
reduction FC6 layer of size 1024. The extra layer is dedicated to make the feature level fusion
tractable. For each modality, the conventional VGG19 network is trained as explained below.
For all the modalities, the networks are initialized by VGG19 pre-trained on Imagenet [64].
CNN-Face: To optimize the weights for extracting the face features, the pre-trained
network is fine-tuned on the CASIA-Webface [65] and the BioCOP [57] face 2013. The
network is then trained on 294 subjects in the dataset 2013 that are also present in the 2012
dataset. Finally, previously trained weights for the first 16 layers of the network, along with
FC6 layer of size 1024 and the softmax layer, are fine-tuned on the 294 subjects in 2013
dataset.
The face image inputs are 224 × 224 RGB images. The preprocessing algorithm consists
of the channel-wise mean subtraction on RGB values, where channel means are calculated on
the whole training set. The training algorithm is deployed by minimizing the softmax crossentropy loss using mini-batch stochastic gradient descent with momentum. The training is
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regularized by weight decay and 50% dropout for the fully-connected layers except for the
last layer. The batch size, momentum and L2 penalty multiplier are set to 32, 0.9, and
0.0005, respectively. The initial learning rate is set to 0.1. The learning rate is decreased
exponentially by a factor of 0.1 for every 2 epochs of training. In this network, batch
normalization [84] is applied. The moving average decay is set to 0.99.
CNN-Iris: Similar to the face network, the training is performed over the Imagenet pretrained VGG19. To specify the kernels to extract the iris-specific features, the pre-trained
network is finetuned on the CASIA-Iris-Thousand [66] and Notre Dame-IRIS 04-05 [67].
For the BioCOP [57] database, the network is then tuned on BioCOP iris 2013. The
network is then fine-tuned on 294 subjects in the dataset 2013 which are also present in the
2012 dataset. After dropping the last two layers of VGG19 and adding FC6 and the softmax
layers, the network is once again trained on these 294 subjects in 2013 dataset. The iris
image inputs are 64 × 512 grayscale images. The optimization parameters are the same as
face architecture. In this network, batch normalization is also applied. The moving average
decay is set to 0.9. The learning rate decrease exponentially by a factor of 0.1 every 5 epochs.
For the BIOMDATA database [58], for each of the two modalities, the pre-tuned network
is tuned on all subjects that have samples in that modality, and then, on 219 subjects that
have samples in all six modalities. Since the number of samples in this dataset is much
smaller than the number of samples in BioCOP database, the learning rate decay is set
to 0.99. Similar to CNN-Face, each tuned networks is fine-tuned after dropping the fully
connected layers and adding FC6.
CNN-Fingerprint: Fingerprint networks are initiated with Imagenet pre-trained VGG19
weights. For BioCOP database, it is then trained on BioCOP 2013 fingerprint dataset. Then,
the network is fine-tuned on 294 subjects in the dataset 2013 which are also present in the
2012 dataset. For the BIOMDATA database, for each of the four modalities, the pre-tuned
network is tuned on all subjects that have samples in that modality, and then, on 219 subjects that have samples in all six modalities. The inputs are 224 × 224 grayscale images.
The optimization parameters are the same as CNN-Face architecture. The learning rate
decreases exponentially by a factor of 0.1 every 10 epochs.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.3: CMC curves for (a) BioCOP, and (b) BIOMDATA databases.

3.7.2

Joint optimization of networks

Initially, to train the joint representation, the modality-dedicated networks’ weights are
frozen, and the joint representation layer is optimized greedily upon the extracted features
from the modality-dedicated networks. The optimization parameters are the same as the
CNN-Fingerprint network. Finally all the networks are jointly optimized. Here, the batch
size is further reduced, and the initial learning rate is reduced to the the smallest final learning
rate among modality-dedicated networks. In all the mentioned steps, Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) activation function is utilized for all the layers except the classification layer.

3.7.3

Hyperparameter optimization

The hyperparameters in our experiments are : λ the regularization parameter, α0 initial
learning rate, n number of epochs per decay for the learning rate, d moving average decay,
and the m as the momentum. For each optimization, the five-fold cross-validation method
is considered to estimate the best hyperparameters.
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Right index

NBIS

CNN w/o

CNN

95.67

96.08

97.28

Table 3.5: Rank-one recognition rate for BioCOP database utilizing NBIS software, CNN
without data augmentation and CNN with data augmentation.

3.8
3.8.1

Experiments and discussions
Evaluation metrics

The performance of different experiments are reported and compared using two classification
metrics: classification accuracy and Recall@K. The classification accuracy is the fraction of
correctly classified samples regarding their classes. The Recall@K metric is the probability
that a subject class is correctly classified at least at rank-k, while the candidate classes are
sorted by their similarity score to the query samples. The calculation of Recall@K is done
per class, and is averaged over all available classes.
The reported values are the average values for five randomly generated training and test
sets. As explained in section 3.6. A, training and test sets consist of 73, 500 triplet images
for BioCOP database and 54, 750 sets of six images for BIOMDATA database.

3.8.2

Data augmentation

For both databases, data augmentation is performed on the fingerprint images. 20 augmented
samples of each fingerprint image is generated by translating the core point both vertically
and horizontally using Gaussian distribution. For each fingerprint image, ten augmented
images are generated using Gaussian distribution with parameters µ = 0 and σ = 2.5. The
remaining ten augmented images are generated with µ = 0 and σ = 5 being considered.
In Table 3.5 studies the effect of data augmentation on the rank-one recognition rate for
the modality-dedicated CNN-Fingerprint for BioCOP database. This table also includes the
recognition rate for NBIS software [85].

BIOMDATA

BioCOP
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KNN

SVM

CNN

Face

89.68

88.76

98.14

Iris

70.52

79.26

99.05

Right index

91.22

90.61

97.28

Left iris

66.61

71.92

99.35

Right iris

64.89

71.08

98.95

Left thumb

61.23

63.96

80.15

Left index

82.91

84.70

93.43

Right thumb

62.11

63.52

82.63

Right Index

82.05

84.46

93.12

Table 3.6: Rank-one recognition rate for single modalities.

3.8.3

Results

To compare the results for the proposed algorithms with the state-of-the-art algorithms,
Gabor features in five scales and eight orientations are extracted from all modalities. For
the face images, 31, 360 features are extracted from 224 × 224 aligned images. While, for the
iris images, 36, 630 features are extracted from 64 × 512 segmented and normalized image.
In the case of fingerprint images, 31, 360 features are extracted from the enhanced 224 × 224
images, as described in Section 3.6.2, around the core point. These features are used for all
the state-of-the-art algorithms except CNN-Sum, CNN-Major, and two proposed algorithms.
Table 3.6 presents single modality rank-one recognition rate for both the databases. In
this table the Gabor features are used for SVM and KNN algorithms. The performance of the
proposed weighted feature level fusion and multi-abstract fusion algorithms are compared
with that of several state-of-the-art feature, score and decision level fusion algorithms in
Tables 3.7 and 3.8. SVM-Sum and CNN-Sum use the probability outputs for the test sample
of each modality, added together to produce the final score vector. SVM-Major and CNNMajor chose the maximum number of modalities taken to be from the correct class.
The feature level fusion techniques include the serial feature fusion [68], the parallel feature fusion [69], the CCA-based feature fusion [70], JSRC [3], SMDL [5] and DCA/MDCA [4]
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Modality

{1,2}

{1,3}

{2,3}

{1,2,3}

SVM-Major

79.22

89.27

80.47

90.32

Serial + PCA + KNN

71.12

86.28

75.69

76.18

Serial + LDA + KNN

80.12

91.28

79.69

82.18

Parallel + PCA + KNN

74.69

88.12

77.58

-

Parallel + LDA + KNN

82.53

93.21

82.56

-

CCA + PCA + KNN

87.21

95.27

86.44

95.33

CCA + LDA + KNN

89.12

95.41

86.11

95.58

DCA/MDCA + KNN

83.02

96.36

83.44

86.49

CNN-Sum

99.10

98.85

98.92

99.14

CNN-Major

98.51

97.70

98.31

99.03

Weighted feature fusion

99.18

99.03

99.12

99.25

Multi-abstract fusion

99.31

99.16

99.20

99.34

Table 3.7: Rank-one accuracy evaluation on BioCOP database, for different fusion settings.
1, 2, and 3 represent face, iris, and fingerprint, respectively.
algorithms. Note that in case of more than two modalities, the parallel feature fusion method
cannot be applied. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the results for BioCOP and BIOMDATA
databases, respectively. As presented in this table, both fusion algorithms outperform singlemodality and two-modality architectures for BioCOP database. Similarly, both the fusion
algorithms outperform single-modality, two irises, and four fingerprints architectures. The
proposed algorithms excel the score-level and the decision-level fusion algorithms for the
independently-optimized CNNs as well.
Figure 3.3 presents Cumulative Match Curves (CMCs) for both databases. Figure 3.3 (a)
compares Recall@K for two and three modality weighted feature fusion algorithms with the
three modality multi-abstract feature fusion algorithm. Similarly, Figure 3.3 (b) compares
three weighted feature fusion scenarios (two irises, four fingerprints, and all six modalities) with the six modality multi-abstract feature fusion algorithm. For both the studied
databases, the multi-abstract fusion algorithm excels the weighted fusion algorithm both in
terms of rank-one recognition rate and CMC curve.
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Modality

2 irises

4 fingerprints

6 modalities

SVM-Major

78.12

88.34

93.31

SVM-Sum

81.23

94.13

96.85

Serial + PCA+ KNN

72.31

90.71

89.11

Serial + LDA+ KNN

79.82

92.62

92.81

Parallel + PCA+ KNN

76.45

-

-

Parallel + LDA+ KNN

83.17

-

-

CCA + PCA + KNN

88.47

94.72

94.81

CCA + LDA + KNN

90.96

94.13

95.12

JSRC

78.20

97.60

98.60

SMDL

83.77

97.56

99.10

DCA/MDCA + KNN

84.16

98.1

99.60

CNN-Sum

99.54

99.46

99.82

CNN-Major

99.31

99.42

99.48

Weighted feature fusion

99.73

99.65

99.86

Multi-abstract fusion

99.81

99.72

99.91

Table 3.8: Rank-one accuracy evaluation on BIOMDATA database, for different fusion settings.

3.9

Conclusions

In this chapter, we proposed a joint CNN architecture with feature level fusion for multimodal recognition using multiple modalities of face, iris, and fingerprint. We proposed a
multi-abstract network to handle the spatial mismatch problem and yet having no loss in
performance with significant reduction in network parameters. We demonstrated that the
proposed multi-stream CNNs with multimodal fusion at different feature level abstraction
and jointly optimization of modality-dedicated networks, joint representation, and classifier,
significantly improve unimodal representation accuracy by incorporating the captured multiplicative interactions of the low-dimensional modality-dedicated feature representations.
Two fusion methods at the fully-connected layer are studied, and it is concluded that the
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multi-abstract fusion outperforms the weighted feature fusion algorithm.

38

Chapter 4
Quality-Aware Multimodal
Recognition
4.1

Introduction

Biometrics research explores the possibility of automatically recognizing individuals based
on their unique physical or behavioral traits such as face, fingerprint, voice, iris, or handwriting, which are referred to as biometric modalities. The uniqueness of the biometric features
extracted from these traits, have allowed unimodal biometric systems to be widely used for
identification and verification applications in a wide variety of scenarios [3, 3–5, 86]. Beyond unimodal systems, a major merit of multimodal biometric recognition is its robustness
to noisy data, non-universality, and category-based variations. Indeed, fusing multiple instances of biometric information lowers recognition error rates for low-quality and unreliable
biometric samples, such as latent fingerprints, face images captured at a distance, and lowresolution iris images [39,40,87]. Hence, we argue that the multimodal framework should be
able to leverage the quality information of the input samples to incorporate all identification
information within these samples while discarding the distorted information in low-quality
samples that may negatively affect the identification.
The most commonly deployed feature fusion methods for multimodal frameworks presented in the literature are feature concatenation [44,47], bilinear multiplication [48,49], and
compact bilinear pooling [51–53]. However, these methods treat all samples equally, and do
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Figure 4.1: A multimodal biometric sample set consists of samples from different modalities
and varying quality. The quality-aware multimodal network, which consists of two fusion
blocks, represents the sample set as a multimodal representation. The intra-modality and
inter-modality qualities are estimated in a weakly-supervised fashion by minimizing the multimodal separability training loss, while the multimodal network compactness loss regularizes
the network to provide better generalization.
not take their reliability and usefulness into account. A multimodal recognition algorithm
requires selecting the discriminative and informative features from each sample, as well as exploring the dependencies between features extracted from different samples in a multimodal
sample set. This framework should also determine the priority of features according to their
usefulness and reliability for the recognition task. In addition, the information provided by
different samples in a multimodal biometric sample set may or may not be independent. For
instance, consider the case where the multimodal biometric recognition framework has access
to videos captured by a surveillance camera and fingerprints collected using a sensor. In this
situation, face images captured with pose variations are correlated, while the face images and
fingerprint samples are independent. Therefore, compared to other recognition frameworks,
information fusion for multimodal biometric systems has remained a challenging task.
A biometric sample is of good quality if it is suitable for automated matching. This
quality can be quantified as a measure of how properly the biometric sample can be processed
within the matching algorithm, including feature extraction and accurate recognition with
a high confidence score [87]. For a multimodal sample set consisting of different modalities
and a varying number of samples from each modality, the recognition framework should
investigate both intra-modality and inter-modality information fusion. The intra-modality
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and inter-modality usefulness can be interpreted as the intra-modality quality of the samples
and the inter-modality quality of different modalities, respectively.
Recent multi-sample recognition frameworks [88–91] aim to solve this problem when
all samples in the multimodal sample set are of the same modality. However, multimodal
multi-sample recognition requires the consideration of independent samples in the set, where
samples represent different modalities. Our proposed framework seeks to formalize a learning
framework that automatically identifies the usefulness of the samples in a multimodal sample
set through the loss defined by the underlying recognition task, where this usefulness is due to
the intra-modality and inter-modality quality of the samples. This quality-aware framework
aims to improve the representation of a multimodal sample set in the embedding space by
estimating the quality of each of its samples in a weakly-supervised fashion.
As presented in Fig. 4.1, our framework employs two weakly-supervised quality-aware
fusion blocks. This framework represents each sample in the multimodal sample set with a
feature vector and an intra-modality quality score. The feature vectors and quality scores
associated with samples from each modality are utilized to construct a unimodal feature representation for each modality, while the inter-modality quality scores are utilized for credit
assignment among the unimodal feature vectors in the fusion of the modalities. No quality
scores are explicitly provided to the framework, and quality estimation allows different features from different samples to dynamically come to the forefront as needed by re-weighting
the features when constructing the multimodal embedding space [92].
Our proposed multimodal recognition model includes two quality-aware fusion blocks
for adaptive feature-level re-weighting [88, 89]. We jointly train these quality-aware fusion
blocks through minimizing multimodal separability loss and multimodal network compactness losses. The first loss imposes an equi-distributed multimodal embedding in which the
inter-class distance of multimodal representations is maximized and the intra-class variance
is minimized. In addition, this loss function considers other constraints on the unimodal
embeddings, linking them to the multimodal embedding. Our trained multimodal network
is utilized during the test phase to incorporate the usefulness of each sample for the recognition task. Therefore, we propose multimodal network compactness loss to improves the
generalization capability of the network by minimizing the hyperspherical energy for the

Sobhan Soleymani

Chapter 4. Quality-Aware Multimodal Recognition

41

layers of the network.
In the experimental setup, we focus on three multimodal recognition scenarios. In the
first scenario, which can represent a traditional biometric framework, each modality in the
multimodal sample set consists of a single sample. Here, the first quality-aware fusion block
acts as a feature extraction block while the second one aims to satisfy the recognition task
by learning the inter-modality quality of each modality. This scenario enables us to analyze
the performance of the second fusion block. The second recognition scenario characterizes a
Next Generation Identification (NGI) framework. Multi-biometric capture systems used for
criminal booking, as is done within the FBI’s NGI framework [93]. Due to variations in sensor
type, training level of the booking officer, and overall human error, the biometric samples
collected during booking and subsequently entered into an Electronic Biometric Transmission
Specification (EBTS) can vary wildly in quality. In this scenario, for each subject a set of
low-quality face images and varying number of latent fingerprints are considered for the
identification. This scenario mainly provides the possibility of studying the performance of
the intra-modality fusion block. The third scenario, which can model a access control security
system, is focused on representing a set of samples per modality with a single embedding
space representation while the first fusion block considers the quality of each sample. Then,
the second block aggregates the representations corresponding to different modalities through
their inter-modality quality in the recognition task. This setup allows a more comprehensive
evaluation of the joint performance of the two quality-aware fusion blocks.
The contributions of this chapter in the field of multimodal biometrics are as follows:
• We propose a quality-aware fusion framework for multimodal biometrics applications
which is optimized through learning in a weakly-supervised fashion without direct
supervision of the quality of the samples or modalities.
• We formalize the multi-sample multimodal recognition problem by learning two consecutive embeddings dedicated to extract discriminative features by exploiting the intraand inter-modality information.
• An end-to-end training framework is proposed consisting of two novel loss functions
for training the quality-aware fusion blocks.
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• Three specific multi-sample multimodal person recognition scenarios are designed to
carefully evaluate the performance of the proposed framework.

4.2
4.2.1

Ralated Works
Feature extraction and fusion

Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are efficient tools that can be employed to extract
and represent discriminative features from raw data. Compared to hand-crafted features,
the use of CNNs as domain feature extractors has been demonstrated to be more promising
when facing different biometric modalities such as face [23], iris [15], and fingerprint [18].
One of the major challenges in multimodal fusion is managing the large dimensionality of
the fused feature representations, which highlights the importance of the fusion algorithm.
In comparison to score- [94, 95], rank- [45, 96, 97], and decision-level [98–100] fusion schemes,
feature-level fusion results in a better discriminative classifier [50, 73, 101] due to preservation of raw information [3]. Feature-level fusion integrates different features extracted from
different modalities into a more abstract and compact feature representation, which can
be further used for verification or identification [4, 74]. Several frameworks have exploited
feature-level fusion for multimodal biometric identification. Among them, serial feature fusion [68], parallel feature fusion [69], Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA)-based feature
fusion [70], Joint Sparse Representation Classifier (JSRC) [3], Supervised Multimodal Dictionary Learning (SMDL) [5], and Multiset Discriminant Correlation Analysis (MDCA) [4]
are the most prominent techniques.
The prevalent feature fusion method in the deep learning literature is feature concatenation, which becomes very inefficient as the dimensionality of the feature space increases [22, 44, 46, 47]. Bilinear feature multiplication [48, 49] is effective since all elements
of different modalities interact with each other through multiplication. The main issue in
bilinear operation is the high dimensionality of its output regarding the cardinality of the
inputs. Recently, to overcome this shortcoming, compact bilinear pooling has been proposed [23, 51–53]. This pooling algorithm mimics results close to bilinear pooling while the
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dimensionality of the embedding space is relatively small.

4.2.2

Multi-sample recognition

Multi-sample recognition has been recently utilized in recognition frameworks. The authors
in [89] have considered a neural aggregation network, in which a set of face images is represented by a vector in the embedding space. In their proposed framework, a CNN block
maps each face image into a feature vector in the embedding space. Their aggregation module consists of two blocks. These blocks adaptively aggregate the feature vectors and form
a single fixed-sized feature vector to represent a set of face images. Their framework is
trained with a classification loss function without direct supervision. They concluded that
their proposed framework can learn to differentiate between high-quality and low-quality
face images in a set of images by solely minimizing this loss function. The authors in [88]
have considered the problem where a set of face images are aggregated to be presented by a
vector in the embedding space. Their proposed network consists of two branches. The first
branch constructs a feature vector in the embedding space for each image sample, while the
second branch computes the quality score for each image sample. Finally, all of the feature
vectors and quality scores in one set are aggregated through the loss function to construct
the feature vector in the embedding space and represent the set of face images.

4.2.3

Quality-aware fusion

The quality of a biometric sample is defined as its suitability for feature extraction, correct
recognition, and automated matching with a high confidence score [87]. Multimodal qualitybased fusion frameworks give higher weights to the more reliable modalities. On the other
hand, fusion algorithms which do not consider the quality of modality samples provide a
fixed weighting scheme. Therefore, these frameworks do not present the optimal decision
when sample quality varies. The quality-based fusion frameworks should receive an effective
set of quality measures. These frameworks should also present an effective fusion mechanism
to consider these quality scores from all samples and make an optimal decision [102].
One of the very first works considering the quality of the samples in biometric fusion
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is presented in [103]. In this work, the authors have manually deployed quality measures
generated by human experts. The authors in [104] have proposed a framework to minimize
cross-device matching performance degradation by device-specific quality-dependent score
normalization. In this framework, each device score is normalized independently. To fuse
the outputs of different devices, these scores are combined using a naive Bayes approach. A
user-quality-based fusion of biometric modalities is proposed in [105]. This work quantifies
the quality of biometric data by using user templates to incorporate the quality of the sensor
data in order to generate a more reliable estimate on the matching scores, while a score-level
fusion of the matching scores in the multimodal setting is considered.
A unified framework for quality-based fusion from a Bayesian perspective is proposed
in [102]. In this work, the authors have investigated feature-based and cluster-based fusion
algorithms for their quality-based framework. The authors in QFuse [106] present an adaptive context switching algorithm coupled with online learning to address uncontrolled noisy
conditions and scalability. A probabilistic logic to explicitly take uncertainty and trust into
consideration is proposed in [107]. The authors in [108] have proposed a dynamic weighted
sum fusion quality metric while combining unimodal scores. This work proposes a single
quality metric for each gallery-probe comparison, instead of incorporating the quality of the
gallery and probe images separately. The context weighted majority algorithm presented
in [109] introduced score-level and decision-level context-aware biometric fusion methods to
consider the context in which biometric inputs are acquired.
In contrast to the works mentioned in this section, the framework proposed here provides a multi-sample multimodal framework which benefits from quality-aware fusion. Our
framework provides a unimodal representation for each modality considering intra-modality
quality of the samples in that modality and aggregates these representations using their
inter-modality quality. The proposed framework is trained in a weakly-supervised fashion
by minimizing the proposed multimodal separability loss to uniformly spread the centers of
class representations in the embedding space. The proposed multimodal network compactness loss regularizes the multimodal network by minimizing the hyperspherical energy for
different layers of the network. The performance of the proposed framework is compared
with several state-of-the-art methods mentioned in this section.

Sobhan Soleymani

4.3

Chapter 4. Quality-Aware Multimodal Recognition

45

Quality-Aware Multimodal Network

Here, we describe our methodology to provide a framework for multi-sample multimodal
recognition for inputs consisting of different modalities with different quality and varying
number of samples per modality. We first describe the proposed quality-aware fusion in
Section 4.3.2. This fusion framework consists of two quality-aware fusion blocks. Then, as
discussed in Section 4.3.3, we present our training criteria consisting of two loss functions.
The multimodal separability loss aims to construct an embedding which provides separability of the representations by uniformly distributing the multimodal class centers in the
embedding space. Due to over-parametrization, the multimodal networks suffer from a lack
of generalization on unseen samples. Hence, we propose a second loss function as multimodal
network compactness loss to improve the generalization of the framework by minimizing the
hyperspherical energy for different layers of the network. The two proposed loss functions
are customized for the multimodal multi-sample settings. In Section 5.6, we study the effect
of these loss functions on the performance of the proposed framework.

4.3.1

Notations

The following notations are used throughout this chapter:
• Multimodal sample set, X, consists of one or a set of a varying number of samples
from each modality.
• We consider K modalities, N training samples, and M training classes in the proposed
framework.
• Xk represents the set of samples from the k th modality in multimodal sample set X.
• Xki represents one sample from modality k in multimodal sample set X.
• L represents the number of layers in the architecture and Nj represents the number of
kernels in the j th layer.
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Figure 4.2: Fusionak consists of a multi-task CNN block, qNetak , and intra-modality aggregation to deliver a unimodal embedding space representation.
• For simplicity, in this section, we use the notation k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, for the different
modalities. However, in the next section, we replace them with the actual modality
names.

4.3.2

Quality-aware fusion mechanism

We denote each multimodal sample set by X = {Xk }K
k=1 , which consists of samples from K
modalities, and Xk represents samples from the k th modality. Our quality-aware framework
consists of two fusion blocks. The first quality-aware block converts each Xk to a unimodal
representation, Yk , while considering the quality of each sample in Xk . This fusion block
is applied on the samples from each modality and extracts the features that are the best
representation of the corresponding modality: Yk = Fusionak (Xk ). The second quality-aware
fusion block constructs the multimodal embedding space representation, Z, from the unimodal representations of modalities, Yk , k = 1, 2, ..., K, considering the quality of information
across the modalities. This block determines the relative credit assignment to the feature
vectors in the unimodal constructed embedding spaces: Z = Fusionb (Y1 , Y2 , ...YK ). In the
following, we describe each of these fusion blocks in greater detail.
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Intra-modality fusion (Fusionak ): When multiple samples per modality are available,
one can consider the average representation of samples to combine their identification information for the corresponding modality. This is equivalent to assigning equal quality scores
to all of these samples. However, a better choice is to incorporate the quality of the samples
to combine their representation. Figure 4.2 presents this fusion block consisting of feature
extraction, intra-modality quality estimation, and feature aggregation. The inputs to this
block are samples from the k th modality, Xk1 , Xk2 , ..., Xkpk , where pk is the number of samples for this modality in the multimodal sample set, and can vary from one sample set to the
other. To utilize the quality of samples in Xk and construct a richer unimodal representation, Yk , this block consists of a quality-aware modality dedicated network, qNetak , and the
intra-modality feature aggregation.
The first fusion block aims to provide a discriminative unimodal representation for a set
of samples Xk . This block constructs a fixed-size vector representation, Yki , and an intramodality quality score, qki , for sample Xki . These representations construct the embedding
space representation for the k th modality through softmax normalization of the quality scores:
a

a
qeki

eqki dki
= P qa dkj ,
kj
je

(4.1)

a
represents the normalized intra-modality quality score for the ith
where i = 1, ..., pk , and qeki

sample. These quality scores are utilized to construct the representation of the k th modality
a
in the embedding space, where qki
Yki represents the normalized quality-aware embedding

space vector representation for sample Xki :
Yk =

X

a
Yki .
qeki

(4.2)

i

One of the main concerns for the proposed framework is the possibility of high-quality
samples dominating the other samples during the training, in which the quality scores corresponding to these samples tend to be significantly high, forcing the scores corresponding
to the other samples to be very small. To resolve this issue, we perform the dropout technique on samples of the modality during the training and randomly set some of the quality
scores to zero. Here, dki is a binary value, and takes values based upon the modality-specific
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Figure 4.3: Fusionbk consists of K modality-dedicated networks, qNetbk , and a fully-connected
network, FNetb . Each modality-dedicated network, qNetbk , presents a modality with a representation and a modality-dedicated quality vector. Quality vectors are concatenated and
fed into FNetb to provide the inter-modality quality scores.
dropout probability, µk . As presented in Fig. 4.2, when a modality consists of one sample, Xk = Xk1 , the first fusion block acts as a feature extraction block, and provides a
discriminative unimodal representation for this sample.
Inter-modality fusion (Fusionb ): As presented in Fig. 4.1, the second fusion block consists of feature transformation, inter-modality quality estimation and inter-modality feature
aggregation. The feature transformation aims to provide the flexibility for the unimodal
representations, Yk , utilized for inter-modality quality estimation and feature aggregation
trained by loss functions described in Section 4.3.3. This fusion block includes inter-modality
networks, qNetbk , and a fully-connected block FNetb to estimate the inter-modality quality
scores.1 This fusion block constructs a multimodal representation for the multimodal sample
set, X, through learning the inter-modality quality of the unimodal representations. To this
aim, the unimodal representations are fed into inter-modality networks (qNetbk , 1 ≤ k ≤ K).
qNetak networks have different architectures. However, although parameters for qNetbk networks differ, we
consider their architecture to be the same.
1
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This fusion block constructs an embedding space representation, Zk , as well as a modalitydedicated quality vector, Qbk . Each representation and the quality vector, interacting with
the corresponding unimodal feature vectors and quality vectors from the other modalities,
build Z as the multimodal embedding space representation of X. To this aim, as presented
in Fig. 4.3, the quality vectors are concatenated and fed into a fully-connected block of layers, FNetb . The quality vectors from all of the modalities interact through this network, and
the inter-modality quality scores corresponding to each modality, as qkb , k = 1, 2, ..., K are
estimated. These quality scores are normalized through softmax normalization:
b

qekb

eqk dk
= P qb d , k = 1, ..., K,
j j
je

(4.3)

where qekb represents the normalized inter-modality quality score for the k th modality in X and
present the relative importance of this modality in the recognition of X. To avoid the possibility of one modality dominating the other modalities during the training, we randomly set
some of these quality scores to zero. This approach is implemented utilizing binary values,
dk , which take values based upon the dropout probability, µ. In the case of single-sample
multimodal recognition, each normalized inter-modality quality score interprets the quality
of the sample as well as the inter-modality quality of the modality. These normalized quality scores interact with the embedding space representations of the modality samples, Zk
vectors, to present a quality-aware representation of X, where qekb Zk represents the normalized embedding space representation for Xk . We aggregate the representations of all the
modalities as:

Z = ΦK
qkb Zk ),
k=1 (e

(4.4)

where Φ represents the aggregation method applied to the normalized embedding space
vectors, such as addition [4], concatenation [47], bilinear multiplication [49], or compact
bilinear pooling [51]. In all experiments presented in this chapter, we consider addition of
P
the feature vectors as the aggregation method, which results in Z = K
ekb Zk . Equivalently,
k=1 q
this operation represents re-weighting the last layers of the modality-dedicated networks. The
learned representations, Z and Yk , are considered for multimodal and unimodal frameworks,
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‘
Figure 4.4: Our multimodal separability training loss consists of four multimodal losses. The
angular loss, La , provides the compactness between different multimodal sample sets of a
given class. The uniform loss, Lu , aims to guarantee that the centers for different multimodal
classes are uniformly distributed in the embedding space. Lc forces the centers of different
modalities for a class to follow the same direction. For each class, Lr aims to provide Zk
representations that are comparable.
respectively. These representations are utilized through the loss functions described in the
next section to construct the decision.
The proposed framework learns inter-modality quality scores by minimizing the recognition loss function. These scores represent both the quality of the samples of one modality
assigned to each multimodal sample and the inter-modality quality of the modality compared
to the other modalities for a multimodal sample set. Therefore, the inter-modality quality
of the k th modality over the dataset for the underlying recognition task is computed as:
Pkb = EX {e
qkb },

(4.5)

where EX represents the expectation over the multimodal sample sets in the dataset.

4.3.3

Multimodal separability and network compactness

Inspired by the recent advances in metric learning for deep biometric recognition such as
SphereFace [110], ArcFace [111], and UniformFace [112], we design an equi-distributed mul-
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timodal embedding in which the inter-class distance of multimodal representations is maximized and the intra-class variance is minimized. The equi-distributed constraint is applied
on the centers of each class representations by uniformly spreading them in the embedding
space. However, simple consideration of this constraint is not sufficient in a multimodal
framework in practice. Thus, we consider two additional constraints on the unimodal embeddings, linking them to the multimodal embedding, which subsequently results in unifying
the unimodal representations. In addition, to boost the generalization capability of the proposed framework, we regularize the weights in each layer of the architecture. The proposed
regularization method benefits from considering similar, but not necessarily the same, architectures for different networks.
Separability of representations: The softmax loss is the common loss used for training
CNN-based classifiers in the literature. This loss is defined as a combination of the last fullyconnected layer, a softmax function, and a cross-entropy loss [113]. The radial properties
of features learned by the softmax loss do not contribute to the discrimination of samples,
thereby the angular similarity should be preferred, leading to normalized features [114].
Let us assume that N is the number of training samples, xi is the learned feature representation corresponding to the ith training sample with label yi , and vj and bj are the weights
and bias of the last fully connected layer corresponding to j th class, respectively. To impose
the angular similarity to the softmax loss, we assume that ||vj || = 1 and bj = 0. These
assumptions result in the classification to depend entirely on the angles between xi and vj ,
θj,i . Therefore, the modified softmax loss can be defined only based on θj,i [110]. Several
works have provided more general assumptions on the modified softmax loss for different
recognition tasks:

La = −

e||xi ||(cos(m1 θyi ,i +m2 )−m3 )
1 X
log ||x ||(cos(m θ +m )−m ) P
,
1 yi ,i
2
3
N
e i
+
e||xi || cos(θj,i )
i

(4.6)

j6=i

where La represents the angular similarity loss. The effect of m1 , m2 , and m3 are studied in
SphereFace [110], ArcFace [111], and CosFace [115], respectively. Inspired by the UniformFace [112], we maintain the discriminative nature of the framework considering the angular
loss, while forcing the embedding space representations to follow a uniform distribution.
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Here, during the training, centers cj1 and cj2 are assigned to the j1 th and j2 th classes. Then,
the uniform loss is defined as:
M X
M
X
1
1
,
Lu =
M (M − 1) j =1 j =1 ||cj1 − cj2 ||2 + 1
1

(4.7)

2

j2 6=j1

where M is the number of classes during the training phase. We combine the uniform loss
and angular softmax loss as uniform angular loss:

L1 = La + λu Lu ,

(4.8)

where λu is the regularization parameter.
As described in Equation 4.11, we train the multimodal representation, Z and each of
the unimodal representations, Yk , using Equation 4.8. However, to enforce the unimodal
representations, Zk , for different modalities of a class to be comparable for both estimating the inter-modality quality scores and multimodal fusion, we define a representation loss
between these representations. In particular, we want the magnitude and phase of qekb Zk to
capture the inter-modality quality of the corresponding modality and its recognition information, respectively. Therefore, we constrain the magnitude of the modality representations
to depend solely on qekb :
N X
K X
K
X
1
(||Zk1 ||2 − ||Zk2 ||2 )2
,
Lr =
PK
N K(K − 1) i=1 k =1 k =1
k=1 ||Zk ||2
1

(4.9)

2

k2 6=k1

where the first summation represents multimodal sample sets in the training set and the
denominator represents the summation of the norms of Zk representations for a multimodal
sample set.
We consider that for each class, Zk representations share the same direction. This assumption provides a better separability between the classes since small variations of unimodal representations for each modality result in a minimal multimodal intra-class variance.
Equivalently, the unimodal representations for different modalities of the same class should
represent the same directions as the multimodal embedding space representation of that
class. We define a similarity loss between the directions of the centers of the modalities of
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Lc =
(k)

where cj

(k)
K M
cj
1 XX
cj
||
− (k) ||2 ,
KM k=1 j=1 ||cj ||2 ||cj ||2
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(4.10)

represents the representation center for k th modality of the j th class. We define

multimodal separability loss as:
K
1 X
Lms = La + λu Lu + λc Lc + λr Lr +
(λak Lak + λuk Luk ),
| {z } |
{z
} K
L1

L2

(4.11)

k=1

where Lak and Luk represent the unimodal uniform angular loss function for the k th modality
and λr , λc , λak , and λuk are the regularization parameters. In verification setups, λc = 0.
In this training loss, L2 represents the inter-modality training loss, while L1 represents
multimodal uniform angular training loss. Fig. 4.4 highlights the effect of the four defined
losses on the separability of our multimodal framework. It is worth mentioning that the
last term in the above equation represents the unimodal uniform angular training loss [112].
Therefore, while computing it, the unimodal centers of classes are considered.
Network compactness: Although deep neural networks are powerful nonlinear functions that can be trained end-to-end to extract the features and satisfy the underlying recognition task simultaneously, their over-parametrization results in highly correlated neurons
that can hurt the generalization ability and incur unnecessary computation cost [116]. Multimodal deep neural networks suffer from this shortcoming the most, since they require a vast
number of parameters and training multimodal sample sets. Regularization of the deep neural networks aims to avoid the representation redundancy. Regularization of these networks
can roughly be categorized into implicit and explicit methods [117].
Implicit methods do not directly impose constraints on the weights, but instead, regularize the networks in order to prevent over-fitting and stabilize the training dynamics.
Batch normalization [84], dropout [118], weight normalization [119], and group normalization [120] are examples of the implicit regularization methods. Explicit models, such as
orthonormal regularization [121, 122], diversification [123, 124], uncorrelation [125, 126], and
minimizing the hyperspherical energy (MHE) [116], aim to impose direct constraints on the
weights of the network. However, the high-dimensionality of the kernels in convolutional
neural networks, in addition to the vast number of kernels in multimodal frameworks, makes
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Figure 4.5: Corrupted fingerprint samples from the BioCOP dataset in the training set
generated from the clean sample (top left) by warping the clean fingerprint [19] (first row)
and fading the fingerprint ridges at random points and adding backgrounds [20] (second
row).
it difficult to regularize our multimodal framework using explicit methods [127]. Here, we
expand Compressive Hyperspherical Energy Minimization (CoMHE) [117], which projects
the kernels and neurons of the network to a low-dimensional space and minimizes the energy
in the projected space, to apply it in our multimodal setting. We define the hyperspherical
energy for the j th convolutional layer which consists of Nj kernels, Wj = {w1 , w2 , ..., wN j }
as [116]:
Es (Wj ) =

Nj
Nj
X
X

(||g(ŵi ) − g(ŵl )||2 )−2 ,

(4.12)

i=1 l=1,l6=i

where ŵi =

wi
.
||wi ||2

However, the proposed energy minimization problem can result in colinear

kernels in opposite directions. Therefore, we consider MHE in half space, in which both ŵi
and −ŵi are utilized in the energy function above. The same energy function can be applied
to the fully-connected layers where the vector wi represents the weights going to the ith
neuron.
The compression function is defined as g(ŵi ) =

P ∗ ŵi
,
||P ∗ ŵi ||

where P ∗ is the optimized projec-

tion matrix using unrolled optimization [117]. Then, the hyperspherical loss can be defined
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Figure 4.6: (a) Eye image, (b) normalized iris and mask images, (c) latent fingerprint image,
(d) enhanced fingerprint image using [63], and (e) three enhanced fingerprint images using
constant Gabor angles of 0◦ , 60◦ , and 100◦ for the whole image.
as:

Lmc = λh

L−1
X
j=1

1
1
{Es }j + λh0
Es (ŵiout |M
i=1 ),
Nj (Nj − 1)
NL (NL − 1)

(4.13)

where L is the number of layers. For our multimodal framework, the P ∗ matrices for different
modalities are shared when the kernel size is the same. We find it beneficial to share projection matrices for different modalities. Sharing the projection basis can effectively reduce the
number of projection parameters, also reducing the inconsistency within the hyperspherical
energy minimization of projected neurons for different modalities, and further improves the
generalization. To implement this loss function, we consider the dimension of the projected
space to be equal to 30 for all layers. For the rest of this chapter we refer to this loss function
as multimodal network compactness loss, Lmc . Then, the overall training loss is defined as:
L = Lms + Lmc .

(4.14)
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Figure 4.7: The estimated quality of the corrupted samples from the BioCOP dataset in a
multi-sample unimodal framework.

4.4

Experiments and discussions

In this section, we present performance metrics, the data representation for different modalities, training setup, experimental scenarios, and results. We conclude this section with the
discussions and comparisons with the state-of-the-art classical and deep learning algorithms
to address multi-sample multimodal recognition problem. To evaluate the performance of
the proposed framework, we follow the evaluation metrics and protocols presented in [128].
For the identification setup, the Recall metric is used. This metric computes the probability
that a subject is correctly classified at least at the specified rank, while the candidate classes
are sorted by their similarity score to the query samples. The performance metrics for the
verification setup are the area under the curve (AUC), equal error rate (EER), and true
acceptance rate (TAR) at different false acceptance rates (FAR). In addition, cumulative
match curve (CMC) and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) are considered to present
the performance for identification and verification setups, respectively.
Data representation: To preprocess the samples, the face images are aligned through
five landmarks (two eyes, two mouth corners and nose) [129], and cropped to 112 × 112
resolution images. As presented in Fig. 4.6b, iris images are segmented, normalized using
OSIRIS [130], and transformed into 64 × 512 strips. In addition, each iris image is concatenated in depth with its mask image. Fingerprint images are enhanced using the method
described in [62], in which the core point is detected from the enhanced image [63], and
a 224 × 224 region centered by the core point is cropped for recognition. We follow the
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conventional Gabor filtering for enhancing fingerprint ridge information [63].
This approach identifies the locally optimal Gabor filter using the estimated ridge frequency and orientation maps. However, since in our problem fingerprints are assumed to be
of different quality, these maps and the subsequent filtering can be significantly deteriorated.
Hence, instead of estimating the best local Gabor filter, which is unreliable for low-quality
samples, we feed the network with the response of several major Gabor filters with varying angles. We assume that the network learns to select the appropriate response through
minimizing the recognition loss. Each fingerprint image is concatenated in depth with nine
other images. The algorithm described in [63] computes the direction of the Gabor filter
to estimate the ridge maps locally. Each of these additional nine images is the response of
Gabor filtering with the angels in [0◦ −160◦ ] with steps of 20◦ . Fig. 4.6 d-e visualize several
Gabor responses obtained from the latent fingerprint in Fig. 4.6c.

4.4.1

Training setup

Training datasets: The BioCOP multimodal dataset [57]2 is one of the few datasets that
allows training of multi-sample multimodal fusion since it contains a vast number of samples from different modalities from the same individual. This dataset consists of four subcollections acquired over the course of 5 years, labeled by the year when each sub-collection
was initiated; 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2013. There are 3,990 distinct subjects in these four
sub-collections, while there are subjects common in these sub-collections, e.g., 294 in subcollections 2012 and 2013. We consider face, iris, and fingerprint samples from this dataset
in our training phase. There are a total number of 254,660, 264,821, and 338,912 samples
for face, iris, and fingerprint modalities in this dataset, respectively.
The face modality contains both constrained and unconstrained images with different
expressions, camera angles, and camera models. The constrained face images are acquired in
head pose angles of ±90◦ , ±45◦ , and 0◦ , with open and closed eyes. The fingerprint modality
consists of all ten fingers captured using the CrossMatch Verifier 300LC, CrossMatch Verifier
310, and UPEK EikonTouch 700 sensors. The iris samples contain both left and right irises
2

This dataset is available upon request: Jeremy.Dawson@mail.wvu.edu.
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Table 4.1: The input size and network architectures. The first row for each network represents the main branch which delivers the embedding space representation and the second
row represents the quality score branch.

network input

architecture

qNetaFace 112×112×3 C64-3×RES64-3×RES128
qNetaIris

64×512×2

2×C64-3×RES64-3×RES128

qNetaFing 224×224×10 2×C64-3×RES64-3×RES128
qNetb
k

512×1×1

FC512

FNetb

16K ×1×1

FC16-FC16-FCK

-3×RES256-FC512
-M-FC1
-3×RES256-FC512
-M-FC1
-3×RES256-FC512
-M-FC1
-FC512
-FC64-FC1

Figure 4.8: Samples from test datasets before preprocessing: (a) BIOMDATA non-ideal,
(b) IIIT-Delhi MOLF-Latent (D4), (c) IIIT-Delhi Latent, (d) CASIA Iris V4-Distance, (e)
YouTube Face, and (f) IJB-A.
and are acquired using the Aoptix Insight, CrossMatch I SCAN 2, and LG ICAM 4000
near-infra-red sensors. Although, the interval of data acquisition in BioCOP dataset can
vary up to five years, we also utilize the VGGFace2 [131] dataset to consider age-progression
during the training phase. The VGGFace2 dataset also provides the training setup with
more pose variations. This dataset consists of 9,131 subjects with 3.31 million face images.
These images include different pose, quality, and resolution variations. As described in the
Training section in more details, for half of the subjects which have the least number of
face samples, the face samples in BioCOP dataset are replaced with face samples from the
VGGFace2 dataset.
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Table 4.2: Test datasets description, fine-tuning of the test datasets, and training parameters.
For the verification setups, λc = 0.

Unimodal
# classes Modalities
BIOMDATA L iris
i

219

ii

500

iii

142

Multimodal

Fine-tuning Datasets

m1 , m2 , m3 λh , λh0 λak , λuk µk m1 , m2 , m3 λh , λh0 λu λr , λc µ

BIOMDATA R Iris

1.2, 0.3, 0.2

1.5,1

0.3,0.3 0.1

BIOMDATA L index BIOMDATA R Index

1.2, 0.4, 0.2

1.5,1

0.3,0.3 0.1 1.1,0.4,0.2

BIOMDATA L thumb BIOMDATA R Thumb

1.2, 0.4, 0.2

1.5,1

0.3,0.3 0.1

IJB-A

VGGFACE2

MOLF-Latent

MOLF-D4 (remain. cla.) 1.2, 0.4, 0.2

1.35, 0.4, 0.15 1.5,1

YouTube Face

VGGFACE2

1.5,1

1.35, 0.4, 0.15 1.5,1

0.4,0.4 0.2
0.4,0.4 0.1

1.1,0.4,0.2

1 0.2,0.2 0.2

2,1

1 0.2,0.2 0.3

0.3,0.3 0.2

CASIA-distance L iris CASIA-distance R iris

1.2, 0.3, 0.2

1.5,1

0.3,0.3 0.1 1.1,0.4,0.2

IIIT-Dehli Latent

1.2, 0.4, 0.2

1.5,1

0.3,0.3 0.1

IIIT-Lat. (remain. cla.)

2.5,1

2.5,1

1

0.2,0 0.3

To provide real-world scenarios for our training setup, we augment the described datasets
with corruptions that reduce image quality. The face images are corrupted using motion
blur, JPEG compression, additive Gaussian noise, scaling (width to height ratio ∼ 0.9−1.1),
down-sampling and smoothing. To corrupt the iris images, blurring matrix, B, warping,
W , downsampling, D, and additive noise n̄ are considered: X̄ = DBW X + n̄ as described
in [132].
Similarly, as presented in Fig. 4.5, the fingerprint images are degraded using two corruptions [19,20]. The first corruption consists of warping the clean fingerprints [19] by randomly
sampling the first two principal warp components extracted from the Tsinghua Distorted Fingerprint Database [19, 133]. The other corruption considers fading the fingerprint ridges at
random points [20]. Data augmentation is also performed on the fingerprint images, where
20 samples are generated for each fingerprint image by translating the core point both vertically and horizontally using distances coming from Gaussian distributions [22]. Here, ten
translated images are generated using a Gaussian distribution with parameters µ = 0 and
σ = 2.5. The remaining ten augmented images are generated with µ = 0 and σ = 5.
Architecture: As presented in Fig. 4.2, the main architecture of each qNetak is a multitask CNN that delivers a unimodal embedding space representation and a scalar quality
score. This architecture consists of a ResNet network [134] and a fully-connected modalitydedicated embedding layer of size 512 to deliver Yki . The quality estimation branch of this
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network delivers a scalar quality score, qki . As presented in Fig. 4.3, the qNetbk networks
are also multi-task networks consisting of fully-connected layers which deliver an embedding
space representation, Zk , of size 512 and a modality-dedicated quality vector, Qbk . The
score vectors dedicated to modalities are concatenated and fed into FNetb to estimate the
inter-modality quality scores for each modality.
Table 4.1 lists the architectures for these networks. We use (M) as max-pooling of size
2 × 2 with stride 2, (C[i]) as convolutional layers with i kernels of spatial size 3 × 3 followed
by an M, and (FC[i]) as fully-connected layers with i nodes. Element j×RES[i] consists of 2j
residual blocks with skip connections after two convolutional layers with i kernels followed
by an M. For each qNetak , the quality estimation branch diverges from the main branch at
RES128 and delivers the quality score. This branch contains M and FC layers. ReLU is
used as the non-linearity after each layer for all networks, except for the final layer of score
estimation branches for the qNetak networks and FNetb network where sigmoid function is
considered to limit the scores in the range [0,1].
Training: We initially train each qNetak for the classification setup with a varying number
of modality samples per multimodal sample set, where a feature vector of size 512 is trained
using uniform angular loss and network compactness loss as defined in Equations 4.8 and 4.13,
respectively. Iris and fingerprint unimodal networks are trained on their respective BioCOP
modalities, while the face network is trained on the combination of BioCOP and VGGFace2
datasets. The estimated normalized quality scores for degraded samples in the BioCOP
dataset can be found in Fig. 4.7. Each row in this figure presents eight samples of the
same subject to construct the unimodal multi-sample set. The number of samples from a
modality in a multimodal sample set is chosen to represent the test datasets. Therefore, up
to 30 samples are considered for the face modality, while for the other two modalities up to
five samples are considered.
As described in Table 4.2, each multimodal network, is trained for the multimodal setup,
while the multimodal separability loss and multimodal network compactness losses are enforced. This setup is trained for 3,990 subjects in the BioCop dataset, where, for half of the
subjects which have the least number of face samples, the face samples are replaced with
face samples from the VGGFace2 dataset. To study the effect of data augmentation on the
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qNetaFing , we compare the rank-25 recognition rate, with and without data augmentation,
with NBIS software [85]. Data augmentation improves the performance of the proposed
framework from 14.29% to 17.87%, while the NBIS software results in 12.72%.
The main branch of qNetak networks are initialized with weights pre-trained on Imagenet [64]. The other parameters are initialized using Kaiming initialization [135]. The
preprocessing algorithm consists of the channel-wise mean subtraction. The five-fold crossvalidation method is considered to estimate the best hyperparameters during the training
phase. The training algorithm is deployed using mini-batch stochastic gradient descent with
momentum of 0.9. The training is regularized by weight decay of 5 × 10−4 and 50% dropout
for the fully-connected layers, except for the last layer of each network where the representations are considered for recognition. The moving average decay is set to 0.99 for all the
networks except the iris modality, for which it is set to 0.9. Batch size is set to 32 and 16 for
unimodal and multimodal frameworks, respectively. The initial learning rate is set to 0.1.
The learning rate decreases exponentially by a factor of 0.1 after 105 iterations, and then
every 5 × 104 iterations, with the final learning rate of 10−6 .

4.4.2

Results

Datasets: In our experiments, we consider multimodal dataset BIOMDATA [58], face
datasets IJB-A [128] and YouTube Face (YTF) [136], iris dataset CASIA-Distance [137],
and fingerprint datasets IIIT-Delhi MOLF-Latent (D4) [138] and IIIT-Delhi Latent fingerprint (D4) [139]. Samples from these datasets are presented in Fig. 4.8. To evaluate the
performance of the proposed framework, we consider three multimodal datasets. In the
first dataset, which can represent a traditional biometric framework, the recognition framework has access to only one sample from each modality. The second experimental scenario
characterizes a Next generation identification (NGI) framework where multiple samples extracted from a low-quality video footage and a varying number of latent fingerprints are
available. The third experimental scenario, which can model a access control security system, studies the possibility of improved recognition when multiple samples are available for
multiple modalities, e.g., face, iris and fingerprint. To evaluate the performance of the pro-
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posed framework for these scenarios, we consider three datasets corresponding to these three
scenarios.
There are few multimodal datasets captured in real-world circumstances where each
modality consists of multiple samples. Therefore, in our multimodal test setup, except
for the BIOMDATA multimodal dataset, we create virtual subjects by assigning real-world
biometric samples from subjects in one dataset to the subjects in other dataset i.e., chimeric
pairing. For instance, we consider the face samples from IJB-A dataset and fingerprint
samples from IIIT-Dehli MOLF fingerprint dataset to create our second multimodal dataset.
It might be noted that this procedure is feasible since modalities considered in this work are
intrinsically independent [140–142]. For each dataset, the number of samples per subject
and per modality may vary. Therefore, for each subject, up to 25 multimodal sample sets
are randomly constructed. A brief description of each multimodal dataset, the fine-tuning,
and the hyper-parameters for fine-tuning the architecture for each test dataset are presented
in Table 4.2. It is worth mentioning that, although virtual subjects inherently can provide
different recognition performances because of the quality of the samples assigned to them
e.g., thumb compared to index fingerprints, the same virtual subjects are considered for all
the baselines, which results in a fair comparison. In addition, to provide a better performance
assessment for chimera datasets, we expanded our experiments by evaluating the standard
deviation of the multimodal recognition performance over five different sets of virtual subjects
from the unimodal datasets.
Baselines: Unimodal matching algorithms considered as baselines for the iris modality
are OSIRIS (Version 4.1) [130], Sun et al. [144], and Zhao et al. [145]. The performance
of the fingerprint modality is compared to NBIS (Release 5.0.0) [85] and VeriFinger (Version 10.0) [146]. In addition, angular decision-making algorithms such as SphereFace [110]
and UniformFace [112] as well as aggregation algorithms such as Neural Aggregation Network (NAN) [89] are considered to build baselines for face recognition performance. The
performance of the proposed framework is compared with the decision-level and score-level
fusion of the mentioned algorithms as well as the unimodal performance of our proposed
framework. To achieve score-level and decision-level fusion we train independent classifiers
for each modality. Then, we aggregate the outputs by adding the corresponding scores

Sobhan Soleymani

Chapter 4. Quality-Aware Multimodal Recognition

63

Table 4.3: The performance for the BIOMDATA non-ideal multimodal dataset.

Method

@10−4 Rank-1 EER

JSRC [3]

27.13

97.15 7.12

GJSRC [143]

28.54

97.24 6.84

SMDL [5]

28.14

97.12 6.15

MDCA [4]

30.41

98.51 5.94

VeriFinger+OSIRIS-Sum

30.85

98.28 5.87

VeriFinger+OSIRIS-Major

29.54

97.86 6.15

CNN-Major

32.96

99.12 5.65

CNN-Sum

38.33

99.22 5.21

Weighted feature fusion [22]

43.83

99.40 4.84

Multi-abstract fusion [22]

54.06

99.57 2.97

Generalized compact bilinear [23] 58.30

99.74 2.45

Ours w/o L2

89.06

99.80 0.86

Ours w/o Lc

90.13 99.84 0.82

Ours with weight sharing

86.82

Ours

90.11 99.92 0.82

99.80 0.90

of each modality or using the majority voting among the independent decisions. These
approaches are abbreviated with Sum and Major, respectively [5]. We also consider the
element-wise averaging of the feature vectors representing samples, equivalent to assigning
similar quality scores to all the samples in one modality. This approach is abbreviated as
Avg. The performance of the proposed framework is compared with the performance of
Joint Sparse Representation Classifier (JSRC) [3], Generalized Joint Sparse Representation
Classifier (GJSRC) [143], Supervised Multimodal Dictionary Learning (SMDL) [5], and Multiset Discriminant Correlation Analysis (MDCA) [4]. Multi-abstract fusion and generalized
compact bilinear fusion are adopted from [22] and [23], respectively.
First multimodal dataset: BIOMDATA non-ideal multimodal database-Release 1 [58]
is a challenging dataset, since many of the samples are damaged with blur, occlusion, sensor
noise and shadows [4]. Six biometric modalities are considered in our experiments: left
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Table 4.4: The performance for the second multimodal dataset for varying number of latent
fingerprint samples per multimodal sample set.

Verification

Ours

General.
compact
bilinear
[23]

Weighted
feature
fusion
[22]

VeriFinger
+(qNeta
-Face)
-Sum

@10

−2

@10

−3

Identification
Rank-1 @10−2 @10−1

1 96.31 92.35

96.12

91.64 94.57

2 96.74 92.59

96.57

92.06 94.76

3 97.12 93.42

97.67

92.54 95.14

4 97.64 94.12

97.93

92.75 95.78

1 97.64 93.48

98.37

92.97 96.48

2 97.88 93.72

98.39

93.12 96.55

3 97.93 94.01

98.41

93.21 96.58

4 98.01 94.12

98.42

93.25 96.61

1 97.67 93.52

98.38

93.02 96.51

2 98.90 93.75

98.40

93.14 96.57

3 97.92 94.07

98.42

93.21 96.59

4 98.02 94.18

98.43

93.25 96.60

0 97.34 93.14

98.37

92.71 96.36

1 97.92 94.22

98.48

93.22 96.64

2 98.16 94.72

98.53

93.43 96.75

3 98.31 95.03

98.56

93.52 96.79

4 98.40 95.18

98.57 93.54 96.81

and right irises, and thumb and index fingerprints from both hands. Our experiments are
conducted on 219 subjects that have samples in all six modalities. Following the protocol
in [147], we fine-tune the network on the right index and thumb fingerprints and the right
iris samples. The performance of the framework is tested on the left thumb and index
fingerprints and the left iris samples as three modalities constructing the multimodal sample
sets. In this dataset, there are 1458, 1519 and 1504 images for left iris, left thumb, and
left index, respectively. In the identification setup, for each modality, four randomly chosen
samples are used as the gallery and the remaining samples are used for the test set. For any
modality in which the number of the samples is less than five, one sample is used as the
probe and the remaining samples are used as the gallery. Then, the multimodal sample sets
are generated as described in the Datasets section. In the verification setup, the pairs of
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multimodal sample sets are generated from these described disjoint sub-sets.
Table 4.3 and Fig. 4.9 present the results for this dataset. Here, CNN-Major and CNNSum represent the rank-level and score-level fusion of the outputs of each modality network
when quality scores for the second fusion block are not considered. As presented in Table 4.3,
the proposed framework outperforms these two frameworks by more than 30% for TAR at
FAR = 10−4 . We also observe that the effect of weight-sharing between qNetbk networks,
which decreases the number of parameters in the inter-modality quality score estimation
networks by 66% and results in 0.08 drop of the performance in terms of EER. Fig. 4.9
presents the CMC curve for the proposed framework in comparison with mentioned frameworks. As presented in this figure, the proposed framework consistently outperforms the
baseline frameworks.
For this dataset, since one sample per modality is considered, the first quality-aware fusion
block acts as a feature extraction framework, feeding the features to the second fusion block
to estimate the inter-modality-quality of each modality. In our experiments, we observed that
for this dataset the expectation of inter-modality quality score, as defined in Equation 4.5,
for the left iris, index, and thumb are 0.44, 0.32, and 0.24, respectively. This observation is
aligned with our expectation since the unimodal performance of these three modalities, which
can represent the overall quality of these modalities, follows the same sequence. Since the
considered modalities are independent, we expect that the alignment of the embedding space
representations of different modalities during the training should only affect the identification
and not the verification performance. These expectations are consistent with the performance
observed in Table 4.3.
Second multimodal dataset: This dataset consists of face samples from IJB-A [128]
and latent fingerprints from IIIT-Delhi MOLF-Latent (D4) [138]. IJB-A is a challenging
face recognition dataset consisting of unconstrained images. This dataset contains 500 individuals, 5,397 images, and 20,412 video frames split from 2,042 videos. These images are
captured with extreme pose, illumination, and expression conditions. The testing protocol
for the dataset consists of 10 folds, where each fold is represented by a different random
collection of 333 subjects for training and 167 for testing. IIIT-Delhi MOLF-Latent (D4)
contains 4,400 fingerprint samples from 1,000 classes (10 fingers of 100 individuals). The
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Figure 4.9: The CMC curves for identification performance on the first multimodal dataset.
latent fingerprints are captured using a black powder dusting process. In this experimental setup, we consider two modalities, where we assign 500 fingerprint classes with multiple
samples to the IJB-A subjects. The network is fine-tuned on multimodal sample sets consisting of the remaining 500 fingerprint classes and 500 classes of VGGFace2. As presented
in Table 4.4, for our multimodal experiments, we follow the setup presented for the IJB-A
dataset. In addition, Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11 study the effect of increasing the number of
fingerprint samples per subject.
We compare the performance of the proposed framework with the same framework when
the network compactness loss, Lmc , is not considered for the fingerprint modality. We observe
that the AUC performance gap widens from 0.13 to 0.29, when the number of fingerprint
samples increases from one to four. We believe this improvement is due to the more reliable
fingerprint representation in the embedding space when four fingerprints are considered. We
also observe that the performance when the feature vectors representing the fingerprints
are averaged, i.e., the same quality score is considered for all the fingerprint samples, drops
by 0.61 when considering four fingerprint samples. We study the effect of the auxiliary
ridge maps when we compare the performance with the framework in which no additional
map is concatenated to the original map. We observe that the variation of our framework
with these additional maps in which equal quality scores are assigned to the fingerprints
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Figure 4.10: The verification TAR at FAR = 10−3 for the second multimodal dataset when
the number of latent fingerprint samples per subject increases.
outperforms the previously mentioned framework with a margin of 0.72 for four fingerprints.
In addition, we compare the performance of the proposed framework with the score-based
fusion of VeriFinger and qNeta -Face. As presented in Table 4.4, inter-modality quality
estimation of the proposed framework can improve the performance of the qNetaFace when
combined with qNetaFing compared to its combination with .
To compare the performance of the proposed method with other fusion methods, we
average the feature vectors representing each fingerprint sample and consider the scorelevel fusion of the fingerprint and face modalities. As presented in Fig. 4.10, the proposed
framework consistently outperforms the score-level fusion of the modalities. Table 4.4 studies
the effect of the inter-modality-quality score estimation by comparing the performance of
the proposed framework with score-level fusion of and qNeta -Face, and weighted feature
fusion [22] and generalized compact bilinear pooling [23] of the outputs of qNetak networks.
As presented in this table, the conventional aggregation of the feature vectors, when one
of the modalities is significantly more informative than the other modality and samples in
the dataset are of varying quality, does not prove to be beneficial. On the other hand,
the estimation of the inter-modality-quality scores for samples in the multimodal sample
set can provide better recognition performance. As presented in this table, our proposed

Sobhan Soleymani

Chapter 4. Quality-Aware Multimodal Recognition

68

Figure 4.11: The verification performance for the second multimodal dataset when the number of latent fingerprint samples per subject varies.
framework outperforms these fusion methods. However, when we study the rate of the
recognition improvement by adding fingerprint samples, we observe that the gap in this rate
shrinks when the number of fingerprint samples increases. For instance, adding the first
fingerprint sample results in a TAR at a FAR of 10−3 improvement of 0.81 and 0.34 for the
proposed framework and weighted feature fusion, respectively. However, the improvement,
when adding the fourth sample, is equal to 0.15 and 0.11, respectively.
For this dataset which consists of face image sets and latent fingerprint samples of low
quality, the expectations for inter-modality quality scores, when one latent fingerprint is
considered, are 0.72 and 0.28 respectively. The expectation for inter-modality-quality scores
of the fingerprint modality scores increases from 0.28 to 0.33 when the number of fingerprints
per multimodal sample set increases from one to four. These inter-modality quality scores,
which can represent both the importance of a modality in the joint multimodal framework
as well as the overall quality of the samples, are aligned with our expectation about intermodality-quality scores.
Third multimodal dataset: We construct this multimodal dataset using three datasets.
YouTube Face dataset (YTF) [136] is designed for unconstrained face verification in videos.
It contains 3,425 videos of 1,595 different people, and the video lengths vary from 48 to 6,070
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Figure 4.12: The verification AUC for the third multimodal datasetwhen the number of iris
and latent fingerprint samples per subject increases.
frames with an average length of 181.3 frames. In this dataset, ten folds of 500 video pairs
are available. CASIA Iris V4-Distance dataset is a subset of database [137] and contains
2,446 instances from 142 different subjects. IIIT-Delhi Latent fingerprint (D4) dataset [139]
consists of 1046 latent fingerprint samples pertaining to 15 subjects with all 10 fingerprints,
thus the dataset has 150 classes. The latent fingerprints are captured under semi-controlled
environment the black powder dusting process. The dataset is prepared in multiple sessions
with variations in background, and captures the effect of dryness, wetness, and moisture.
This provides sample variation in the quality, noise, and information content of latent fingerprint samples. The samples of lifted latent fingerprints are digitized using a Canon EOS
500D camera. For our third dataset, we consider three modalities and 142 classes. Here,
we select 142 random classes from YouTube Face, assign iris classes and randomly selected
fingerprint classes to them, and follow the protocol described in YouTube Face for our verification setup. The network is fine-tuned using the VGGFACE2, the right iris samples from
CASIA Iris V4-Distance, and the remaining subjects from IIIT-Delhi Latent (D4).
Table 4.5 and Fig. 4.12 present the verification performance for this dataset. In Table 4.5a, we study the impact of adding the latent fingerprint and iris samples to the YouTube
Face dataset classes. As expected, adding iris samples improves the recognition performance

Sobhan Soleymani

Chapter 4. Quality-Aware Multimodal Recognition

70

better than adding the latent fingerprint samples. In addition, the performance improves
drastically after adding the first few fingerprint and iris samples. However, this improvement
lessens when adding several samples. Furthermore, Fig. 4.12 presents results related to the
effect of different modifications in the multimodal framework. In this figure, the blue curves
present the results when up to four pairs of iris and latent fingerprint samples are added to
each subject. Similarly, red and green curves represent the performance when adding only
iris or fingerprint samples to each class, respectively. The dashed blue curve represents the
performance when Lmc is not considered for iris and fingerprint networks. As presented in
this figure, the iris modality outperforms the latent fingerprint modality by a wide margin.
In addition, the gap between the improvement resulted by using iris samples and latent fingerprint samples widens as the number of considered samples increases. On the other hand,
the performance of the framework in which only iris samples are added to YouTube Face
dataset classes approaches the performance of framework using all three modalities as the
number of iris samples increases.
For this multimodal dataset, we observe that the inter-modality-quality score for face,
iris and fingerprint modalities, when one fingerprint and iris samples are included in the
multimodal sample set, are 0.51, 0.30, and 0.19, respectively. However, by increasing the
number of iris and fingerprint samples from one to four, their corresponding scores improve to
0.37 and 0.24, respectively. As studied in [111], the combination of inter-class loss functions
cannot improve the angular loss defined in Equation 4.6 for face recognition. However, we
observe that the multimodal network compactness loss, Lmc , although not very efficient for
the unimodal networks, can improve the multimodal performance. We believe this is due to
the over-parametrization of the multimodal network compared to the unimodal networks.
In addition, we compare the performance of the proposed framework with the score-level
fusion of VeriFinger and OSIRIS in Table 4.5b. As presented in this table, the proposed
framework outperforms the performance of this score-level fusion with a wide margin when
considering a fewer number of samples. However, when the number of samples is increased,
the performance of the score-level fusion becomes closer to the proposed framework.
Chimeric pairing and statistical analysis: Due to the lack of multimodal datasets
for evaluating the current work, we manually constructed two chimeric multimodal sets.
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Table 4.5: The verification AUC for the third multimodal dataset when the number of latent
fingerprint and iris samples per subject vary.
Iris

Iris
1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

0

98.12 98.65 98.99 99.17 99.32

0

98.12 98.23 98.44 98.53 98.61

1

98.45 98.85 99.10 99.25 99.39

1

98.24 98.42 98.53 98.61 98.75

2

98.69 99.01 99.19 99.31 99.42

2

98.43 98.61 98.82 98.72 98.94

3

98.84 99.12 99.25 99.35 99.44

3

98.67 98.82 98.94 99.03 99.12

4

98.93 99.17 99.28 99.38 99.45

4

98.72 98.93 99.13 99.26 99.36

(a) Ours

Fingerprint

Fingerprint

0

(b) qNetaFace +VeriFinger+OSIRIS-Sum.

Multimodal samples generated randomly in our experiments can possess varying recognition
potentials which consequently affects the matching performance and comparisons. To provide a better performance assessment for chimeral datasets, we expanded our experiments
by evaluating the standard deviation of the multimodal recognition performance over five
different sets of virtual subjects from the unimodal datasets. The standard deviation of the
performance for the second and the third datasets, when considering four samples from each
modality, is observed to be less than 0.05% and 0.02%, respectively. This validates the effectiveness of random pairing for constructing multimodal datasets using independent single
modalities, and advocates that the same criterion can be used to alleviate the scarcity of realworld multimodal datasets. It is also worth mentioning that, although the improvement in
the performance resulted from multimodal settings compared to the unimodal settings, may
be considered as small, these improvements can be beneficial when large-scale applications
such as passport control are considered [136, 148, 149].

4.4.3

Ablation study

Here, we study the feature extraction performance of the first quality-aware fusion block
when a single sample is fed to the network. On the other hand, the aggregation capability
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Table 4.6: The unimodal performance of qNetaIris on single-samples. For Sun et al. and Zhao
et al., results are reported from [145].

BIOMDATA Left

CASIA-Dist. Left

Method

@10−3 Rank-1 EER @10−3 Rank-1 EER

OSIRIS [130]

86.30

Sun et al. [144]

90.11

–

5.19

83.07

–

7.89

Zhao et al. [145] 94.30

–

2.63

84.10

–

5.50

99.38 3.14

83.51

Ours w/o mask 92.84
Ours

95.17 4.43

95.48 99.51 2.15

80.07

88.68 6.39

94.52 6.47

86.12 96.14 5.09

and quality estimation performance of this block is studied when we feed multiple samples
to the unimodal network.
Single-sample and single-modality: For the IJB-A [128] and YouTube Face [136]
datasets, we follow the protocol presented in the corresponding papers. For the identification
setup for iris datasets contained in BIOMDATA [58] and CASIA-Distance [137], we consider
the protocol presented in [4], while for the verification setup we follow [145]. Here, in the
identification setup, for each subject, four randomly selected samples are considered as the
gallery and the remaining samples are considered as the probes. For fingerprint datasets
present in BIOMDATA, IIIT-Delhi MOLF-Latent (D4) [138], and the IIIT-Delhi Latent
fingerprint dataset [139], we follow [4], [138], and [139], respectively. It should be noted that,
for experiments performed on the IIIT-Delhi MOLF-Latent (D4) dataset, we consider the
latent-to-sensor framework, while for the IIIT-Delhi Latent fingerprint dataset, latent-tolatent recognition is considered.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the unimodal results for the single-sample setup on iris and
fingerprint modalities. The performance of the qNetaIris is compared to OSIRIS [130], Sun et
al. [144], and Zhao et al. [145]. We also compare the performance of the proposed framework
with the same framework when not concatenating the mask images to the iris images. As
presented in Table 4.6, concatenating the mask image with the iris image can improve the
recognition performance, which outperforms the state-of-the-art framework [145] by 0.48 and
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Table 4.7: The unimodal performance of qNetaFing for single-samples.

BIOMDATA L Thumb
Method

@10−3 EER

Rank-1

BIOMDATA L Index

MOLF-Latant

IIIT-Latant

@10−3 EER Rank-1

@10−2 Rank-25 Rank-50

@10−2 Rank-1 Rank-10 Rank-25

NBIS [85]

57.49 14.45

71.23

68.68 6.48

87.17

12.21

5.01

8.63

48.33

52.31

58.90

63.42

VeriFinger [146]

68.26 12.03

76.16

76.12 6.18

90.41

8.14

2.87

6.56

55.19

61.02

74.00

77.44

Ours w/o 9 maps 61.23 13.16

74.78

73.12 6.35

88.51

5.21

4.51

7.73

52.89

57.57

68.21

72.35

Ours w/o Lmc

74.83

8.71

83.43

81.84 5.87

94.87

22.12

37.14

64.94

60.56

69.47

81.54

86.81

Ours

76.16 7.52

84.71

87.63 4.66 95.12

25.14

40.41

67.11

65.53 73.81

85.21

89.74

Table 4.8: Identification performance of qNetaFing for multi-sample setup consisting of one to
four samples.

Method

BIOMDATA L Thumb

BIOMDATA L Index

MOLF-Latant

Rank-1

Rank-1

Rank-25

IIIT-Latant
Rank-1

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

VeriFinger-Major

76.16

76.74

82.45

84.23

90.41

91.22

94.92

95.58

2.87

3.54

9.10

13.41

61.02

62.81

62.84

76.20

VeriFinger-Sum

76.16

80.10

83.87

85.41

90.41

93.98

95.15

95.89

2.87

5.49

10.83

14.45

61.02

68.82

74.43

78.56

Ours-w/o 9 maps-Sum 74.78

76.45

77.34

78.12

88.51

90.38

91.79

92.24

4.51

5.81

6.76

7.13

57.57

61.79

63.64

65.42

Ours-w/o 9 maps

74.78

78.51

81.64

83.34

88.51

91.56

93.58

94.19

4.51

6.03

8.42

9.05

57.57

64.80

69.28

63.82

Ours-Major

84.71

85.12

91.53

93.85

95.12

95.47

97.63

98.51

40.41

40.92

56.52

60.33

73.81

73.91

80.95

82.49

Ours-Sum

84.71

87.74

91.63

93.59

95.12

97.96

98.01

98.94

40.41

50.48

56.33

60.07

73.81

77.23

80.18

82.41

Ours-Avg.

84.71

88.57

92.46

94.12

95.12

98.17

98.87

99.22

40.41

51.39

57.27

62.76

73.81

77.40

81.42

83.83

Ours

84.71 89.41 93.74 95.64

95.12 98.53 99.23 99.70

40.41 52.34 58.79 64.88

73.81 78.78 82.64 85.12

0.41 in terms of EER on BIOMDATA left and CASIA-Distance left, respectively.
Table 4.7 presents the performance of qNetaFing compared to NBIS [85], VeriFinger [146],
and qNetaFing fed with only the original fingerprint image processed with Gabor filters with
locally estimated angles and not concatenated with the remaining nine maps explained in
the Data representation section. As presented in this table, the additional ridge maps
are mostly beneficial for latent fingerprints since these maps are constructed using constant
directions for the whole fingerprint image. These auxiliary maps are considered according
to the fact that ridge orientation estimation for latent fingerprints is not accurate due to
the photometric and geometric distortions, and therefore, using that orientation map for
enhancement reduces the reliability of ridge information. However, by considering a constant
global direction for each auxiliary map, there is a chance that the ridge information from
unreliable regions can be enhanced in at least one of the additional maps and the deep model
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Table 4.9: Recognition performance of qNetaIris for multi-sample setup consisting of one to
four samples.

BIOMDATA Left
@10−3
Method
OSIRIS-Major

CASIA-Dist. Left
@10−3

Rank-1

Rank-1

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

86.30

86.41

88.41

90.17

95.17

95.21

95.83

95.97

80.07

80.23

85.68

86.35

88.68

88.70

89.01

89.12

OSIRIS-Sum

86.30

89.10

90.92

91.53

95.17

95.94

96.43

96.78

80.07

84.49

86.83

88.45

88.68

88.88

89.15

89.35

Ours-Major

95.48

97.02

97.12

97.34

99.51

99.54

99.55

99.55

86.12

86.22

86.32

86.38

96.14

96.63

96.93

97.13

Ours-Sum

95.48

97.74

97.63

97.59

99.51

99.55

99.07

99.59

86.12

88.33

89.41

90.45

96.14

96.75

96.82

97.25

Ours-Avg.

95.48

97.49

98.17

98.55

99.51

99.60

99.63

99.67

86.12

88.87

91.24

93.85

96.14

96.87

97.57

97.92

Ours

95.48 98.67 99.75 99.82

99.51 99.62 99.67 99.71

86.12 89.58 92.81 94.32

96.14 97.35 98.51 98.89

can exploit these maps to construct better representations.
Multi-sample and single-modality: Tables 4.10, 4.8, and 4.9 present the results for
the unimodal multi-sample setup for face, fingerprint, and iris modalities, respectively. The
unimodal networks are trained with uniform angular loss as defined by Equation 4.8 and network compactness loss. In addition to comparison with other frameworks, in these tables,
we study the effect of these loss functions on the unimodal performance. As presented in Table 4.10, the performance of the qNetaFace is compared to frameworks such as SphereFace [110]
and UniformFace [112], and it is shown to achieve state-of-the-art performance with fewer
training samples; 3M compared to 6M for UniformFace. Here, on the face recognition task,
we clearly observe the effect of the network compactness loss as well as the separability loss
which improve the performance of the proposed framework to 93.1% and 98.12% on IJB-A
and YouTube Face datasets for verification at a FAR of 10−3 , respectively.
Table 4.8 presents the multi-sample recognition results on four fingerprint datasets when
up to four samples are considered. The performance of the proposed quality-aware framework
is compared to the rank-level and score-level fusions of the single-sample representations as
well as element-wise averaging of these representations. On the other hand, the fusion of the
VeriFinger scores outperforms our framework when auxiliary ridge maps are not considered.
However, the proposed framework outperforms VeriFinger by a large margin on the latent
fingerprints. Table 4.9 presents the results for BIOMDATA left and CASIA-Distance left
iris datasets. As presented in this table, the proposed framework consistently outperforms
different score-, rank-, and feature-level variations of the multi-sample frameworks as well as
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Table 4.10: The performance of qNetaFace for multi-sample face recognition.

IJB-A

YTF

Verification
Method

@10

−2

Identification

@10

−3

Verification

Rank-1

Rank-5

@10−3

AUC

DR-GAN [150]

77.4 ± 2.7

53.9 ± 4.3

85.5 ± 1.5

94.7 ± 1.1

–

–

Triplet Similarity [151]

79.0 ± 3.0

59.0 ± 5.0

88.0 ± 1.5

95.0 ± 0.7

–

–

Template Adaptation [152]

93.9 ± 1.3

83.6 ± 2.7

92.8 ± 1.0

97.7 ± 0.4

–

–

NAN [89]

93.3 ± 0.9

86.0 ± 1.2

95.4 ± 0.7

97.8 ± 0.4

95.72

98.8

SphereFace [110]

92.3 ± 1.6

88.4 ± 4.2

93.2 ± 1.3

96.5 ± 1.1

95.0

–

DeepFace [153]

–

–

–

–

91.4

96.3

CoseFace [115]

–

–

–

–

97.6

–

ArcFace [111]

–

–

–

–

98.02

–

PRN [154]

96.5 ± 0.4

91.9 ± 1.3

98.2 ± 0.4

99.2 ± 0.2

95.8

–

UniformFace [112]

96.9 ± 0.8

92.3 ± 1.7

97.9 ± 0.5

98.8 ± 0.2

97.7

–

Ours-Avg.

92.5 ± 0.8

82.7 ± 2.3

97.9 ± 0.5

98.8 ± 0.2

97.51

99.0

Ours w/o Lmc

97.0 ± 0.7

92.5 ± 1.9

98.0 ± 0.5

98.8 ± 0.3

98.06

99.0

97.3 ± 0.7

93.1 ± 1.7

98.4 ± 0.4

99.2 ± 0.2

98.12

99.1

Ours

score-level and rank-level fusion of the OSIRIS verifier.
Quality measures: To analyze the quality scores estimated by the proposed framework,
we focus on our single-sample single-modality frameworks without quality score normalization and the comparison of the distribution of learned scores with no reference image quality
metrics such as Blind/Referenceless Image Spatial Quality Evaluator (BRISQUE) [155] and
NIST Fingerprint Image Quality (NFIQ 2.0) [156]. BRISQUE score is predicted by a support
vector regression model trained on a set of images with their corresponding differential mean
opinion score as the target. The set of images contain original images along with their distorted versions corrupted by known distortion effects such as compression artifacts, blurring,
noise etc. The BRISQUE score is a scalar value usually in the range [0, 100]. Lower values
of BRISQUE score reflects better perceptual quality. NFIQ 2.0 assigns each fingerprint a
numerical score from one (high quality) to 100 (low quality).
Fig. 4.13 compares the distribution of the qualities measured by the BRISQUE with our
multi-sample single-modality framework on IJB-A and Youtube Face datasets. To provide a
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Figure 4.13: The probability of estimated quality scores for the proposed framework compared to BRISQUE on IJB-A and Youtube Face datasets.
better comparison both the quality scores are normalized to [0, 1] and the ”1-scores” for the
proposed framework are plotted. As presented in this figure, the quality scores estimated by
the proposed framework closely follow the BRISQUE scores. On the other hand, Fig. 4.14
presents compares the quality scores estimated by the proposed framework with NFIQ 2.0.
In this figure, all the fingerprint samples from three test multimodal datasets are considered
and the scores are quantized to five levels. For both figures 4.13 and 4.14, the estimated
scores are higher (closer to zero) than no reference measures since the networks are trained
mostly on corrupted samples.

4.5

Conclusions

In this chapter, we presented a quality-aware fusion with feature-level fusion for multi-sample
multimodal recognition using modalities of face, iris, and fingerprint consisting of two blocks
to handle different multi-sample multimodal scenarios. The first block provides high-level
representation of each modality considering the quality of the samples in that modality.
The second block provides a multimodal representation for the input multimodal sample
set, while utilizing the inter-modality quality of modalities. The network is trained using
the proposed multimodal separability loss, while the multimodal network compactness loss
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Figure 4.14: The probability of quantized quality scores for the proposed framework compared
to NFIQ 2.0 on fingerprint datasets.
alleviates the over-fitting caused by the over-parametrization of multimodal networks. To
study the performance of the proposed framework, as well as loss functions proposed in this
chapter, we consider three real-world multimodal and eight unimodal datasets. The proposed framework is trained end-to-end in a weakly-supervised fashion without any quality
score supervision. The expectation of the inter-modality quality on each multimodal test
dataset represents the importance of the modalities in the recognition task and is aligned
with the unimodal performance of the framework. Compared to state-of-the-art algorithms,
we demonstrated that the proposed architecture significantly improves the multimodal performance by estimating the quality of the samples. The proposed quality-aware fusion can
be adapted to different preprocessing algorithms, feature extraction methods, and loss functions for recognition and several other multimodal applications such as access control security
system, passport control, and unlocking the smartphones.
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Chapter 5
Prosodic-Enhanced Cross-Device
Text-Independent Speaker
Verification
5.1

Introduction

Speech is considered as a form of biometric verification, since everybody has his or her unique
voice. Speaker verification aims to extract features from a speaker’s speech samples and
use them to recognize or verify speaker identity through modelings of the speaker’s speech
samples [157]. The speaker-verification literature focuses on designing a setup in which
the claimed identity of a speaker is either accepted or rejected, which can be conducted
as text-dependent [158–160] or text-independent [161, 162]. During text-dependent speaker
verification the speech content is a predefined, fixed text, such as a passphrase, while textindependent speaker verification aims to verify the speaker using freeform spoken words,
independent of the text or language or other prior constraints. The possible unconstrained
variations in text-independent speaker verification make it much more challenging compared
to text-dependent models [159].
Voice samples can be acquired through different recording devices and are subject to
device and quality mismatch. In addition, the samples can be recorded at different sampling rates and distances, which result in bit-rate mismatch and channel noise. The samples
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are also subject to background noise problem due to environmental noise and distortion.
Channel-independent speaker verification frameworks [163] try to address this problem.
Channel-independent text-independent frameworks are considered to be the ultimate test
in the speaker verification domain [164, 165].

5.2

Related Works

Deep learning architectures have recently proven to be able to provide superior performance
compared to traditional speaker verification algorithms, showing significant gains over the
state-of-the-art Gaussian Mixture Models and Hidden Markov Models [166–168]. The majority of the deep learning architectures proposed for speaker recognition task are multilayer
perceptron (MLP)-based models using Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) [158,159,
169]. However, MLP-MFCC architectures fail to preserve the correlation between the adjacent features. To address this issue convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are used in speaker
recognition [162, 163]. Additionally, compared to architectures requiring hand-crafted features, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) extract and classify features simultaneously,
and, therefore, avoid losing valuable information [170].
State-of-the-art deep speaker recognition systems use spectro-temporal voice features [163,
169]. The most well-known of these short-term features used in the literature are spectrogram, MFCCs, and Mel-frequency spectrogram coefficients (MFSCs). Inheriting from the
short-term nature of these features, most of the models proposed only explore the acoustic
level of the signal, such as spectral magnitudes and formant frequencies [171, 172]. However,
several important linguistic levels such as lexicon, prosody or phonetics cannot be recognized
from short-term features. These levels of information are learned habits by the speaker.
These features do not perform as well as the short-term features in the identification and
verification scenarios when the utterances are significantly short. However, when the length
of the utterance increases, it is shown that the identification and verification performance
of the prosodic features increases drastically [173]. These features also significantly improve
the model when fused with short-term features [172, 174].
In the speaker-verification literature a three-phase procedure is defined. Initially, in
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the development phase, background models are developed from a large collection of data.
New speakers are added to the model during the enrollment phase to construct speakerdependent models. In the evaluation phase test utterances are compared to the enrolled
speaker models and the background model to verify the identity of the speaker [159]. In
this setup, the difference between low-dimensional representations of enrollment and test
utterances is considered to accept or reject the hypothesis [169]. However, in the proposed
algorithm, the enrollment phase is excluded. The proposed Siamese model is trained using
the utterances from the training set in the training phase. In the test phase, the trained
model is deployed to compute the distance between two utterances. The computed inter
sub-network distance is used to determine whether or not the utterances belong to the same
speaker.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions: (i) prosodic, jitter, and shimmer
features are deployed to enhance the performance of the proposed CNN Siamese network;
(ii) a text-independent embedding space is constructed considering short-term and prosodic
features; (iii) rather than extracting the features using hand-crafted methods, a fully datadriven architecture using fused CNN and MLP networks has been optimized for joint domainspecific feature extraction and representation with the application of speaker verification,
finally (iv) the proposed algorithm can be used for real-time applications since it does not
require the enrollment phase.

5.3

Prosodic features to enhance deep coupled CNN

CNN architectures have recently proven to outperform the traditional speaker verification
algorithms. Following the scenario deployed in image processing literature, the input fed
into the CNN is a nonlinearly scaled spectrogram with its first and second temporal derivatives [175]. CNN models prefer inputs that change smoothly along both dimensions. Therefore, acoustic features need to smoothly change both in time and frequency [176]. Since the
acoustic signal is smooth in time, the frequency features need to preserve the locality of the
speech signal. The majority of the works using deep neural networks for speech processing
use MFCCs [159, 169, 177].
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However, these features do not preserve the locality of the frequency domain signal since
the discrete cosine transform (DCT) projects the spectral energies into a basis that does
not maintain locality [175]. Recently, MFSCs have been introduced to compensate for this
shortcoming [176]. MFSCs are the log-energy computed directly from the mel-frequency
spectral coefficients, which are the representation of the smoothed spectral envelope of the
speech. These features, which are computed similarly to MFCC features with no DCT
operation, along with their deltas and delta-deltas (first and second temporal derivatives)
are fed into CNN as three channels of the input, describing the acoustic energy distribution
of the spoken utterances.
These short-term coefficients represent the spectral envelope of a speech frame. Although
these parameters are speaker specific, they are unable to represent supra-segmental characteristics of the speech signal [172]. On the other hand, prosodic coefficients represent features
that are larger than phonetic units such as sound, duration, tone and intensity variation.
Although within-speaker variability in phonetic content and speaking style degrades the
performance of speaker verification systems for short utterances [173], due to the practical
complexity of the CNN architecture and the vast number of parameters that need to be
trained, it is not feasible to feed the utterances to the network since it will drastically reduce
the number of samples in the training set. To compensate for this shortcoming, we propose to
compute the prosodic features from the whole utterances. For each utterance, several short
utterances are randomly chosen. Each of these short utterances, along with the prosodic
features calculated for the utterance, are fed to the network. The decision is made upon the
computed overall scores.
Following the setup in [172], 18 prosodic features are extracted from the utterances: three
features related to word and segmental durations (number of frames per word and length of
word-internal voiced and unvoiced segments), six features related to fundamental frequency
(mean, maximum, minimum, range, pseudo-slope and slope), and nine jitter and shimmer
measurements. Jitter indices used in this setup are absolute jitter, relative jitter, rap, and
ppq5, while the shimmer indices used are shimmer (dB), relative shimmer, apq3, apq5, and
apq11 [172].
Jitter and shimmer are defined as the indices for the cycle-to-cycle variations of funda-
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Figure 5.1: Speaker verifier Siamese network. The MFSC-CNN consist of five convolutional
and two fully-connected layers. The MLP network consists of two 64-unit hidden layers and
the output layer of 32 units. This output layer along with FC7 layer are fed into FC8 of
size 128. Contrastive loss with weight-sharing is applied on sub-networks to compute the
distance between two short utterances.
mental frequency and amplitude, respectively. These indices are used to describe the voice
quality. The frequency of a speaker’s voice varies from one cycle to the next cycle. Jitter is
defined as the cycle-to-cycle variation of fundamental frequency, and is the measurement of
vocal stability. On the other hand, Shimmer is the index for vocal amplitude perturbation.
Since these features characterize particular voices, they provide speaker-specific information.

5.4

Speaker-verification architecture

The proposed Siamese architecture consists of two sub-networks that share weights. Each
sub-network includes MLP and CNN networks, and the joint representation layer. Segmental
features are extracted from each utterance, and are fed to the MLP network, while random
short utterances are chosen from the utterances. MFSCs are extracted from short utterances
and fed into CNN network. Each sub-network is represented by a fully-connected fusion layer
that act as the joint representation. Two joint representations are used to train the network
through the contrastive loss.
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5.4.1

Frequency- and prosody-domain networks

Pooling algorithms are used in CNN architectures to reduce the possibility of over-fitting.
Maxpooling is the sample-based conventional process in CNN architectures to down-sample
the feature map representation without smoothing the feature maps, while extracting the
most important features. It reduces the maps’ dimensionality and allows the architecture to
make sub-region assumptions. However, maxpooling is a shift-invariant operator and risks
undesirable phonetic confusion [178]. To compensate, we propose to use multiple maxpooling
sizes in the frequency domain instead of the conventional maxpooling and concatenate the
output feature maps in depth as shown in Table 5.1. On the other hand, since the proposed
architecture is text-independent, the conventional last-layer fully-connected layer is replaced
by average pooling along the time axis and a fully connected layer along the frequency axis.
Additionally, this modification allows the inputs to vary in size in the time domain.
The frequency domain network is comprised of five major convolutional components
and two fully-connected layers which are connected in series. Each convolutional layer is
followed by a rectified linear unit (ReLU) layer and a time domain maxpooling. Conv2 and
Conv4 are also followed by a heterogeneous frequency domain maxpooling. In the proposed
heterogeneous maxpooling, different kernel sizes are applied on the feature maps and the
outputs are concatenated in depth and fed into the next convolutional layer. The inputs
to the frequency-domain network represent short-term features of the acoustic signal. 18
Prosodic features are fed into a multilayer perceptron with two hidden layers. Each hidden
layer consists of 64 hidden units, while the output layer includes 32 nodes.

5.4.2

Speaker-verification coupled CNN

The final objective of the proposed model is to verify whether or not two utterances recorded
on different devices belong to the same speaker or not. The utterances can also be recorded
at the same time or in different sessions. Therefore, the proposed method needs to satisfy the
text-independent condition. On the other hand, it is not feasible to feed the whole utterances
to the network, since it drastically reduces the number of samples. In addition, since the
utterance can vary in length, feeding them to the network limits the batch normalization
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Table 5.1: The MFSC-dedicated CNN architectures. Notations (t) and (f) represent time
and MFSC axis respectively.

CNN-MFSC
layer

kernel

input

output

conv1

3×3×64

40×300×3

40×300×64

maxpool1 (t)

2×1×1

40×300×64

40×150×64

conv2

3×3×128

40×150×64

40×150×128

maxpool2 (t)

2×1×1

40×150×128

40×75×128

maxpool2-a (f)

1×2×1

40×75×128

20×75×128

maxpool2-b (f)

1×3×1

40×75×128

20×75×128

maxpool2-c (f)

1×4×1

40×75×128

20×75×128

3×3×256

20×75×384

20×75×256

2×1×1

20×75×256

20×37×256

3×3×256

20×37×256

20×37×256

conv3
maxpool3 (t)
conv4

20 × 27 × 256 20 × 18 × 256

maxpool4

2×1×1

maxpool4-a (f)

1×2×1

20×18×256

10×18×256

maxpool4-b (f)

1×3×1

20×18×256

10×18×256

maxpool4-c (f)

1×4×1

20×18×256

10×18×256

conv5

3×3×512

10×18×768

10×18×512

avgpool (t)

1×18×1

10×18×512

10×1×512

FC6 (f)

10×1×1024

10×1×512

1×1×1024

FC7

1×1 × 128

1×1×1024

1×1×128

benefits. Therefore, we propose to randomly choose several fixed-length short utterances.
Each short utterance is fed into the network along with the prosodic features calculated from
the long utterance. The final decision is made upon the distances (scores) given to each pair
of short utterances.
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the proposed architecture is a Siamese network, where two
sub-networks share weights. Each sub-network consists of CNN and MLP networks. The
MFSC-CNN consist of five convolutional and two fully-connected layers. The MLP network
consists of two 64-units hidden layers and the output layer of 32 units. This output layer,
along with the FC7 layer, are fed into a fully-connected layer of size 128. Contrastive loss is
applied to compute the distance between two short utterances.

Sobhan Soleymani Chapter 5. Prosodic-Enhanced Text-Independent Speaker Verification 85
The ultimate goal of the proposed architecture is to find the latent deep features representing the speaker specific features. In order to find a common latent embedding subspace,
we couple sub-networks via a contrastive loss function [179]. This function (Lc ) pulls the utterances that belong to the same speaker toward each other into a common latent embedding
subspace and pushes the utterances belong to different speakers apart.
Although the utterances came from different devices, the recording device is assumed
unknown in the test process. Therefore, the sub-networks cannot be trained for a specific
device. Considering no knowledge about the recording device, weight-sharing between subnetworks is assumed. The contrastive loss between the sub-networks is defined as [179]:
Lc (xi , xj ; yi,j ) = (1 − yi,j )lge (xi , xj ) + yi,j lim (xi , xj ),

(5.1)

where xi and xj are two utterances. The binary label yi,j is equal to 0 if xi and xj belong to
the same speaker. Otherwise, it is equal to 1. lge and lim represent the partial loss functions
for the genuine and impostor pairs, respectively, and Di,j indicates the Euclidean distance
between the embedded data in the common feature subspace (FC8). lge and lim are defined
as follows:
1
lge (xi , xj ) = ||z(xi ) − z(xj )||2 for yi,j = 0,
2
1
lim (xi , xj ) = max(0, m − ||z(xi ) − z(xj )||2 ) for yi,j = 1,
2

(5.2)
(5.3)

where m is the contrastive loss margin. z(x) is the sub-network based embedding functions,
which transforms x into the common latent embedding space. It should be noted that the
contrastive loss function considers the subjects’ labels inherently. Therefore, it has the ability
to find a discriminative embedding space by employing the data labels in contrast to some
other metrics, such as Euclidean distance. This discriminative embedding space would be
useful in identifying speaker specific features. During the training phase, the pairs of the
short-utterances are fed into the Siamese network along with the prosodic features computed
from the pair of whole utterances. During the test phase, for a pair of utterances, first the
prosodic features are computed. Then, several pairs of short utterances are randomly chosen
and fed to the network. The distance for each pair is computed. The distance between two
long utterances is defined as the mean of these distances.
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5.5

Joint optimization of the network

In this section, the training of the Siamese architecture is discussed. Here, we explain the
implementation of CNN and MLP networks, the joint fully-connected fusion layer and the
concurrent optimization of the architecture.

5.5.1

Training of the network

Initially, the MFSC-dedicated CNNs are trained independently as a classifier using all the
utterances in the training set. As explained in Section 5.4, the network consists of five
convolutional and two fully-connected layers. A softmax layer is added to the network,
where the number of units is equal to the number of speakers in the training set. Training
the network as classifier facilitates the extraction of the discriminative features from MFSC
coefficients.
The inputs are 3-second utterances which are represented as 300 × 224 × 3 images. Three
channels represent static, delta and delta-delta feature maps, while 40 MFSC coefficients are
considered. The training algorithm is deployed by minimizing the softmax cross-entropy loss
using mini-batch stochastic gradient descent with momentum. The training was regularized
by weight decay and 50% dropout for the fully connected layers except for the last layer. The
batch size, momentum and L2 penalty multiplier are set to 32, 0.9 and 0.0005, respectively.
The initial learning rate is set to 0.1. The learning rate is decreased exponentially by a factor
of 0.1 for every 2 epochs of training. In this network, batch normalization [84] is applied.
The moving average decay is set to 0.99.
Similarly, the MLP network is optimized independently. The parameters for this optimization are the same as the parameters for the CNN network. To train the joint representation, the CNN and MLP networks are frozen and the joint representation layer is optimized
greedily upon the extracted features. The initial learning rate is reduced to the smallest final
learning rate among two networks. Finally, the classification architecture is trained jointly.
To train the Siamese network, the network is initialized with the weights optimized for
the classifier network. The pairs are fed into the network and the contrastive loss function
is minimized while the sub-networks share weight.
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Table 5.2: The number of utterances in train and test sets for FBI voice collection 2016
database.

5.5.2

Train set

Test set

Utterances

2148

300

Microphone

705

100

DVR

708

100

Phone

705

100

Hyperparameter optimization

The hyperparameters in our experiments are : λ the regularization parameter, α0 initial
learning rate, n number of epochs per decay for the learning rate, d moving average decay,
and m as the momentum. For each optimization, the 5-fold cross-validation method on the
training set is used to estimate the best hyperparameters.

5.6
5.6.1

Experiments and disscussions
Dataset

FBI Voice Collection 2016: This database consists of two sessions (July 2016 and January
2017) of speech from 411 individuals using three recording devices: a high- quality microphone, a typical interview room recording system/DVR, and a digital recorder capturing the
speech over a cell phone connection. The last two recording are recorded simultaneously.
The number of male and female speakers are 205 and 206 respectively. This database is
one of the few databases that allows disjoint channel-independent training and testing of
the proposed algorithm. The total number of utterances is equal to 2, 418. The training is
conducted on 361 speakers. The test is performed on the remaining 50 subjects. A summary
of the database is presented in Table 5.2.
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5.6.2

Data representation

Initially all utterances are re-sampled to 48 KHz. For each utterance prosodic features
were extracted using Praat software for acoustic analysis [180]. These 18 features listed in
Section 2 are the inputs fed to MLP network. Then, voiced segments of the utterances are
detected using the voicebox toolbox [181]. Each voiced utterance is divided into 25ms frames
with 60% overlap.
Each frame is multiplied with a hamming window to keep the continuity of the first and
the last points in the frame. 40 MFSC coefficients are extracted from each frame. Delta
and delta-delta channels are constructed for each frame as the first derivative and second
temporal derivative of MFSC features. Cepstral mean and variance normalization are applied
on each utterance, in which each frequency bin is normalized to zero mean and unit variance.
Finally, short utterances of three seconds length with two seconds overlap are generated. The
inputs fed to CNN network are 40 × 300 × 3 short utterances.

5.6.3

Training and test phases

Training phase: Pairs of short utterances are randomly chosen, while we make sure that
the overall number of genuine and imposter pairs are equal. The pairs of short utterances are
fed into the architecture along with the prosodic features. The architecture is trained under
contrastive loss with no normalization on the last fully-connected layer (FC8). Here the
short utterances are assumed to be independent samples, and the contrastive loss is applied
on each pair of short utterances. The contrastive loss margin is set to 10.
Test phase: For each pair of utterances, 500 pairs of short utterances are randomly
chosen. The pairs of short utterances are fed into the architecture along with the prosodic
features. For each pair of short utterances, the distance is computed as the Euclidean
distance between the samples in the embedding space. The vector of the distances between
the short utterances is used to determine the distance between two utterances. The short
samples can be noisy or may not include speaker specific information. Therefore, averaging
the distances between pairs of short utterances may include outliers. To remove the effect of
these short utterances, the vector’s mean and standard deviation are computed. The average
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Table 5.3: Verification performance on FBI Voice Collection 2016 database.

Algorithm

AUC

EER

i-vector/PLDA (MFSC)

0.9153

0.1579

i-vector/PLDA (MFCC)

0.9185

0.1526

Chen et al. [158]

0.9207

0.1451

Nagrani et al. [163]

0.9215

0.1469

CNN network

0.9218

0.1421

Prosodic network

0.9011

0.1673

Score-level fusion

0.9148

0.1578

Coupled network

0.9358

0.1311

of the elements in the vicinity of two standard deviations from the mean value represent the
distance between the pair of utterances.

5.6.4

Evaluation metrics

The performance of different experiments are reported and compared using two verification
metrics. The utilized metrics are equal error rate (EER) and area under curve (AUC). When
false acceptance and false rejection rate for the model are equal, the common value is referred
to as EER. AUC represents the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve.

5.6.5

Results

Table 5.3 presents the verification results for the proposed algorithm. In addition, the
verification results for CNN and MLP trained independently are presented. The score-level
fusion of two networks is considered as well. The performance of the proposed algorithm
is compared with that of i-vector/PLDA algorithm [182]. The same MFSC feature used
in the proposed deep algorithm are used in i-vector algorithm. The i-vector model is also
trained with MFCC features. The algorithm is also compared with two state-of-the-art deep
architectures [158, 163]. Table 5.4 presents the results for channel-dependent setup. In this
special case, each sub-network is fed with utterances from a specific device. To train this

Sobhan Soleymani Chapter 5. Prosodic-Enhanced Text-Independent Speaker Verification 90
Table 5.4: EER and AUC for the channel-dependent setup.
Device
Microphone

Microphone

DVR

Phone

Device

0.0712

0.1132

0.1247

Microphone

0.0827

0.2069

DVR

0.1316

Phone

DVR
Phone

(a) EER

Microphone

DVR

Phone

0.9785

0.9537

0.9512

0.9717

0.8467
0.9547

(b) AUC

architecture, the sub-networks do not share weights. To initialize the parameters for this
setup, both the sub-networks are initialized with the parameters from channel-independent
setup. This setup leads to better performance compared to channel-independent setup, since
the channel-dependent information in the test samples can be learned during the training
phase. The only exception is Phone-DVR cross-device verification setup, where, both devices
are considered low-quality devices.

5.7

Conclusions

In this chapter we proposed a novel cross-device text-independent speaker verification Siamese
architecture, where Mel-frequency spectrogram coefficients are used to benefit from correlation of the adjacent features. In addition, prosodic features were deployed to enhance the
spectral features fed to CNN. A MLP network is trained to represent the prosodic features
describing words, fundamental frequency, jitter and shimmer. The joint representation fusing two networks, trains the network through contrastive loss. The proposed end-to-end
verification architecture performs feature extraction and verification simultaneously. The
proposed architecture displays significant improvement over conventional classical and deep
algorithms for forensic cross-device speaker verification.
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Chapter 6
Adversarial Examples to Fool Iris
Recognition Systems
6.1

Introduction

Biometric systems are widely deployed in many recognition and security applications. Iris
images provide the most reliable human identification trait, since, due to the chaotic morphogenesis involved in the formation of the iris pattern, there is a very large variability of
iris patterns among different persons [183]. Additionally, although externally visible, the iris
is thought to be relatively stable over the time since it is well-protected as an internal organ.
However, the recognition performance of raw iris images can be reduced in imaging instances
that include cases such as light reflections from the eye’s surface, occlusions and fluctuations
of perspective, and illumination [184].
The majority of iris recognition systems generate the iris template from the eye image.
This process consists of filters such as 2-D Gabor and wavelets. The binarized iris template
is considered as the iris-code, which removes the unwanted amplitude information. Furthermore, storing the iris-code in the database is more secure than the actual eye image, since the
eye image can provide sensitive information, including health data, about the subjects. In
addition, storing only the iris-code is sufficient for future identity verification attempts [185].
However, iris biometric recognition systems are vulnerable to a diverse set of attacks [186].
Presentation attacks on iris recognition systems are well-studied in the biometrics litera-
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Figure 6.1: (a) Normalized iris image, (b) normalized mask, and (c) the corresponding iris
code generated using [61].
ture [187]. These attacks undermine the performance of a recognition system by presenting
biometrics that are similar to those of an authorized user.
Adversarial examples, introduced in [41], are samples of input data modified such that
machine learning classifiers are fooled. While, in many cases, these modifications are perceptually indistinguishable and cannot be noticed by a human observer [41, 42]. Adversarial
examples can be utilized to conceal the identity of a subject or fool the security system to
provide access to an unauthorized subject by matching the adversarial example to a specific
or any other authorized subject. Adversarial examples are considered security threats since
an adversarial example that is designed to be misclassified by one model is often also misclassified by the other models [43]. Therefore, adversarial examples can be generated without
the exact knowledge of the recognition framework. The majority of the attacks applied on
iris are done in the iris code domain [188]. However, spatial correlation between the adjacent
locations in the iris and the nature of the filters used in iris-template generation, result in
correlation between iris-code bits [83, 189]. Therefore, the modification of the bits in the
iris-code domain does not necessarily represent a real physical iris image.
The authors in [188] have tried to solve this problem by altering the unstable bits.
They defined the unstable bits as the bits between consecutive 1-bit and 0-bit sequences.
However, this cannot be an optimal solution, since depending on the filters used in iris
template generation, this correlation can occur in adjacent bits, non-adjacent bits, or even
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non-adjacent rows. For example, when the template generation process consists of a bank
of Gabor filters [61], locations far away from each other can be highly correlated. Therefore,
altering the bits in the iris-code may result in a code that does not represent an actual
iris. On the other hand, although there are attempts to generate the natural iris image
from a given iris code using evolutionary algorithms [190], this is a very complex task since,
theoretically, it is impossible to generate the iris image from the iris code [191].
In this chapter, we make the following contributions: i) we mimic the iris-code generation filter bank procedure with a surrogate deep network, ii) the surrogate deep network is
differentiable with respect to its parameters and its input, which is then used to generate
adversarial examples, iii) the possibility of generating adversarial irises when the attacker is
provided only with a partial knowledge of the iris recognition model is investigated, and iv)
several attack scenarios are examined for non-targeted and targeted frameworks. The nontargeted frameworks investigate the possibility of fooling the iris recognition system not to
recognize the identity of the subject. While, in the targeted framework the attacker attempts
to represent a specific subject.

6.2
6.2.1

Related Works
Iris Code

The iris modality is among the most promising biometric features that illustrates highperformance with a reasonable confidence level. The majority of iris recognition systems
utilize the iris template generated from the eye image. However, the performance of iris
recognition systems become limited when the amplitude of the iris template is considered in
the recognition algorithm, because the amplitude is sensitive to the light reflections, occlusions, illumination change. Therefore, most of the iris recognition frameworks in practice are
based on the phase information [184], where to bypass the amplitude effect, the iris template
is binarized. Binarizing the iris template, which is refereed to as the iris-code, removes the
effect of the amplitude information.
The iris-code is generally constructed through segmentation, mask generation, normal-
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Figure 6.2: Iris code generation: The normalized iris image and the normalized mask are
concatenated in depth as the input to the iris code surrogate deep network, while, the output
is forced to mimic the iris code by minimizing the reconstruction loss.
ization, and binerization. To generate the iris-code, the eye image is segmented to find the
iris image to identify the area of interest. Segmentation is performed by finding the pupillary
and the limbus boundaries of the iris. The mask image is then generated using the segmented
eye image. In the binary mask, the ones represent the iris. This binary mask is used during
the matching step in order to ignore noisy pixels and the pixels that do not belong to the
iris. The iris and mask images are then normalized into a rectangular shape following rubber
sheet model [183]. The normalized iris image is finally converted to an iris template through
multiple levels of 2-D Gabor or wavelets filters. To generate the iris-code, the iris template is
binarized. The iris-code is used in combination with the normalized mask image to verify or
classify the iris images. In the authentication or recognition phase, iris-codes are compared
using bit-based metrics such as Hamming distance. Several prominent iris authentication
frameworks are built through this general framework [61,183,184,192]. Figure 6.1 presents a
normalized iris image, the corresponding normalized mask, and the corresponding iris-code
generated using algorithm described in [61].

6.2.2

Iris Presentation Attacks

Presentation attacks make a fake presentation to the sensor in order to fool the recognition
system and cause it to make an incorrect decision [191]. In this scenario, the attacker needs
the subject’s iris image, iris code, or equivalent information. Presentation attack technologies
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can coarsely be categorized into technologies associated with artifacts and the actual eye.
Well-known examples of the first category are paper printouts, textured contact lenses,
displays, and prosthetic eyes. The second category includes attacks such as non-conformant
use, cadavers, and coercion. Paper printouts refer to a printed artifact. In this attack, a
hole is cut in the area where the pupil is printed to mimic the reflections typically created
capturing an iris image using a camera or illuminator system [193]. Textured contact lenses
are manufactured to have a visual texture. The authors of [194] have shown that, not only
the textured contact lenses, but also the clear contact lenses with no visible texture can fool
iris recognition systems. Screens can be utilized to display an iris image or video to the
sensor as a presentation attack [195]. Prosthetic eyes, although requiring a huge amount of
time and expertise, have proved to be successful spoofs [191].
Presentation attack detection algorithms are coarsely categorized into hardware-and
software-based solutions. Hardware-based solutions add additional components to the sensor
to detect attacks to the sensor. Although these frameworks present better performance, they
are more expensive compared to the software-based techniques [187]. Additionally, softwarebased approaches are more convenient since they are non-invasive, fast, and user-friendly.
These techniques identify the attacked image after it is captured by analyzing its statistical
characteristics. On the other hand, the attack detection algorithms can consider the iris as
a static or dynamic object [191], while these algorithms can include inducing changes to the
iris image.

6.2.3

Adversarial Attacks

Recently, deep learning models have outperformed the classical machine learning models in
a variety of application areas, including biometrics [22, 23, 196]. However, these models are
vulnerable to a small perturbation in the input image. These small perturbations cannot
typically be noticed by a human observer but can still alter the predictions of the model.
Adversarial attacks [41] attempt to generate adversarial samples, that are very similar to
the benign samples, which are misclassified by the classifier [41, 42]. When used to attack
a biometric security system, these attacks can conceal the identity of a subject or fool the
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security system to give access to an unauthorized subject.
Adversarial attacks are generally categorized based on the perturbation type they utilize.
The authors in [197] introduced a L-BFGS method to generate one of the first adversarial
attacks. Although computationally expensive, this method is able to fool deep networks
trained on different inputs [198]. The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [41] is a fast
and efficient attack based on the sign of the gradient of the classification loss with respect
to the input sample as the perturbation. Several extensions to this attack are developed
in the literature. The authors in [199] have proposed to use the gradient value instead of
the gradient sign to increase the effectiveness of the attack. Utilizing a Jacobian matrix of
the prediction of classes with regards to the input pixels is considered in [200] to reduce
the number of pixels that are needed to be altered during the attack by calculating the
saliency map of the input space. Although this attack requires a very small number of pixels
to be modified, saliency-based methods are computationally expensive due to the greedy
search for finding the most significant areas in the input sample. In conclusion, these attacks
manipulate the classifier by adding high-frequency components to the input sample and using
an Lp norm constraint to control the amount of distortion.

6.3

Approach

In this section, we describe the proposed framework, the networks, the architectures, and
the attack scenarios.

6.3.1

Problem Statement

Spatial correlation between the adjacent locations in the iris and the nature of the filters used
in iris template generation, result in correlation between iris-code bits. Depending on the
filters that are used in the template generation, this correlation can be between the adjacent
or non-adjacent bits. For instance, in the case of the Gabor filter bank used in [61], locations
far away from each other can be highly correlated. In addition, generating the natural iris
image from the iris-code is computationally expensive. Therefore, directly altering the bits
in the iris-code domain cannot be an optimal solution to generating a physically feasible
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Figure 6.3: Iris adversarial example generation network: (a) The conventional iris-code algorithm is utilized to generate the benign example, (b) The iris-code surrogate network
transforms the benign example to generate the adversarial examples by enforcing the adversarial loss. (c) The generated adversarial example is compared to a ground truth example
from the gallery.
adversarial iris example. To address this problem, we mimic the iris-code generation with a
deep auto-encoder surrogate network under the reconstruction loss, as shown in Figure 6.2.
The trained iris-code surrogate network is then utilized to generate the adversarial examples
as shown in Figure 6.3(b). Here, OSIRIS iris verification algorithm [61] is considered as the
conventional iris verification framework. It worth mentioning that the proposed framework
can be customized to be applied to the other conventional iris-code based iris recognition
algorithms [183, 184, 192].

6.3.2

Iris-Code Generation

Since the generation of an adversarial example framework, requires the back-propagation of
the gradient of the adversarial loss with respect to the input image, we use an auto-encoder
based on the U-net architecture [201] to generate the iris-code. Inspired by [202, 203], the
iris-code surrogate network is defined as a surrogate network which generates iris-codes that
are similar to the iris-codes that are generated by the conventional algorithm. As shown in
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Figure 6.2, the input sample for this network is the normalized iris image, IN , concatenated in
depth with the binary normalized iris mask, IM . The output of the network is the generated
iris-code, Ts . This output is forced to be close to the iris-code generated by the conventional
algorithm, Ta , using the following reconstruction loss:
Lrec = ||Ta − Ts ||2 .

(6.1)

The details for the U-Net network used in our experiments can be seen in Table 6.1. The
encoding and decoding sub-networks are trained with 2×2 and 1×1 stride sizes, respectively.
The output layers of the encoding layers are concatenated in depth with the corresponding
layers in the decoding sub-network. Separable kernels [204] are considered for all the layers.
The network is trained using batch size 64. Batch normalization is applied on the outputs
of all the layers. A ReLU activation function is utilized for all the layers except the deconv0
layer, where tanh is considered. Finally, 64×512×6 output is reshaped to 384 × 512 to be
compatible to the iris-code.
Through the experimental results we can observe that the proposed surrogate network
can very closely mimic the conventional iris-code generation algorithms. The error rate for
the trained iris-code surrogate network is less than 2%, which presents, the generated iriscode, Ts , to be sufficiently similar to the conventional iris-code, Ta . Since the output of
the tanh activation function is in the [−1, 1] range, prior to calculating Lrec , the output is
normalized to [0, 1], in order to have the same range as Ta .

6.3.3

Adversarial Examples

After training the iris-code surrogate network to learn the iris-code generation, the trained
surrogate network is utilized to generate the adversarial examples. It should be noted that
the weights and the parameters of this network are not trained in this adversarial setup.
Here, the input to the surrogate network is the normalized iris image, IN , concatenated in
depth with the normalized iris mask, IM . In this setup, as can be seen in Figure 6.3(b), at
(n)

(n)

each iteration n, both the adversarial normalized iris image, IN , and normalized mask, IM ,
(n)

are updated through enforcing the adversarial loss, Ladv :
(n)

Ladv = ||Ta − Ts(n) ||2 ,

(6.2)
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Table 6.1: Iris-code deep surrogate network: The first five layers represent the encoding
sub-network, while the next five layers are the decoding layers. Conv and deconv represent
convolutional and deconvolutional layers, respectively.

layer

kernel

input

output

conv1

4×4×64

64×512×2

32×256×64

conv2

4×4×128

32×256×64

16×128×128

conv3

4×4×256

16×128×128

8×64×256

conv4

4×4×512

8×64×256

4×32×256

conv5

4×4×512

4×32×256

2×16×512

deconv4 4×4×512

2×16×512

4×32×512

deconv3 4×4×256 4×32×(512 + 256)

8×64×256

deconv2 4×4×128 8×64×(256 + 256) 16×128×128
deconv1 4×4×64 16×128×(128 + 128) 32×256×64
deconv0 4×4×6

(n)

32×256×(64 + 64)

64×512×6

is the adversarial iris-code generated at the nth iteration. The loss function is

where Ts

only calculated on the bits which are not already flipped, i.e., locations where the binarized
(n)

values of Ts

(n)

are equal to the values of Ta . The adversarial setup to update IN follows a

clipped iGSM algorithm [41]:
(0)

(n)

(n−1)

P : IN = IN , IN = Clip{IN

(n)

−  sign ∇I n−1 Ladv }.
N

(6.3)

The clip function thresholds the values to make sure that the values are inside [0, 1] range,
sign represents the sign function, and  indicates step size in each iteration of the adversarial
attack. The variable  limits each pixel’s maximum distance between the nth iteration and
the (n − 1)th iteration adversarial examples. Since the conventional iris-code is a binary
image, the normalized mask is also updated during each step. Through these updates, the
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bits that are already saturated, are added to


0





0
(0)
(n)
Q : IM = IM , IM (i) =


0




1

100

the normalized mask.
(n−1)

(i) = 0,

(n−1)

(i) = 0 & IN (i) 6= 0,

(n−1)

(i) = 1 & IN (i) 6= 1,

if IM
if IN
if IN

(6.4)

otherwise,

where, i represent the locations in the normalized iris and mask images. The combination
of this transformation and computing the adversarial loss function over the bits that are not
flipped yet, results in a more accurate and realistic adversarial attack. Adversarial training
is continued until the termination criteria is satisfied or the maximum number of iterations
is reached. Following the framework in [188], the termination criteria is HD(IN , IN (n)) > δ,
where HD represents the Hamming distance and δ is the recognition threshold. Since a
Hamming distance of 0.32 results in False Match Rate of about 0.0001%, we select δ = 0.32.
Finally, the final generated adversarial iris, IN∗ , along with the normalized iris mask, IM ,
are compared with a the ground truth iris image, which consists of a normalized iris image,
g
INg , and its corresponding normalized iris mask, IM
, from the gallery. This comparison can

be performed using the whole iris-code , which we refer to as the first scenario, or a series of
bits from locations in the iris-code. We investigate the scenario in which these locations are
known to the attacker in the second scenario. The third scenario examines the performance
of the proposed framework when these locations are not revealed to the attacker.

6.3.4

Attack Scenarios

To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed non-targeted adversarial framework, three
attack scenarios are considered. The first attack scenario focuses on the whole adversarial
iris-code. In this scenario, Hamming distance between the generated adversarial iris-code,
Ts∗ , which corresponds to IN∗ and IM , and the ground truth iris-code, Tag , which corresponds
g
, is considered as the verification criteria. In the second scenario, bits from a set
to INg and IM

of locations, v, known by the attacker in the generated adversarial iris-code, are compared
to the bits from the same locations in the ground truth iris-code, using Hamming distance.
To train the adversarial example in the second scenario more specifically, the adversarial loss
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(n)

in (6.2) is altered to present the distance between bits in these locations in Ta and Ts :
(n)

Ladv = ||Ta (v) − Ts(n) (v)||2 .

(6.5)

The third scenario investigates the possibility of generating adversarial examples when the
locations of the bits selected to verify the adversarial example are not known by the attacker.
In this scenario, the adversarial loss is the same as (6.2). We investigate the possibility
of targeted attacks to iris-codes using the same three scenarios. In this framework, the
adversarial loss function is altered to force its corresponding iris-code to move closer to the
target iris-code,which represents a different subject:
(n)

Ladv = −||Tatar − Ts(n) ||2 ,

(6.6)

where Tatar represents the target iris-code, obtained from the conventional iris-code algorithm.

6.4

Experimental Setup

In the experimental setup, to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, OSIRIS
iris verification algorithm [61] is considered as the conventional framework. This algorithm
considers a filter bank of six Gabor filters. The normalized iris and mask images are of size
64 × 512. This algorithm generates binary images of size 384 × 512 as the iris-codes. In
our framework, ADAM solver for stochastic optimization [205] is used to train the surrogate
network. All the optimizations are conducted using mini-batch of size 64 and learning rate
of 10−4 . Two dataset are considered in this experimental setup. The iris-code surrogate
network is trained on the BioCop dataset [57], then the adversarial framework is tested on
the BIOMDATA dataset [58]. The iris-code surrogate network is trained using 10, 000 pairs
of normalized iris and mask images. The adversarial framework is tested using 3, 040 iris
images from 231 subjects.

6.4.1

Results and Discussion

Table 6.2(a) presents the average distance and the number of iterations required to generate
adversarial examples for the non-targeted framework for three scenarios. The distance is
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Table 6.2: The average distance between the benign and adversarial examples and the average
number of iterations required for the successful non-targeted and targeted attacks.
(b) Targeted framework

(a) Non-targeted framework
scenario1


dist

#itr

scenario2
dist

#itr

scenario3
dist

#itr

scenario1


dist

#itr

scenario2
dist

#itr

scenario3
dist

#itr

0.03

0.003139 2.08 0.002689 2.14 0.004834 2.54

0.03

0.005166 2.72 0.004707 6.14 0.008151 6.80

0.02

0.001835 2.40 0.001503 2.70 0.003255 3.36

0.02

0.003557 3.64 0.003326 7.38 0.005401 8.22

0.01

0.000963 3.76 0.000627 4.12 0.001894 5.62

0.01

0.002113 6.10 0.001775 11.38 0.003273 12.40

0.007 0.000760 4.90 0.000450 5.36 0.001554 7.50

0.007 0.001778 8.24 0.001436 14.70 0.002781 16.10

0.005 0.000640 6.40 0.000352 6.96 0.001358 10.06

0.005 0.001540 10.96 0.001244 18.92 0.002399 20.10

0.002 0.000480 14.12 0.000232 14.78 0.001087 23.32

0.002 0.001258 25.56 0.001007 40.74 0.002036 43.24

0.001 0.000436 27.16 0.000200 27.44 0.001015 45.74

0.001 0.001166 49.76 0.000938 76.56 0.001921 79.72

0.0007 0.000426 38.46 0.000191 38.22 0.000988 64.68

0.0007 0.001141 70.54 0.000937 109.10 0.001891 110.80

0.0005 0.000419 53.52 0.000187 52.92 0.000975 90.24

0.0005 0.001123 98.24 0.000925 150.90 0.001884 152.78

0.0002 0.000407 132.34 0.000180 130.08 0.000950 223.46

0.0002 0.001099 243.78 0.000913 373.41 0.001875 372.32

0.0001 0.000402 263.78 0.000177 258.26 0.000943 446.06

0.0001 0.001091 486.28 0.000893 738.46 0.001885 740.08

defined as:
dist =

∗ ||
||IN − IN
2
P
,
IM

(6.7)

where the denominator represents the number of 1 bits in IM . For the second and third
scenarios, 1024 bits from randomly selected locations are considered. As can be seen in
this table, for each scenario, the number of iterations required to generate the adversarial
example increases when  decreases. On the other hand, the distance between these two
images decreases when the step size decreases. This inference is due to the fact that smaller
step sizes increase the possibility that the perturbations added to a less important pixel can
cancel out during multiple steps. However, the distance remains almost unchanged for step
sizes smaller than 0.001, while the average number of iterations required to generate the
adversarial example increases proportionally with . In addition, as expected, the average
distance in the first scenario is more than the average distance in the second scenario, since
the attacker only needs to alter a subset of the bits. On the other hand, the average distance
in the third scenario is more than the first two scenarios, since the attacker does not have
any knowledge about the locations of the bits considered in the verification algorithm.
Table 6.2(b) presents the results for the targeted framework. To consider a more realistic
framework, for each attack, we select the iris images that belongs to the same eye, left or
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Table 6.3: The success rate for the first scenario on (a) non-targeted and (b) targeted
frameworks for different step sizes when maximum number of possible iterations changes.
(a) Non-targeted framework
, #it 10 20 30 40 50 100 200 300
0.03

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

0.02

99.4 99.8 100 100 100 100 100 100

0.01

91.2 95.7 100 100 100 100 100 100

0.007 75.4 93.6 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.005 50.3 91.3 97.3 100 100 100 100 100
0.002 2.3 39.1 69.4 89.5 95.2 100 100 100
0.001

0

3.5 15.7 42.9 57.3 98.1 100 100

0.0007 0

0

0.0005 0

0

0

0.0002 0

0

0

0

0

0.0001 0

0

0

0

0

6.1 13.8 30.5 87.1 100 100
4.5 8.7 57.8 96.1 99.6
5.3 45.6 74.1
0

5.2 12.3

(b) Targeted framework
, #it 10 20 30 40 50 100 200 300
0.03

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

0.02

95.1 97.6 100 100 100 100 100 100

0.01

88.4 93.1 100 100 100 100 100 100

0.007 71.1 88.7 100 100 100 100 100 100
0.005 36.2 82.7 94.8 100 100 100 100 100
0.002 1.8 29.7 61.5 89.5 95.2 100 100 100
0.001

0

2.1 11.2 32.4 49.5 95.3 100 100

0.0007 0

0

4.3 10.1 22.7 83.7 92.1 100

0.0005 0

0

0

0.0002 0

0

0

0

0

0.0001 0

0

0

0

0

2.1 5.2 41.2 89.8 97.6
4.4 38.7 61.3
0

3.2 6.5

right, to increase the overlap between the normalized iris masks. In this framework the
perturbation is added to a benign iris image is order to force it to generate an iris-code
close to the conventional iris-code from another subject. Here, we consider δ = 0.25 as the
termination constraint, while δ = 0.32 is considered as the verification threshold. In this
framework the distance is defined as:
∗ ||
||IN − IN
2
dist = P
tar ,
IM ∩ IM

(6.8)

tar
where IM
is the normalized mask image for the target iris image. Here, the denominator

represents the number of pixels in which both normalized iris mask images are equal to
1. As shown in this table, although the number of iterations and the total amount of
perturbation required to generate the adversarial example increases compared to the nontargeted framework, the overall trend of the parameters with respect to the step size is
similar to the non-targeted framework. Table 6.3(a) presents the adversarial attack successrate for different  values and the maximum number of iterations in the first scenario for the
non-targeted framework. The success-rate is defined as the percentage of successful attacks,
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Figure 6.4: (a) The benign example. Adversarial examples and normalized to [0, 1] absolute
values of perturbation for non-targeted (b) first and (c) second scenarios. (d) Two adversarial
examples generated by the targeted first scenario. The benign iris is transformed to the
images in the second row and verified as subjects represented by the iris images in the top
row.
given the maximum number of allowed iteration and the randomly chosen ground truth iris
image. The maximum number of allowed iterations is directly proportional to the maximum
possible difference between the benign and adversarial examples in each pixel. As expected,
for small values of the allowed iterations, the success-rate drops drastically when the step
size decreases. Table 6.3(b) presents the success-rate for the first scenario in the targeted
framework. Compared to the non-targeted framework, the success-rate drops drastically.
However, the overall trend of the success-rate is similar to the non-targeted framework.
Figure 6.4 presents benign and generated adversarial examples for targeted and nontargeted frameworks when  = 0.0002. As shown in this figure, the adversarial examples
are perceptually close to the benign examples, while recognized as a different subject. Figure 6.4(b) and (c) present the adversarial example and normalized to [0, 1] absolute value of
perturbations for the non-targeted framework using first and second scenarios, respectively.
For the second scenario, also the total amount of the perturbation added to the image is less,
the perturbation is clustered in certain locations, while in the first scenario, the perturbation
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is more smoothly distributed. Figure 6.4(d) presents two examples of the targeted framework using the first scenario. Here, the top iris images are the target images. The second
row images, also perceptually very close to the benign image, are verified as the subjects
represented by target iris image.

6.5

Conclusions

In this chapter, we generated physical adversarial examples for code-based iris recognition
systems. However, conventional iris-code generation algorithms are not differentiable with
respect to the input image. Generating adversarial examples requires back-propagation of
the adversarial loss. Therefore, we proposed to deploy a deep surrogate auto-encoder network
to generate iris-codes very similar to iris-codes generated by conventional algorithm. The
adversarial network uses the trained surrogate network to generate the adversarial examples
using fast gradient sign descent algorithm. We examined the possibility of generating nontargeted and targeted adversarial examples. Considering three white-box and black-box
attack scenarios, the proposed network was able to deceive the iris recognition system, while
the perturbation added to the benign examples remain in the acceptable range.
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Chapter 7
Defending Against Adversarial Iris
Examples
7.1

Introduction

Adversarial examples [41] are data samples modified to fool machine learning classifiers.
However, these modifications can be constructed to be perceptually indistinguishable for
human observers [41, 42]. Therefore, the adversary can utilize these samples to conceal the
identity of a subject. In addition, these examples can be deployed to fool a security system
and provide access to unauthorized subjects by matching the adversarial examples to a
specific or any other authorized subject. Adversarial examples are considered security threats
since examples that are designed to be misclassified by one machine learning model can also
be misclassified by other models [43]. Therefore, adversarial examples can be generated
without the exact knowledge of the recognition framework. The countermeasures against
adversarial attacks, which are donated as defense strategies, aim to either make the classifiers
more robust to the adversarial attacks or detect the adversarial examples.
There exist a very large variability of iris patterns among different persons due to the
chaotic morphogenesis involved in the formation of the iris pattern [183]. Additionally, although externally visible, the iris is relatively stable over the time as a well-protected internal
organ. As the result, among different biometric traits, iris images are the most reliable human
identification trait. However, the adversarial examples to fool the iris recognition systems
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can be a major threat to the security systems, since many recognition and security applications widely rely on iris recognition systems. In this chapter, we propose three defense
strategies that are optimized to detect adversarial iris examples. To this end, we benefit from
the fact that the low and low-mid frequencies wavelet components of an iris, consists of rich
information for iris recognition and are robust to noises [206]. In addition, the adversarial
attacks manipulate the classifiers by adding high-frequency components to the input sample
and using an Lp norm constraint to control the amount of the distortion.
In the first defense strategy, we focus on creating several denoised versions of the input image example, where each denoised version is constructed by setting some randomly
chosen mid- and high-level wavelet sub-bands to zero, and classify each of them using the
classifier used for the unperturbed benign examples. The second defense strategy considers
removing the sub-bands that are most likely perturbed by the adversary. In this strategy,
each sub-band of the input image example is denoised and the sub-bands that change the
most after denoising are ignored in the reconstruction of the denoised version of the input
image example. The third strategy removes the sub-bands that are most likely affected by
the adversary and replaces the other sub-bands with their corresponding denoised version.
In our proposed frameworks we benefit from the fact that the wavelet decomposition
divides the iris image into sub-bands that represent different vertical, horizontal, and diagonal
frequency ranges. The low and low-mid frequency wavelet components of the iris are mainly
used for iris recognition. These components, that are robust to noise, cannot be damaged
drastically by the adversary to generate adversarial examples. In this chapter, we make the
following contributions: i) we introduce three defense strategies to recognize the adversarial
iris images, ii) each of these strategies, that can be used as a preprocessing step in iris
recognition frameworks, decompose the iris image into wavelet domain sub-bands, iii) the first
strategy, randomly set some of the mid- and high-level sub-bands to zero, reconstruct several
denoised versions of the input sample, and decide about the input example by classifying
the denoised examples, iv) the second and third proposed strategies denoise each wavelet
domain sub-band and determines the sub-bands affected by the adversary by investigating
how much the sub-bands changes after denoising, and v) the proposed framework is robust
to adversarial attacks and its performance is compared to several defense strategies.
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Figure 7.1: In the first proposed defense strategy, the normalized iris image is considered
as the input image example. K denoised version of this example are generated through
randomly selecting a maximum number of N mid- and high-frequency wavelet sub-bands of
the example and setting them to zero. Each denoised example is classified by classifier, C.
The majority voting between classes assigned to the reconstructed examples by the classifier,
cr is compared to the class assigned to the input image example, c0 , to decide whether or
not the input image example is an adversarial example.

7.2
7.2.1

Related Works
Adversarial Attacks

Deep learning models have outperformed the classical machine learning models in a variety
of applications, such as biometrics [22, 23, 196], security [11, 207], and hashing [13, 208, 209].
However, deep learning models are vulnerable to carefully crafted small perturbations in
the input image. Although these small perturbations can change the predictions of the
model, human observers cannot notice them. In other words, adversarial attacks [41] aim to
construct adversarial samples that can fool the classifier, while perceptually very similar to
the benign samples [41, 42]. The adversary can utilize these samples to conceal the identity
of a subject and acquire access to a biometric security system. One of the first adversarial
attacks is generated by the authors in [197] considering a L-BFGS method. Although this
method is able to fool deep classifiers trained on different inputs, it is computationally
expensive [198].
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The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [210] is proposed to compensate this shortcoming. The perturbation in FGSM is calculated based on the sign of the gradient of the
classification loss with respect to the input sample. The authors in [199] have increased the
effectiveness of their attack by using the gradient value instead of the gradient sign. To
reduce the computational cost of the attack, the authors in [200] utilized a Jacobian matrix
of the prediction of classes with respect to the input pixels. They have reduced the number
of pixels that are required to be altered during the attack by calculating the saliency map
of the input space. However, saliency-based methods are computationally expensive due to
the greedy search for finding the most significant areas in the input sample. DeepFool [211]
finds Lp minimal perturbations by iteratively translating input samples toward the closest
decision boundary.

7.2.2

Adversarial Defense Strategies

Defense strategies against adversarial examples can be categorized into two main categories [212]. Reactive strategies try to detect adversarial examples after deep neural networks
are built. On the other hand, proactive strategies make deep neural networks more robust
before adversaries generate adversarial examples. Network distillation, adversarial training,
and classifier robustifying are three major proactive defense methods. The authors in [202]
have considered distillation of the deep neural network [213] to defend against adversarial
examples. This approach is based on the fact that adversarial attacks on deep neural networks are successful because of the sensitivity of the deep networks. Therefore, reducing the
sensitivity of the model using distillation, decreases the possibility of adversarial attacks.
Authors in [210] have included adversarial examples in their training phase. Although, this
strategy increases the robustness of neural networks for one-step attacks but is not useful
to avoid iterative attacks [41]. Classifier robustifying aim to decrease the uncertainty from
adversarial examples, employing different classifiers models [214]. The authors in [215] have
observed that most adversarial examples are labeled as a small subset of incorrect classes.
Therefore, to mitigate the misclassification effect of the adversarial examples, they have
divided the classes into sub-classes and ensembled the result from sub-classes by majority
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Figure 7.2: Training the denoising auto-encoders for the second and third proposed defense
strategies. (a) These auto-encoders are trained to reconstruct their corresponding wavelet
sub-bands through the L2 reconstruction loss. (b) The trained auto-encoders are utilized to
compute the average reconstruction error for each sub-band on the validation set.
voting.
Three major reactive strategies to prevent adversarial examples are adversarial detecting, input reconstruction, and network verification. The authors in [216] have considered
training a binary classifier to detect the adversarial examples. The authors in [217] have
added an outliers class to their original classifier to detect the adversarial examples. The
authors in [218] have observed that the distribution of the real data is different than the
distribution of the adversarial data. The authors in [219] have observed that the adversarial
examples have different low-ranked coefficients after principal component analysis compared
to the benign examples. Input reconstruction aims to transform the adversarial examples
to their corresponding benign examples, in order for the adversarial examples to be classified into their correct classes. The authors in [219] have trained a denoising auto-encoder
network to transform adversarial examples to benign examples by removing the adversarial
perturbations. Verifying the properties of deep neural networks is a reliable defense strategy,
since it can detect the new unseen attacks. Network verification methods examine whether
an input violates the properties of a neural network [220].
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Proposed Method

In our proposed defense strategies, we do not alter the classifier, but aim to detect adversarial examples by removing perturbations in the input examples. In other words, the same
classifier which is used for the unperturbed benign examples is considered to detect the
adversarial examples by classifying the denoised version of the input image examples. To
this aim, we decompose the input example into its corresponding uniform wavelet sub-bands
using a uniform wavelet transform. Our first proposed defense strategy, randomly sets some
of the mid-high and high frequency wavelet sub-bands to zero, and then reconstructs the
iris image. The reconstructed iris image is classified using the classifier which is used for the
benign iris images. This process is repeated several times using the same classifier. When the
majority of the reconstructed iris images are classified as a different class compared to the
class assigned to the iris image, the iris image is considered as an adversarial example. Since
for each reconstructed iris image some of the wavelet sub-bands are randomly chosen and
set to zero, the adversary cannot use this information to re-train their adversarial network.
The second and third proposed defense strategies, investigate each wavelet domain subband and determine the sub-bands that are most likely affected by the adversary. To this
end, we train a denoising auto-encoder for each wavelet domain sub-band on the training
set. Then, for each test set example we compute the sub-band specific reconstruction errors
for all the sub-bands. The sub-bands that change the most after denoising are considered as
the sub-bands that are most affected by the adversary. In the second defense strategy, these
sub-bands are removed from the wavelet domain representation of the input example before
reconstructing the denoised example. Similarly, the third strategy removes the sub-bands
that are most likely affected by the adversary. However, it replaces the other sub-bands with
their corresponding denoised version, prior to reconstruction of the input example. If the
classification result of the denoised example is the same as the label assigned to the input
example, the input example is considered as benign.
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Uniform Wavelet Decomposition

In contrast with hierarchical wavelet decomposition which aims to decompose the low-pass
sub-bands more finely as the number of decomposition levels increases, uniform wavelet
decomposition consists of decomposing an input image uniformly into equal sub-bands. This
uniform decomposition provides our proposed framework with more flexibility to choose
mid- and high-frequency sub-bands. There are 4L sub-bands in an L-level two-dimensional
(L)

(L)

uniform wavelet decomposition. We denote these 4L sub-bands by B (L) = {X1 , X2 , . . . ,
(L)

(L)

X4L }, where X1

represents the low-frequency component of the wavelet decomposition.

Assume that X is the input image example, and g[n] and h[n] are the low-pass and high-pass
(L−1)

analysis wavelet filters, respectively. If Xi

is the ith sub-band in (L − 1)-level uniform

wavelet decomposition of the input image example, X, its four corresponding level L subbands after another level of uniform wavelet decomposition are:
(L)

(L−1)

(L)

(L−1)

[n1 , n2 ] ∗ h[n1 ] ∗ g[n2 ]}2 ↓V 2 ↓H ,

(L)

(L−1)

[n1 , n2 ] ∗ g[n1 ] ∗ h[n2 ]}2 ↓V 2 ↓H ,

X4i−3 [n1 , n2 ] = {Xi
X4i−2 [n1 , n2 ] = {Xi

X4i−1 [n1 , n2 ] = {Xi
(L)

(L−1)

X4i [n1 , n2 ] = {Xi

[n1 , n2 ] ∗ g[n1 ] ∗ g[n2 ]}2 ↓V 2 ↓H ,

(7.1)

[n1 , n2 ] ∗ h[n1 ] ∗ h[n2 ]}2 ↓V 2 ↓H ,
(0)

where n1 and n2 represent horizontal and vertical indexes, respectively. X1 = X, and 2 ↓V
and 2 ↓H represent down-sampling vertically and horizontally by a factor of 2, respectively.
After denoising the input image example, X, in the wavelet domain, the image X 0 is
0(L)

0(L)

0(L)

reconstructed from sub-bands B 0(L) = {X1 , X2 , . . . , X4L }, where B 0(L) is the modified
version of B (L) . As described in Section 7.3.2, this modification is done in order to denoise
the input image. Assume that g1 [n] and h1 [n] are the low-pass and high-pass synthesis
0(L−1)

wavelet filters, respectively. Then, Xi

which is the ith sub-band in the (L − 1)-level

uniform wavelet decomposition of image X 0 , is reconstructed from its four corresponding
wavelet sub-bands in L-level wavelet decomposition:
0(L−1)

Xi

0(L)

[n1 , n2 ] = {X4i−3 [n1 , n2 ] ∗ g1 [n1 ] ∗ g1 [n2 ]}2 ↑V 2 ↑H
0(L)

+{X4i−2 [n1 , n2 ] ∗ h1 [n1 ] ∗ g1 [n2 ]}2 ↑V 2 ↑H
0(L)

+{X4i−1 [n1 , n2 ] ∗ g1 [n1 ] ∗ h1 [n2 ]}2 ↑V 2 ↑H
0(L)

+{X4i [n1 , n2 ] ∗ h[n1 ] ∗ h[n2 ]}2 ↑V 2 ↑H ,

(7.2)
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Figure 7.3: Second and third proposed defense strategies: The trained auto-encoders are employed to denoise each wavelet sub-band of the input image example. The distance between
each sub-band and its corresponding denoised sub-band, along with the average reconstruction error for each sub-band computed on the validation set, are considered to determine
which sub-bands should be ignored in order to denoise the input image example. The second strategy, considers keeping the other sub-bands without any change, while the third
strategy uses the denoised version of them in the reconstruction. The class assigned to the
reconstructed example by the classifier, cr , is compared to the class assigned to the input
image example, c0 , to determine whether or not the input image example is an adversarial
example.
(0)

where X 0 = X1 , 2 ↑V and 2 ↑H represent up-sampling vertically and horizontally by a
factor of 2, respectively.

7.3.2

Defense Strategies

The proposed defense strategies are effective for uniform wavelet decomposition and specifically iris images since each wavelet sub-band roughly includes a different range of vertical,
horizontal, or diagonal frequencies. In the first proposed defense strategy, as presented in
Figure 7.1, K denoised versions of the input iris image, X, are reconstructed. We denote
these reconstructed versions as Xi0 , i = 1, 2, ..., K. To construct each denoised iris image,
Xi0 , we decompose the input image example into its corresponding uniform wavelet sub-
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(L)

bands, B (L) = {X1 , X2 , . . . , X4L }, using Equation 7.1. A maximum number of N highL

and mid-level sub-bands are randomly selected and represented by binary vector Wi ∈ R4 ,
where 0s in this vector represent the sub-bands that should be set to zero and 1s represent
sub-bands that we keep. This vector along with the original wavelet sub-bands are used
0(L)

to construct sub-bands, Bi

, representing the denoised version of the original input iris
0(L)

image. Then, these sub-bands, Bi

, are utilized to reconstruct the denoised iris image, Xi0 ,

using Equation 7.2. Each reconstructed input image example, Xi0 , is classified by the same
classifier that is used for the unperturbed benign iris examples. If the majority of the K
reconstructed iris images are classified to the label assigned to the iris image, we consider
the iris image as a benign example. Otherwise, the iris image is considered as an adversarial
example.
The second and third proposed defense strategies focus on removing the sub-bands that
are perturbed the most by the adversarial attack. To this aim, as shown in Figure 7.2, we
train a denoising auto-encoders for each sub-band using benign samples in the training set.
Each auto-encoder, AEi , which aims to reconstruct its corresponding sub-band, is trained on
(L)

the ith sub-band of the benign examples, Xi . This auto-encoder reconstructs this sub-band
(L)

as X̂i . We aim to minimize the difference between the input original sub-band and the
reconstructed sub-band using the following loss function:
(L)

Lrec
= ||X̂i
i

(L)

− Xi ||2 .

(7.3)

After training each auto-encoder, AEi , we compute the average of the distance between
sub-bands and the corresponding reconstructed sub-bands for the benign examples in the
validation set as the sub-band specific average reconstruction error:
(L)

Diavg = E{||X̂i

(L)

− Xi ||2 },

(7.4)

where the expectation is calculated over the benign samples in the verification set. These
distances, are employed to recognize the sub-bands that are removed or denoised when
reconstructing the input image example. As presented in Figure 7.3, the trained autoencoders are utilized to reconstruct the denoised version of the input example, X, denoted
by X 0 . To this end, the input example is decomposed into its corresponding sub-bands.
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Each sub-band is fed into the corresponding denoising auto-encoder to be denoised. The
reconstruction error for each sub-band is calculated as:
(L)

Di = ||X̂i

(L)

− Xi ||2 .

(7.5)

These distances along with the average distances for the sub-bands on the training set, Diavg
are utilized to construct the binary vector W :
αi =

Di
,
Diavg

(7.6)

where the elements corresponding to the N largest α values are set to zero for generating the
binary vector W . This vector along with B (L) is utilized to construct B 0(L) and consequently
X 0 . If this image example is classified similar to the input image example, X, the iris image
is considered as a benign example. Otherwise, it is considered as an adversarial examples.
The third defense strategy replaces the sub-bands corresponding to the other 4L − N values
with their denoised version before reconstructing the input image.

7.4

Experimental Setup

In this section, we describe the attack scenarios, the dataset, and the optimization methods. We conclude the section with reporting the results for the proposed frameworks and
comparing their performance with the state-of-the-art frameworks.

7.4.1

Attack Scenarios

The majority of the iris identification frameworks consider constructing iris-codes from the
iris image [61, 183, 184, 192]. The iris-code is generally constructed through segmentation,
mask generation, normalization, and binerization. We consider the normalized iris images
as the image examples. In the conventional iris identifications frameworks, the normalized
iris image is converted to an iris template through multiple levels of 2-D Gabor or wavelets
filters. In these frameworks, during the authentication or recognition algorithm, iris-codes
which are the constructed by binarizing the iris templates are compared using bit-based
metrics such as Hamming distance.
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Figure 7.4: Iris code generation: The normalized iris image and the normalized mask are
concatenated in depth as the input to the iris code surrogate deep network.,The output is
forced to mimic the iris code by minimizing the reconstruction loss. The trained surrogate
network is utilized to generate adversarial examples.
However, conventional filter bank-based iris-code generation frameworks cannot be employed in our experimental setup to generate adversarial examples since generating adversarial examples requires back-propagation of the adversarial loss. Therefore, to compensate
for this shortcoming, we train an auto-encoder surrogate network to mimic the conventional
iris code generation procedure. As presented in Figure 7.4, the normalized iris image and
the normalized iris mask image, which are concatenated in depth, are fed to this surrogate
network to generate the iris code by minimizing the reconstruction loss. In this figure the
template generated by the conventional iris verification algorithm is denoted by Ta and the
iris template generated by the surrogate network is denoted by Ts . The reconstruction loss
is defined as the L2 distance between these two templates [16]. The architecture for this
surrogate network is presented in Table 7.1.
The trained surrogate network, which follows the U-net architecture [201], is then utilized to generate the adversarial examples from the test set using the fast gradient sign
method algorithm (FGSM) [210], iterative gradient sign method algorithm (iGSM) [41], and
Deepfool [211]. The step-size for iGSM algorithm is set 0.005. Following the framework
in [188], the normalized iris images for which the Hamming distance between their iris-code
and their corresponding benign iris-code is more than 32% are considered as adversarial examples. This assumption results in False Match Rate of about 0.0001% [188]. We consider
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Table 7.1: Iris-code deep surrogate network: In this architecture, which follows a U-Net
architecture, the first five layers represent the encoding sub-network, while the next five
layers are the decoding layers. Conv and deconv represent convolutional and deconvolutional
layers, respectively.

layer

kernel

input

output

conv1

4×4×64

64×512×2

32×256×64

conv2

4×4×128

32×256×64

16×128×128

conv3

4×4×256

16×128×128

8×64×256

conv4

4×4×512

8×64×256

4×32×512

conv5

4×4×512

4×32×512

2×16×512

deconv4 4×4×512

2×16×512

4×32×512

deconv3 4×4×256 4×32×(512 + 512)

8×64×256

deconv2 4×4×128 8×64×(256 + 256) 16×128×128
deconv1 4×4×64 16×128×(128 + 128) 32×256×64
deconv0 4×4×6

32×256×(64 + 64)

64×512×6

this criteria as the termination criteria for the adversarial attacks.

7.4.2

Dataset and Optimization

In the experimental setup, the OSIRIS algorithm [61] is considered to generate the normalized
iris images, normalized iris masks, and iris-codes. The normalized iris images and normalized
iris masks are of size 64×512. OSIRIS algorithm considers a filter bank of six Gabor filters to
generate the binary iris-codes of size 384×512. Our classifier algorithm utilizes the iris-codes
generated by OSIRIS. In our framework, ADAM solver for stochastic optimization [205] is
used to train the surrogate network and denoising auto-encoders. All the optimizations
are conducted using learning rate of 10−4 . For the surrogate network and denoising autoencoders, the encoding and decoding sub-networks are trained with 2 × 2 and 1 × 1 stride
sizes, respectively. For the surrogate network, the the encoding layers are concatenated in
depth with the corresponding layers in the decoding sub-network. Separable kernels [204]
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Table 7.2: Denoising auto-encoder network architecture: The first three layers represent the
encoding sub-network, while the next three layers are the decoding layers. Conv and deconv
represent convolutional and deconvolutional layers, respectively.

layer

kernel

input

output

conv1

4×4×64 16×128×1 8×64×64

conv2

4×4×128 8×64×64 4×32×128

conv3

4×4×256 4×32×128 2×16×256

deconv2 4×4×128 2×16×256 4×32×128
deconv1 4×4×64 4×32×128 8×64×64
deconv0 4×4×1

8×64×64 16×128×1

are considered for all the layers. The networks are trained using mini-batch of size 64. Batch
normalization is applied on the outputs of all the layers. A ReLU activation function is
utilized for all the layers except the deconv0 layer in the surrogate network, where tanh is
considered. For the surrogate network, the 64×512×6 output is reshaped to 384 × 512 to be
compatible to the iris-code.
Two dataset are considered in our experimental setup. The iris-code surrogate network
and denoising auto-encoders, which are utilized in the second and third defense strategies,
are trained on 8, 000 normalized iris images from the BioCop dataset [57]. Denoising autoencoders are utilized using the verification set to compute average reconstruction distance
for the sub-bands. The details of the denoising auto-encoder architecture are presented
in Table 7.2. The verification set consists of 2, 000 iris images from the BioCop dataset.
The test set is constructed using 3, 040 iris images from 231 subjects in the BIOMDATA
dataset [58]. One iris image from each subject is considered as the gallery and the other
samples are used as the probe. The Hamming distance between the iris-codes corresponding
to the iris images in the gallery and prob are considered as our classification criteria. To
make the experimental setup unbiased, we consider the test set to include 50% benign and
50% adversarial examples.
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Table 7.3: The performance of the first defense strategy for the FGSM adversarial attack,
when the maximum number of sub-bands that are set to zero, N , and the number of examples
reconstructed, K, are varied.

K, N

7.4.3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

12.50 20.87 22.21 26.67 32.38 28.21 26.31

5

22.13 24.54 31.92 40.48 45.58 40.67 35.56

7

24.79 26.91 35.72 43.21 56.37 51.90 44.75

10

26.87 28.73 38.64 54.91 62.75 59.12 49.43

15

28.31 30.84 42.83 64.43 64.81 64.37 54.57

20

31.10 35.51 62.75 72.97 75.01 65.89 65.23

30

32.14 46.87 63.81 72.41 76.08 66.08 65.46

Experimental Results

We compare our proposed defense strategies with five state-of-the-art frameworks. We consider the success rate of recognizing the adversarial and benign examples as the evaluation
metric for defense strategies. Three adversarial training frameworks [210, 221, 222] and two
denoising frameworks [219, 223] are considered as the baselines for the proposed strategies.
MagNet [219] considers using a denoising auto-encoder and [223] denoises the input image
example using JPEG compression. For all our experiments, we consider Haar wavelet and
two levels of uniform wavelet decomposition which results in 16 sub-bands.
In our first experimental setup, we focus on the first proposed defense strategy. In this
setup, we investigate how the maximum number of sub-bands that are set to zero, N , and
the number of examples reconstructed, K, affect the success rate. For this strategy, we
consider that twelve mid- and high-frequency sub-bands can be set to zero. As presented
in Table 7.3, the performance of the proposed strategy improves when the number of reconstructed examples increases. On the other hand, when increasing the maximum number of
sub-bands that are set to zero, the performance of this strategy drops after K equals to five
sub-bands.
The second experimental setup investigates the performance of the second and third
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Table 7.4: The performance of the second and third defense strategies for three adversarial
attacks when the number of sub-bands that are set to zero, N , is varied.

Ours#2

Ours#3

N No Attack FGSM iGSM Deepfool FGSM iGSM Deepfool
1

99.10

12.57

8.31

18.35

12.91 10.42

18.54

2

98.97

15.19 12.67

25.48

15.24 14.86

25.92

3

98.86

27.38 20.72

37.53

28.51 23.12

37.73

4

98.54

38.52 32.15

63.74

39.54 35.28

64.11

5

98.21

61.74 55.43

84.36

62.12 57.74

84.36

6

98.07

81.23 75.59

78.21

81.65 77.59

78.25

7

97.87

78.18 71.81

70.42

78.53 73.81

70.51

defense strategies when the number of sub-bands that are set to zero varies. As presented
in Table 7.4, similar to the first strategy, the performance first increases and then drops. As
presented in these two tables, both these strategies outperforms the first strategy. This is due
to the fact that randomly selecting and forcing some of the sub-bands to zero, may destroy
some useful information as well as the sub-bands which are not affected by the adversary.
This may increase the false rejection rate. However, when we select the bands affected by the
adversary based on the reconstruction error, we aim to keep the information not destroyed
by the adversary. Therefore, the overall performance of the defense strategy improves. In
this table, we also present the average performance of the classifier for no attack scenario. As
expected, this performance decreases when the number of sub-bands set to zero is increased.
Table 7.5 presents the performance of five state of the art defense frameworks on the
test set. As presented in this table, the adversarial training algorithms are outperformed
by the denoising frameworks. In addition, our proposed defense strategies outperform both
denoising algorithms. This is due to the fact that instead of using a single auto-encoder [219]
or denoising the input image example through compression [223], we aim to figure out which
sub-bands are most likely affected by the adversary. By defining the sub-band specific
distances, we customize the algorithm for each input image example. In other words, the
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Table 7.5: The performance of proposed defense strategies compared to five state of the art
algorithms. The first three algorithms are adversarial training frameworks, while the other
two algorithms are denoising frameworks.

FGSM iGSM Deepfool
[210]

38.98 33.78

45.47

[221]

37.87 34.97

44.41

[222]

39.51 42.18

56.78

[223]

45.15 47.89

51.24

[219]

57.08 53.26

60.54

Ours#1 76.08 71.26

79.54

Ours#2 81.23 75.59

84.21

Ours#3 81.65 77.59

84.36

proposed defense strategies do not denoise the input example blindly, but specifically uses
the sub-bands affected by the adversary to denoise the input example.

7.5

Conclusions

We presented three defense strategies to detect the adversarial iris examples. These strategies
investigate each wavelet sub-band in order to denoise the input examples. Through defining
these defense strategies, we remove the sub-bands that are the most affected by the adversary.
The first proposed defense strategy reconstructs multiple denoised versions of the input
example. Then, this strategy decides about the input example through the classification of
the denoised examples. The second proposed defense strategy denoises each wavelet domain
sub-band. The sub-bands that are most likely affected by the adversary are determined by the
L2 distance between the wavelet domain sub-bands and their reconstructed version. Finally,
the third proposed strategy, focuses on removing the sub-bands that are most effected by
the adversary, while reconstructing the other sub-bands. We investigated the performance
of the proposed defense strategies using three attack scenarios and compare the results with
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five state of the art defense strategies. These five strategies include the adversarial training
and denoising frameworks. Our third proposed defense strategy, which aims to customize
the sub-bands removed for each input example, outperforms the other two proposed defense
strategies.
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Chapter 8
Siamese Differential Morphed Face
Detection
8.1

Introduction

Biometric facial recognition systems have increasingly been integrated into border control
and other security applications that utilize identification tasks, such as official identity cards,
surveillance, and law enforcement. These systems provide high accuracy at a low operational
cost. In addition, face capture is non-invasive and benefits from a relatively high social
acceptance. People use their faces to unlock their phones and also to recognize their friends
and family. Furthermore, facial recognition systems contain an automatic fail-safe: if the
algorithm triggers a false alarm, a human expert on-site can easily perform the verification.
For these reasons, facial recognition systems enjoy a sizable advantage over other biometric
systems. Consequently, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has mandated
the inclusion of a facial reference image in all electronic passports worldwide [224]. This
means that the only biometric identifier present in passports globally is the face.
Although facial recognition systems are largely successful, they still are not impervious
to attack. The mass adoption of automatic biometric systems in border control has revealed
critical vulnerabilities in the border security scheme, namely the inability of these systems to
accurately detect a falsified image. This vulnerability is further exacerbated by a loophole in
the passport application process: the facial reference image, either digitally or as a physical
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Table 8.1: Differential morph algorithms.

Algorithm

Method

Database

Face Demorphing

Image

MorphDB,

[227, 230]

Subtraction

landmark-based

Mutli-algorithm

Feature vectors and

Landmark-based

fusion approach [231]

feature difference

Deep models [232]

Feature embeddings

GAN-based

Our Method – Deep

L2 difference of

landmarkbased,

Siamese Network

embedding representations

and GAN-based

print, is provided by the applicant at the time of enrollment. This opens a window for
the applicant to potentially manipulate the image before application submission. One type
of manipulation that is recently identified as a serious threat is the morph attack [225], in
which a facial reference image can be verified as two or more separate identities. A successful
morphing attack allows two or more people to utilize the same passport to travel.
Thus, a criminal attacker, who otherwise cannot travel freely, could obtain a valid passport by morphing his face with that of an accomplice [225]. Many morphing applications
are not only freely available and easily accessible but also have no knowledge barrier [226].
As such, it is almost absurdly simple for a criminal to procure a legitimate travel document. There are only a few straightforward steps: (1) find an accomplice with similar facial
features, (2) morph both faces together such that existing facial recognition systems would
classify the resulting morphed face as either of the original individuals, (3) the accomplice
applies for a passport with the morphed image. The resulting passport could then be used
by both the criminal and the accomplice to travel as they wish. Currently, we are unaware of
any system in the passport verification process that is designed specifically for the detection
of these manipulations. Moreover, commercial off-the-shelf systems (COTS) have repeatedly
failed to detect morphed images [227]. Likewise, studies show human recognizers are also
unable to correctly differentiate a morphed facial image from an authentic one [227–229].
We propose to develop a novel differential morphing attack detection algorithm using a
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Figure 8.1: Network architecture: Image pairs are fed into the MTCNN for face detection
and alignment, then into the Inception ResNET v1,where contrastive loss is applied. From
the feature embedding representation, verification is conducted by computing the L2 distance
between the feature vectors and a decision score is produced. Left) the training phase on
WVU Twins Day dataset and the training portion of the morph dataset and right) the test
phase.
deep Siamese network. The Siamese network takes image pairs as inputs and yields a confidence score on the likelihood that the face images are from the same person. We employ
a pre-trained Inception ResNET v1 as the base network. The experiments are conducted
on two separate morphed image datasets: VISAPP17 [231] and MorGAN [232,233]. Results
show an D-EER of 5.6% for VISAPAP17 and an D-EER of 12.5% for MorGAN. In the following sections, we briefly summarize the related works in Section II, explain the methodology
in Section III, and discuss our experiments and subsequent results in Section IV. Finally,
conclusions are presented in Section V.

8.2

Related Works

The vulnerability of face recognition systems to morph attacks was first introduced by [225].
Since then, many morph detection algorithms have been proposed of two types: single (no
reference) and differential. Single (no reference) morph attack detection algorithms rely
solely on the potential morphed image to make their classification. Morphs are detected
by extracting and analyzing features from the image in an attempt to identify the unique
artifacts that indicate the face image was morphed or tampered with. On the other hand,
differential morph attack detection algorithms rely on an additional trusted image, typically
a live capture at border security, to compare the potential morphed image with. As such,
differential morphing attack detection algorithms have more information at their disposal
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to make their classification and therefore perform significantly better than single morph
detection algorithms [234].
The majority of the current research exists solely in the single morph attack detection
domain. Many classical hand-crafted feature extraction techniques have been explored to
solve this problem. The most well-performing of these general image descriptors is Binarized
Statistical Image Features (BSIF) [235], used in [236], in which extracted BSIF features were
classified using a Support Vector Machine (SVM). Deep learning methods have also been
proposed [237] [238] [239]. In [239], complementary features from VGG-19 and AlexNet,
both pre-trained on ImageNet and additionally fine-tuned on a morph dataset, are concatenated and then used to train a Probabilistic Collaborative Representation-based Classifier
(ProCRC). A multi-algorithm fusion approach that combines texture descriptors, keypoint
descriptors, gradient estimators, and deep neural network methods has also shown promising
results [240]. The authors extract BSIF and Local Binary Pattern (LBP) [241] features to
obtain feature vectors. Other feature descriptors such as Scale Invariant Feature Transform
(SIFT) [242] and Speeded-Up Robust Features (SURF) [243] are also used to extract keypoint descriptors and Histogram of Gradients (HOG) is used as a gradient estimator. Finally,
deep feature embeddings from the OpenFace DNN are used as the last feature vector. All
the above feature vectors are then used to train separate SVMs. In the end, score-level fusion
is applied to obtain the final decision score for the potential morphed image.
There are a few papers also that address differential morph attack detection. Of these,
reverting of a face morph or face demorphing [244] [245] has provided encouraging results.
The demorphing algorithm subtracts the potential morphed image from the trusted image
and uses the difference for classification. Feature extraction methods used in single morph
attack detection can also be applied to the differential problem domain as well by taking the
difference of the feature vectors of the potential morphed image and the trusted image. This
difference vector along with the original feature vector for the potential morphed image were
then used to train a difference SVM and a feature SVM, respectively. Score-level fusion is
used to arrive at the final decision score. This method is explored in [234] using LBP, BSIF,
SIFT, SURF, and HOG descriptors. Scherhag et. al [246] uses deep face representations from
feature embeddings extracted from a deep neural network to detect a morph attack. The au-
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thors of [246] also emphasized the need for high-variance and constructed their morph image
database using multiple morph algorithms. Several post-processing steps were also applied
to emulate the actual compression methods used in storing passport photos in electronic
passports, including reducing resolution, JPEG200 compression, and printing-and-scanning.
Table 8.1 compares the existing differential morph algorithms.
Although these methods have shown some success, none are sufficiently robust. These
algorithms train on morph datasets of very limited size and scope. When tested on additional
datasets, they perform poorly, indicating the models overfit [247]. These results are notably
evident in the NIST FRVT morph detection test [248], in which nearly all the algorithms
submitted exhibited low performance on almost all tested morph datasets of varying quality
and method. The NIST FRVT test is administered on multiple unseen datasets, ranging from
automatically generated morphs to manually manipulated high quality morphs to print-andscanned morphs. The deep learning method described in [246] outperforms the other models
in the NIST test.

8.3

Method

The fundamental issue facing morph attack detection researchers is the lack of a large
database of morphs with high variance. Many researchers create their own synthetic morph
database, typically employing automated generative techniques, such as landmark manipulation [226] or General Adversarial Networks (GANs) [232]. Although commercial software
such as Adobe Photoshop or GIMP 2.10 have also been used to manually construct morphs,
these methods are often time-consuming, and it is difficult to generate the number of morphs
required to train a model. Each method generates different artifacts in the image, such as
ghosting, unnatural transition between facial regions, hair and eyelash shadows, blurriness
in the forehead and color, among others.
As presented in Figure 8.1, the proposed architecture is a Siamese neural network [249],
in which the subnetworks are instances of the same network and share weights. Contrastive
loss [250] is the loss function for training the Siamese network. Contrastive loss is a distancebased loss function, which attempts to bring similar images closer together into a common
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latent subspace, whereas it attempts to distance the dissimilar ones even more. Essentially,
contrastive loss emphasizes the similarity between images of the same class and underscores
the difference between images of different classes. The distance is found from the feature
embeddings produced by the Siamese network. The margin is the distance threshold that
regulates the extent to which pairs are separated.

Lc = (1 − yg )D(I1 , I2 )2 + yg max(0, m − D(I1 , I2 ))2

(8.1)

where I1 and I2 are the input face images, m is the margin or threshold as described
above and yg is the ground truth label for a given pair of training images and D(I1 , I2 ) is
the L2 distance between the feature vectors:

D(I1 , I2 ) = ||φ(I1 ) − φ(I2 )||2

(8.2)

Here, φ(.) represents a non-linear deep network mapping image into a vector representation in the embedding space. According to the loss function defined above, yg is 0 for
genuine image pairs and yg is 1 for imposter (morph) pairs.
To streamline training, an Inception ResNET v1 architecture [251] is chosen as the base
network, using weights pre-trained on the VGGFace2 dataset [131]. The network is then
re-trained with the WVU Twins Day dataset [252] for the Siamese implementation. The
model is optimized by enforcing contrastive loss on the embedding space representation of
the genuine and imposter twin samples. The trained Siamese network is then additionally
fine-tuned using the training portion of each morph database. To obtain a more discriminative embedding, the representations of the face image and its horizontal embedding are
concatenated. The feature embeddings are taken from the last fully-connected layer and
the L2 distance between the two embeddings is calculated for the verification. As presented
in Figure 8.2, in our experiments we consider two additional decision making algorithms to
explore the embedding space constructed by the contrastive loss, where we augment the proposed framework with the verification of the difference and concatenation of the embedding
features of a pair using radial basis function kernel support vector machine (SVM) classifiers.
These classifiers, which are learned using the training portion of each dataset, are utilized
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Table 8.2: The performance of the proposed framework on VISAPP17.

APCER@BPCER

BPCER@APCER

5%

10%

30%

5%

10%

30%

SIFT

45.12

37.89

17.94

65.11

43.28

17.91

0.221

SURF

55.57

42.72

20.76

72.58

50.74

20.89

0.225

LBP

23.88

19.40

1.58

23.88

20.65

13.43

0.187

BSIF

25.37

22.38

1.49

28.77

25.37

8.91

0.164

FaceNet

11.82

9.82

5.08

29.82

6.91

0.25

0.095

Ours

6.11

3.47

1.64

7.31

4.22

0.24

0.056

5.78

3.29

1.52

6.67

3.95

0.21

0.054

5.29

3.17

1.43

6.12

3.71

0.19

0.052

Method

Ours+SVM
(concat.)
Ours+SVM
(difference)

D-EER

during the test phase to recognize genuine and imposter pairs.

8.3.1

Experimental Setup

The two morph image databases used in this experiment are VISAPP17 [231] and MorGAN [232] [233]. As presented in Figure 8.3, we purposefully employ two different morph
databases, created from two different face image datasets that apply two different morphing
techniques to investigate how our model generalizes. VISAPP17 is a collection of complete
and splicing morphs generated from the Utrecht ECVP database [230]. The images are
900 × 1200 pixels in size. This dataset is generated by warping and alpha-blending [253]. To
construct this dataset, facial landmarks are localized, the face image is tranquilized based on
these landmarks, triangles are warped to some average position, and the resulting images are
alpha-blended, where alpha is set to 0.5. A subset of 183 high quality splicing morphs constructed by selecting morph images without any recognizable artifacts (VISAPP17-SplicingSelected dataset) is used along with 131 real images for a total set of 314 images. The
morphs were created using the splicing technique, where after landmark manipulation, the
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Table 8.3: The performance of the proposed framework on MorGAN

APCER@BPCER

BPCER@APCER

5%

10%

30%

5%

10%

30%

SIFT

65.41

53.37

23.53

97.45

66.66

23.24

0.262

SURF

69.88

56.25

29.82

98.24

78.07

30.06

0.298

LBP

62.43

54.13

21.46

28.40

18.71

14.92

0.155

BSIF

39.85

31.26

16.97

14.22

8.64

7.40

0.101

FaceNet

36.72

30.15

18.49

38.38

26.67

10.51

0.161

Ours

31.85

25.61

13.21

14.32

12.11

5.49

0.125

29.43

24.21

12.35

13.72

11.75

5.18

0.113

27.95

22.78

12.05

13.46

10.42

4.94

0.102

Method

Ours+SVM
(concat.)
Ours+SVM
(difference)

D-EER

resulting morphed face is spliced into the face of one of the original images. This preserves
the background and hair, which helps avoid the issue of blurry artifacts and ghosting that
typically occurs in these regions. However, this also means that the resulting morph derives
its face shape from only one of the contributing individuals.
The MorGAN database is constructed from a selection of full-frontal face images manually chosen from the CelebA dataset [254]. It consists of a custom morphing attack pipeline
(MorGAN), created by the authors, that uses a GAN, inspired by inspired by learned inference model [255], to generate morphs. The database consists of 1500 bona fide probe images,
1500 bonafide references, and 1000 MorGAN morphs of 64 × 64 pixels in size. There is also
an additional MorGAN database, in which the MorGAN morphs have been super-resolved
to 128 × 128 pixels according to the protocol described in [256]. The faces are detected and
aligned using the MTCNN framework [129]. The aligned images are then resized to 160×160
pixels to prepare the images for the Siamese network.
As the Siamese network expects pairs of images as input, the morph images are paired off
into genuine face pairs and imposter face pairs, where a genuine pair consists of two trusted
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Figure 8.2: During the test phase, three decision-making algorithms are considered to explore
the embedding constructed embedding space: (a) Euclidean distance between the representation of the samples in a pair is considered to make the decision. (b) The difference and
(c) the concatenation of the learned representations is fed to a SVM classifier.
images and an imposter pair consists of a trusted image and a morph image. We employ
the same train-test split provided by the authors of MorGAN to facilitate comparison of
performance with other algorithms using this database. The train-test split is purposefully
disjoint, with no overlapping morphs or contributing bonafides to morphs. This enables us to
attain an accurate representation of the performance. For the VISAPP17 dataset, 50% of the
subjects are considered for training, while the other 50% is used to evaluate the performance
of the framework. For the train-test split we consider the same portions for male and female
subjects. In addition, 20% of the training set of the morph datasets was used during model
optimization as the validation set. Batch size of 64 pairs of images of size 160 × 160 × 3 is
used for training the model. Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) is the chosen optimizer.
For the initial round of training with the Twins Day dataset, the initial learning rate is set
to 0.1, multiplied by 0.9 every 5 epochs until the final value of 10−6 . When fine-tuning with
morph datasets, the initial learning rate is set to 10−3 , then multiplied by 0.9 every 5 epochs
until the final learning rate value of 10−6 . The input data is further augmented with vertical
and horizontal flips to increase the training set and improve generalization.
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Results

We study the performance of the proposed differential morph detection framework using VISAPP17 and MorGAN datasets. The performance is compared with state-of-the-art classical
and deep learning frameworks.

8.4.1

Metrics

We apply the widely accepted metrics for morphing attack detection, APCER and BPCER,
to our algorithm. The Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) is the rate
at which morph attack images are incorrectly classified as bonafide. Similarly, the Bonafide
Probe Classification Error Rate (BPCER) is the rate at which bonafide images are incorrectly
classified as morph attack presentations. In real-world applications, the BPCER is the
measure by which individuals are inconvenienced with a false alarm. Hence, artificially
regulating the BPCER rate by restricting it to fixed thresholds is recommended for face
recognition systems [257]. We plot these rates in a Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) graph.
D-EER is the detection Equal Error Rate or the decision threshold at which APCER and
BPCER are equal. Additionally, we also present BPCER and APCER values for fixed
APCER and BPCER values, respectively.
We employed BSIF [235] and LBP [241] as classical texture descriptors. In addition,
we consider key-point detection frameworks, SURF [243] and SIFT [242]. These classical
methods have shown promise in morph detection in the literature. However, due to the
private nature of the databases used in the original papers, we are unable to directly compare
our results with theirs. Still, we employ the exact methodology described in the papers for
best comparison. Our baseline models consist of these four frameworks in combination with
an SVM classifier. The LBP feature descriptors are extracted according to patches of 3 × 3.
The resulting feature vectors, normalized histograms of size 256, are the values of the LBP
binary code. The SIFT and SURF are implemented using the default parameters [242] [243].
8-bits BSIF feature vectors are constructed on a 3 × 3 filters. These filters are Independent
Component Analysis filters provided by [258]. The feature vectors are then fed into a SVM
with an RBF kernel. For all classical baseline models, we follow [234], where the feature
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Figure 8.3: Samples from (a) Morgan and (b) VISAPP17-Splicing-Selected datasets. For
each dataset, the first and second faces are the gallery and probe bona fide images and the
third face is the morph image construed from the first and forth face images. The original
sizes for face images in these datasets are 64 × 64 and 1500 × 1200, respectively. All the faces
are resized to 160 × 160 after detection and alignment using MTCNN.
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representation of the image in question is subtracted from the feature representation of the
trusted image before feeding it to the SVM classifier.
We also compare our Siamese network with FaceNet [259] implementation InceptionResNET v1, where the distance between the embedding representations of the images in pair
is considered to provide the decision. Tables 8.2 and 8.3 presents the results on VISAPP17
and MorGAN datasets, respectively. As presented in these tables, fine-tuning using the
training portion of each morph dataset demonstrably provides better performance for both
datasets. This can be interpreted as the Siamese network is learning the generative nature
of the morph images in the dataset. For the VISAPP17 train-test split, fine-tuning on the
training portion of the dataset results in the BPCER@APCER=5% dropping from 29.82%
to 7.31%. For the MorGAN dataset, this fine-tuning helps lower the BPCER@APCER=5%
from 38.38% to 14.32%. The great difference in BPCER for MorGAN and VISAPP17 can
be attributed to the overall difficulty of the MorGAN dataset, particularly because it is of
a lower resolution than VISAPP17. On the other hand, the proposed SVM-based decision
making frameworks can further improve the performance of the proposed framework.
For both datasets texture descriptors outperform key-point based models which is consistent with the study in [234]. In addition, the proposed Siamese framework outperforms the
FaceNet implementation since the proposed framework initially learns to distinguish between
the images with very small differences through re-training on WVU Twins Day dataset and
then it is fine-tuned on the training portion of the corresponding dataset. For the MorGAN
dataset, our results follow the original paper [232] results on single image morph detection,
where the texture descriptors outperform convolutional neural networks, i.e., FaceNet. This
can be attributed to the generative nature of this dataset, which can be described using
texture descriptors better than deep models. However, fine-tuning the deep model on the
training portion of this dataset provides compatible results with BSIF.
Class activation maps [260] provide the attention of the decision with regard to regions
of the face image. In Figure 8.4, we follow the implementation of gradient-weighted class
activation maps [261]. Here, we present the differentiation of the contrastive distance with
regard to the feature maps constructed by ‘repeat 2’ layer in Inception-ResNET v1. In this
figure, we also report the average per pixel distance between the Grad-CAMs constructed
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Figure 8.4: Grad-CAMs for genuine (top) and imposter (bottom) pairs and the average per
pixel distance between the images for each pair. For each imposter pair, the left and right
images are real and morphed face images, respectively.
for face images in each pair. As shown in these images, the difference between the activation
maps for genuine pairs is smaller compared to the imposter pairs. It worth mentioning that
since the datasets include neutral and smiley faces, while computing the distance between
the activation maps, we do not consider the lower part of the faces. In addition, we can
observe that the class activation maps for the two images in a genuine pair are roughly
similar.

8.5

Conclusions

In this chapter, we proposed a deep Siamese network architecture to detect morphed faces.
Using contrastive loss and a pre-trained Inception-ResNET v1 on WVU Twins Day dataset,
we demonstrate the performance of our Siamese model on two different morph datasets.
Likewise, we compare our model’s performance with baseline models constructed with common classical and deep methods employed in the literature, where our model outperforms
the baseline models. This is attributed to the proposed framework learning to distinguish
between images with small differences while training on WVU Twins Day dataset and learning the nature of the corresponding morph dataset by training on the training portion of the
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Chapter 9
Mutual Information Maximization for
Differential Morph Detection
9.1

Introduction

The main goal of biometric systems is automated recognition of individuals based on their
unique biological and behavioral characteristics [262]. The human face is widely accepted as
a means of biometric authentication. Although, the uniqueness of face images and user convenience of face recognition systems have resulted in their popularity, morphed face images
have shown to pose a severe threat to them. This is because the main objective of morph
attacks is to purposefully alter or obfuscate the unique correspondence between probe and
gallery images [263]. The result of a morph attack is a face image which matches the probe
images corresponding to two different face images. Therefore, the detection of morph images
plays a major role in providing reliable face recognition.
The majority of morph generation frameworks focus on altering the position of the facial landmarks. These frameworks mainly utilize three steps: correspondence, warping, and
blending. The first step aims to detect the corresponding landmarks of both the images.
These sets of landmarks are then utilized to warp the images toward each other, e.g., considering the landmarks of the morph image as the pairwise average of two face images. Finally,
textures from the two images are combined either over the entire face image [246] or face
patches [231]. Another trend of morph generation considers Generative Adversarial Net-
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Figure 9.1: Trusted probe image, xi , and image in question, xj , are disentangled into landmark and appearance representations, using the disentanglement network trained on triplet
of face images. In these triplets, the constructed intermediate face image inherits landmarks and the appearance from two different face images. Landmark, appearance, and ID
representations are utilized to make the decision about the image in question.
works (GANs) to construct images that can be matched with the two source images, such
as AliGAN [232, 255] and StyleGAN [264, 265].
The face morphing algorithms can affect the face image in two broad aspects. First,
they alter the position of the landmarks. On the other hand, they modify the appearance of
the face image by either blending two source images or generating samples using generative
models. Although appearance corresponds to the soft biometrics of a subject which are
not necessarily unique, such as ethnicity, hair color, and gender, it can still be interpreted
to distinguish between face images with similar soft biometrics such as differences in the
texture of the face images. However, deep differential morph detection frameworks focus on
distinguishing the samples based on the ID information. Our proposed differential morph
detection framework investigates both the locations of the landmarks and the appearance
of the face image. Therefore, this approach restricts the attacker’s morphing capability by
studying both the changes resulted from altering the landmarks as well as modification in
soft biometrics and texture information.
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As presented in Figure 9.1, our proposed framework learns the disentangled representations for the landmarks and the appearance of a face image. While these representations are
practically shown to be sufficient for face recognition [10], the proposed training setup ensures that the mutual information between representations of the real images from a subject
is maximized. In this chapter, we make the following contributions: i) we construct triplets
of images in which an intermediate image inherits the landmarks from one image and the
appearance from the other image, ii) these triplets are considered to train a disentangling
network which provides disentangled representations for landmarks and face appearance, and
iii) we train specific networks for each morph dataset by learning contrastive representations
through maximizing the mutual information between real images from each subject.

9.2

Related Works

9.2.1

Facial Morphing

Facial morphing studies the possibility of creating artificial biometric samples which resemble the biometric information of two or more individuals [263]. Morph images can be
generated with little technical experience using tools available on the internet and mobile
platforms [263]. The overall purpose of face morphing is to generate a face image that will be
verified against samples of two or more subjects in automated face recognition systems. One
of the first efforts to study the generation of a morph image from two source images [225]
has concluded that geometric alterations and digital beautification can cause an increase in
the possibility of fooling recognition systems. Morph generation techniques can roughly be
categorized into landmark-based [231,238,266] and generative models [232,267]. Landmarkbased frameworks focus on detecting the landmarks in both the images, translating these
points toward each other, and blending the two face images. On the other hand, inspired
by a learned inference model [255], Morgan [232] presents a face morphing attack based on
automatic image generation using a GAN framework.
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9.2.2

Morph Detection

Morph detection can be categorized into two main approaches [246]: single image morph
detection and differential morph detection. Single image morph detection studies the possibility of detecting the morph image in the absence of a reference image. On the other
hand, differential morph detection leverages the information extracted from a real image
corresponding to the subject. Texture descriptors are the main feature extraction models
for single image morph detection [240, 268–271]. Recently, deep learning models have also
been considered for this purpose [238,266,272]. The models mentioned can also be employed
for differential morph detection when the extracted feature from the two images are compared [234, 273, 274]. Another trend of work for differential morph detection considers that
subtracting the trusted image from the image in question should increase the classification
score of the resulting image for one of the probe subjects [244, 245, 275].

9.2.3

Representation Disentanglement

The geometry of landmarks and visual appearance are the two main characteristics of the
face that can be utilized for face recognition. Initially, the geometry of hand-crafted face
landmarks were basis for face recognition [276]. Neural network approaches have provided
state-of-the-art face recognition performance, with several deep models using the location
of landmarks for varying face recognition purposes [198, 277]. On the other hand, the effect
of appearance in face recognition is widely studied, including soft biometrics such as gender, age, ethnicity, and hair color [278, 279]. Recently, an unsupervised approach using a
coupled autoencoder model for disentangling the appearance and geometry of face images
was developed [280]. In this framework, each autoencoder learns the geometry or appearance representation of the face, while the reconstruction loss is considered as the supervision
for disentangling. Another similar work [281] has incorporated variational autoencoders to
improve the disentangling. Another recent generative model [282] presents an unsupervised
algorithm for training GANs that learns the disentangled style and content representations
of the data.
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9.2.4

Mutual Information and Deep Learning

Among the first works that studied the application of mutual information in deep learning, [283] showed that GAN training loss can be recovered by minimizing the estimated
divergence between the generated and true data distributions. The authors in [284] expanded the mutual information maximization techniques to estimate the mutual information
between two random variables via a neural network. The authors in [285] and [286] used
mutual information to quantify the separation of distributions of positive and negative pairings in learning binary hash codes. The authors in [287] introduced RankMI algorithm,an
information-theoretic loss function and a training algorithm for deep representation learning
for image retrieval. The authors in contrastive representation distillation [288] proposed a
contrastive-based objective function for transferring knowledge between deep networks. The
authors in [289] propose an approach to self-supervised representation learning based on
maximizing mutual information between features extracted from multiple views of a shared
context.

9.3

Proposed Framework

Our proposed differential morph detection framework resonates with the morph generation
frameworks in which the the landmarks of the real image are translated to landmarks of
the target face image [231] or image generation by generative adversarial networks [232].
Disentangling appearance and landmark information has shown to be a powerful tool for
face recognition [10]. These two domains provide the majority of the information content for
differential morph detection as well. We aim to study the possibility of detecting the morph
image based on its differences with the trusted image in both landmark and appearance
domains. Therefore, to train our framework, we construct samples that inherit the appearance and landmarks from different samples. Then, we train a network that can disentangle
these two types of information [10]. This framework is then trained for differential morph
detection by maximizing the mutual information between representations of genuine pairs.

Sobhan Soleymani Chapter 9. Mutual Information Maximization for Morph Detection 142

9.3.1

Landmark and Appearance Triplets

The first step in our proposed training consists of generating face images that inherit appearance from one image and landmarks from the other image. Then, these triplets of face
images are used to train two deep networks. The first network aims to represent the appearance of the face image and the second network extracts the landmark information. The
supervision for disentangling appearance and landmarks of faces is provided by constructing triplets of face images. Each triplet consists of two real face images from two different
IDs. For convenience we denote these images as appearance image, xi , landmark image, x0i ,
and an intermediate face image generated using the appearance of the first face image and
the landmarks of the second face image, xbi . To construct this intermediate face image, we
translate the landmarks of the appearance image to the landmark image.
For this purpose, let xi be a face image noted as an appearance image belonging to the
class yi and the set li describe the locations of its K landmarks. We find another face image
x0i from a different class corresponding to the closest set of landmarks li0 as the landmark
set. The distance between the sets of landmarks is calculated in terms of L∞ , to assure that
xi and x0i have similar structures in order to minimize the distortion caused by the spatial
transformation in the next step.
We use the thin plate spline (TPS) algorithm [290] to transfer the landmarks of the
appearance face image to the landmarks of x0i as:
xbi = TPS(x, l, l0 + δl ),

(9.1)

where TPS and xbi represent the spatial transformation and the deformed image noted as
the intermediate face image. This face image has the appearance of xi and the landmarks of
x0i . The set δl accounts for small perturbations in the localizing the landmarks in the morph
generation framework.

9.3.2

Revisiting Landmarks and Appearance Disentanglement

As presented in Figure 9.2, in our proposed framework, two networks are defined as appearance network, a, and landmark network, g. These networks map the input face image to the
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Figure 9.2: Face image xbi is constructed by considering the appearance of xi and the landmarks of x0i . La enforces the appearance representations of xi and xbi to be similar. Similarly,
Lg ensures that g(xbi ) and g(x0i ) are close to each other. A fully-connected layer of size 512
fed with the concatenation of g and a provides the ID representation for the input image.
appearance and landmark representations as: a(.) : Rw×h×3 → Rda and g(.) : Rw×h×3 → Rdg .
It is worth mentioning that landmarks can be defined as the salient points in the face image. Although the landmark representation aims to represent the landmarks in the face
image, it is trained through a classification setup to preserve the information required to
distinguish between the input images regarding their geometrical differences. We define
a third network, f (.), that maps these two representations to a face ID representation as:
f (.) : Rda ×Rdg → Rdf , where da , dg , and df are the dimension of appearance, landmark, and
face ID representations, respectively. This representations enables us to train the framework
as a classification setup.
To provide enough information to distinguish between real and morph images, these
three representations should satisfy three conditions: i) The appearance representation of
the appearance and intermediate images should be similar: a(xi ) ≈ a(xbi ), ii) the landmark
representation of the landmark and intermediate images should be similar: g(x0i ) ≈ g(xbi ),
and iii) for both the non-manipulated images, xi and x0i , the face representations resulted
from network f should preserve sufficient classification information. We address these three
conditions in our initial training setup. The appearance-preserving loss function aims to
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enforce the first condition:
L1a (xi , xbi ) = −

1 X
Φ(a(xi ), a(xbi )),
N i

(9.2)

where Φ(v1 , v2 ) represents the cosine similarity between v1 and v2 as in [110,291]: Φ(v1 , v2 ) =
v1T v2
||v1 ||2 ||v2 ||2

and N is the number of samples. Similarly, the landmark-preserving loss is defined

as:
L1g (x0i , xbi ) = −

1 X
Φ(g(x0i ), g(xbi ))
N i

(9.3)

+ max(0, Φ(g(x0i ), g(xi )) − αg φg ),
where φg =

||li −li0 ||2
||li −li ||2

is the normalized measure of the distance of landmark locations, and

li is the mean of landmark locations along two axes. αg is a scaling coefficient, scaling to
form an angular loss which aims to maximize the cosine similarity of g(xi ) and g(xbi ) and
dissimilarity of g(xi ) and g(x0i ).
In addition to the discussed training loss functions, we should assure that the appearance
and landmark representations provide sufficient information for the identification of the real
images, xi and x0i :
L1id (xi ) =

−1 X
es(cos(m1 θyi ,i +m2 )−m3 )
,
log s(cos(m θ +m )−m ) P
1 yi ,i
2
3
N
e
+ j6=y es cos(θj,i )
i

(9.4)

i

where f (xi ) = T (a(xi ), g(xi )) is the ID representation [111] for face image, cos(θj,i ) =
WjT f (xi )
,
||Wj ||2 ||f (xi )||2

and Wj is the weight vector assigned to the ith class. In this angular loss

function, m1 , m2 , and m3 are the hyperparameters controlling the angular margin, and s is
the magnitude of angular representations. The training loss function is defined as:
L1t =

X

L1id (xi ) + L1id (x0i ) + λ1a L1a (xi , xbi ) + λ1g L1g (x0i , xbi ),

(9.5)

i

where λ1a and λ1g are hyper-parameters scaling the appearance and landmark preserving loss
functions.

9.3.3

Contrastive Morph Detection

Our proposed differential morph detection framework builds upon recent information-theoretic
approaches to deep representation learning [287,288]. We aim to maximize the mutual information between the real images from the same subject and minimize the mutual information
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Figure 9.3: A pair of one trusted probe image, xi , and an image in question, xj , are fed
into the disentanglement network. This network which is trained in combination with the
auxiliary networks, T a (., .) and T g (., .), provides embedding representations that present high
mutual information for genuine pairs and results in close representations for the samples in
genuine pair and distant representations for samples in imposter pairs. Here, the morph
image (red) is constructed displacing the landmarks of a real image (green) toward the
landmarks of a visually similar image (black). The genuine pair consists of two real images
from the same subject (orange and green), while the imposter pair in constructed using a
real image and its corresponding morph image (green and red).
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between samples in an imposter pair during the training and make the decision during the
test considering the distance between the representations of the pair of images in the embedding. To this aim, as presented in Figures 9.3, the joint training of the disentanglement
and auxiliary networks provides embedding representations distinguishable enough to detect
morphed face images in a differential morph detection setup. Our framework benefits from
transferring knowledge from that recognition task on a large face dataset to the disentanglement network, which provides a faster training of both disentanglement and auxiliary
networks.
To maximize the mutual information between real samples from the same subject in the
embedding space, we follow the notation proposed in [284, 287]. Let xi be an input face
image and zia and zig be its corresponding appearance and landmark representations as:
zia = a(xi ), zig = g(xi ).

(9.6)

We aim to train a(x) and g(x) such that real images from the same subject are mapped
closely in the embedding space. To this aim, we maximize the mutual information between
the real images from the same subject in each embedding space using the functions T a (.)
and T g (.). To construct our training samples we define a genuine set as:

P = {(xi , xj )|ci = cj , ri = rj = 1},

(9.7)

where ci and cj represents the classes for the subjects and ri = 1 represents the real images.
On the other hand we define the imposter set as:
N = {(xi , xj )|ci 6= cj or ri = 0 or rj = 0},

(9.8)

where ri = 0 represents morphed images. It is worth mentioning that we define the above
imposter set during the training. During the test phase, the imposer set consists of pairs in
which both the samples belong to the same subject, while one of them is a real face image
and the other is a morphed face image. In addition, for the genuine set, we can define the
joint distribution of xi and xj as:
p(xi , xj ) =

X
k∈C

p(xi , xj , c = k, ri = rj = 1).

(9.9)
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Assuming the high entropy of p(c)p(r) for the imposter set, we can approximate the joint
distribution of the samples as the product of their marginals:
p(xi )p(xj ) ≈
XX
{p(xi |ci = k)p(xj |cj = k 0 )p(ci = k)p(cj = k 0 )}
k∈c k0 6=k

+

XX

{p(xi |ci = k)p(xj |cj = k)p(ci = k)p(cj = k)

(9.10)

k∈c ri ∈r

p(rj = 0)} +

X

{p(xi |ci = k)p(xj |cj = k 0 )p(ci = k)

k∈c

p(cj = k 0 )p(ri = 0)p(rj = 1)},

where r = {0, 1} represents morphed and real images. Considering the genuine and imposter
pairs defined in equations 9.7 and 9.8, the appearance differential loss is defined to maximize
the mutual appearance information between samples in a genuine pair as [284, 287]:
L2a =

1
||P ||

X

T a (zia , zja )

(xi ,xj )∈P

1
− log
||N ||

X

(9.11)
T a (zia ,zja )

e

.

(xi ,xj )∈N

A similar loss is defied over the genuine and imposter pairs to calculate Lgt as the differential
landmark information loss. Then, the differential loss is defined as:
L2t = λ2a L2a + λ2g L2g + L1id ,

(9.12)

where L1id provides the training for network T and subsequently f (xi ).

9.4

Experiments

We study the performance of the proposed framework on three morph datasets. In our experiments we follow frameworks described in [246, 292]. Evaluation metrics for the differential
morph detection are defined as: Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) as
the proportion of morph attack samples incorrectly classified as bona fide (non-morph), presentation and Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER) is the proportion
of bona fide (nonmorph) samples incorrectly classified as morphed samples.

Sobhan Soleymani Chapter 9. Mutual Information Maximization for Morph Detection 148

9.4.1

Training Setup

For all the datasets, DLib [293] is considered to detect and align faces, as well as extracting
68 landmarks. We train the model on the CASIA-WebFace [65] dataset. In the training
set, for each image, the image from a different ID that provides closest landmarks to its
landmarks in terms of L2 norm is selected. Neighbor face is transformed spatially using
Equation 9.1. This image is aligned again to compensate for the displacements caused by
the spatial transformation. All images are resized to 112 × 112 and pixel values are scaled
to [−1, 1].
We adopt ResNet-64 [134] as the base network architecture. To reduce the size of the
model, the convolutional networks for extracting the landmark representation, g(x), and
the appearance representation, a(x), are combined. This network produces feature maps of
spatial size 7 × 7 and the depth of 512 channels. These feature maps are divided in depth
into two sets, dedicated to the appearance and landmark representations, respectively. Each
set of feature maps is reshaped to form a vector of size 12, 544 and passed to dedicated fullyconnected layers. These layers of size 256 generate the final representations, a(x) and g(x).
The ID representation is constructed by concatenation of these two representations fed to
a fully-connected layer of size 512. The model is trained using Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD) with the mini-batch size of 128 on two NVIDIA TITAN X GPUs. In Equation 9.4,
following ArcFace [111] framework, m1 , m2 , and m3 are set to 0.9, 0.4, and 0.15, respectively.
In Equation 9.1, δl is sampled from N (0, 3).
The initial value for the learning rate is set to 0.1 and multiplied by 0.9 in intervals of five
epochs until its value is less than or equal to 10−6 . The model is trained for 600K iterations.
We select αg = 9.4, λ1a = 1.3, and λ1g = 0.75. For training the network using Equation 9.11,
each fully-connected layer of size 256 is fed to a fully-connected of size 64, and then to a
single unit. Here, considering λ2a = λ2g = 1, the network is trained using the learning rate of
10−2 and is dropped similar to the rate mentioned above.
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Figure 9.4: Samples from (a) MorGAN, (b) VISAPP17-Splicing-Selected, and (c) AMSL
Face Morph Image Datasets. For each dataset, the first and second faces are the gallery and
probe bona fide images and the third face is the morph image construed from the first and
forth face images. The original sizes for face images in these datasets are 64×64, 1500×1200,
and 531 × 413, respectively.
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MorGAN

Dataset

VISAPP17

AMSL

D-EER

5%

10%

D-EER

5%

10%

D-EER

5%

10%

LM-Dlib [274, 293]

12.53

20.71

10.17

17.88

26.64

22.71

14.45

20.67

18.55

BSIF+SVM [235]

10.17

14.22

8.64

16.42

28.77

25.37

12.75

20.71

16.26

LBP+SVM [241]

15.51

28.40

18.71

18.75

23.88

20.65

14.97

21.47

16.21

FaceNet [259]

16.14

38.38

26.67

9.51

29.82

6.91

8.43

25.74

5.68

ArcFace [111]

14.65

22.76

16.23

7.14

17.51

5.69

6.14

14.51

5.23

FaceNet+SVM

12.53

18.84

12.21

8.85

26.46

6.28

8.42

18.46

5.28

ArcFace+SVM [246]

10.82

15.47

12.43

5.38

7.45

4.78

3.87

6.12

3.28

Ours

8.75

12.58

8.51

4.69

5.74

2.59

3.11

5.35

2.24

Table 9.1: D-EER%, BPCER@APCER=5%, and BPCER@APCER=10% for the differential
morph detection.

9.4.2

Results

MorGAN is constructed using the generative framework described in [232]. In this dataset,
500 bonafide images are considered. For each bona fide image two morph images are generated using two most similar identities to the bona fide image, resulting in 1, 000 morph
images. In total this dataset consists of 1, 500 references, 1, 500 probes, and 1, 000 MorGAN
morphing attacks. The database is randomly split into disjoint and equal train and test sets.
All the images are of size 64 × 64.
VISAPP17-Splicing-Selected1 is a subset of VISAPP17-Splicing dataset [294] containing
genuine neutral and smiling face images as well as morphed face images. This dataset is
generated by warping and alpha-blending [253]. To construct this dataset, facial landmarks
are localized, the face image is tranquilized based on these landmarks, triangles are warped
to some average position, and the resulting images are alpha-blended, where alpha is set to
0.5 making alpha-blending equal to average. Splicing morphs are designed to avoid ghosting
artefacts usually present in the hair region, done by warping and blending of only face regions
and inserting the blended face into one of the original face images. The background, hair
and torso regions remain untouched. VISAPP17-Splicing-Selected dataset, which consists of
1

For simplicity, we refer to this dataset as VISAPP17.
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132 bona fide and 184 morph images of size 1500 × 1200, is constructed by selecting morph
images without any recognizable artifacts.
The AMSL Face Morph Image Dataset is created using the Face Research Lab London
Set [295] and includes genuine neutral and smiling face images and morphed face images.
The morphed face images are generated from pairs of genuine face images [294]. For all
the morph images the proportions of both faces in the morphed face are the same. While
generating morphed faces male, female, white, and Asian people are only morphed with
their corresponding category. All images are down-scaled to 531 × 413 pixels and JPEG
compression is applied to them to compress the images to 15kb [296]. This dataset includes
102 neutral or 102 smiling genuine face images and 2,175 morph images.
Differential Morph Detection: For the MorGAN dataset, we follow the train and test
split presented in [232]. For the other two datasets, we consider a disjoint train and test
split in which 50% of the subjects are used for training. The distance between face images
xi and xj is defined as:
D =Φ(f (xi ), f (xj )) + βa Φ(a(xi ), a(xj ))

(9.13)

+βg Φ(g(xi ), g(xj )),
where βa and βg are the scaling parameters used for decision making. We employ classical
texture descriptors, BSIF [235] and LBP [241], with an SVM classifier. The LBP feature
descriptors are extracted according to the original LBP image patches of 3 × 3. The resulting
feature vector is then a normalized histogram of size 256, which encompasses all potential
values of the LBP binary code. BSIF feature vectors are conducted on a filter size of 3 × 3
and 8 bits. The filters utilized for BSIF are pre-learned Independent Component Analysis
(ICA) filters [258] that are utilized by the original BSIF paper to construct normalized
histogram for each image. The feature vectors are then inputted to an SVM with an RBF
kernel for classification. For all classical baseline models the difference between the feature
representation of the image in question and the feature representation of the trusted image
is fed to an SVM classifier.
In addition, we employ LM-Dlib [274, 293] as a model for the landmark displacement
measure. In this framework, the distance between landmarks extracted by Dlib [293] are fed

Table 9.2:

Algorithm

D-EER

5%

10%

LM-Dlib [274, 293]

23.74

51.42

38.67

BSIF+SVM [235]

19.21

51.25

39.41

ArcFace+SVM [246]

11.67

22.36

14.86

Ours

8.55

12.68

8.57

LM-Dlib [274, 293]

20.67

44.28

32.15

BSIF+SVM [235]

17.27

38.54

24.71

ArcFace+SVM [246]

10.48

22.49

14.90

Ours

7.95

11.26

8.81

LM-Dlib [274, 293]

16.82

38.54

24.8

BSIF+SVM [235]

13.52

15.3

14.79

MorGAN

AMSL

MorGAN

AMSL

Test

VISAPP17

AMSL

VISAPP17

MorGAN

Train

VISAPP17
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ArcFace+SVM [246]

15.75

32.58

22.36

Ours

13.85

12.32

8.74

LM-Dlib [274, 293]

18.83

38.86

24.78

BSIF+SVM [235]

16.92

38.84

24.64

ArcFace+SVM [246]

8.27

9.63

5.28

Ours

5.38

3.47

2.38

LM-Dlib [274, 293]

16.24

30.94

19.28

BSIF+SVM [235]

13.84

25.35

14.82

ArcFace+SVM [246]

16.34

38.62

24.51

Ours

14.21

28.58

18.51

LM-Dlib [274, 293]

20.55

62.21

38.42

BSIF+SVM [235]

20.36

51.28

32.95

ArcFace+SVM [246]

10.65

14.36

9.81

Ours

5.21

8.26

4.17

Cross-dataset performance for differential morph detection:

D-EER%,

BPCER@APCER=5%, and BPCER@APCER=10%.
to an SVM. For deep models, the distance between the representations in the embedding
domain is considered as the decision criteria. For all the model, the default parameters
presented in the original papers are considered. It is worth mentioning that in this experiments we do not consider the prior knowledge on which of the images in the pair fed to the
recognition framework is the trusted image. On the other hand, in Table 9.3, we assume
that the differential morph detection framework is provided with the information regarding
the trusted image.
For each the datasets, 10% of the training set is considered as the validation set. Then,
the parameters to train the framework are selected based on the experiments described in
Table 9.4 and Figure 9.5. Table 9.1 presents the performance of the proposed framework in
comparison with four deep learning and three classical differential morph detection frame-
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Dataset

MorGAN

VISAPP17

AMSL

D-EER

5%

10%

D-EER

5%

10%

D-EER

5%

10%

LM-Dlib [274, 293]

8.14

10.67

7.83

15.67

22.87

20.32

11.67

16.98

14.63

BSIF+SVM [235]

6.07

9.15

4.63

13.87

23.53

20.12

10.53

16.53

13.86

LBP+SVM [241]

7.47

9.23

4.71

15.21

20.64

18.74

12.21

17.11

12.81

FaceNet [259]

8.11

14.52

7.59

7.32

24.54

5.21

7.46

22.12

5.17

ArcFace [111]

7.58

9.64

4.08

6.45

14.78

5.02

5.36

10.46

4.87

FaceNet+SVM

7.23

12.46

5.22

6.37

26.46

6.28

8.42

18.46

5.28

ArcFace+SVM [246]

5.35

6.71

3.50

4.52

5.98

4.05

3.27

5.56

2.69

Ours

4.71

5.32

3.85

3.74

4.91

2.17

2.82

4.97

2.82

Ours∗

4.06

5.04

3.42

3.45

4.25

1.85

2.36

4.16

1.47

Table 9.3: The differential morph detection performance on three datasets, when the
trusted image is known to the detection framework: D-EER%, BPCER@APCER=5%, and
BPCER@APCER=10%.
works. In addition to outperforming the baseline models on all the datasets, the proposed
framework outperforms the baseline models by a wide margin on the MorGAN dataset, which
can be contributed to the disentanglement of landmark and appearance representations.
In Table 9.2, we study the performance of the networks trained on the training portion of
one morph dataset and tested on the other datasets. As presented in this table, while outperforming the other models, the proposed framework provides high cross-dataset performance
between VISAPP17 and AMSL. In addition, the proposed framework provides D-EER of
8.55% and 7.95% for cross-dataset performance on the network trained on MorGAN and
tested on VISAPP17 and AMSL datasets, respectively. On the other hand, BSIF+SVM
outperforms the other algorithms when testing the network trained on other two datasets
and tested on MorGAN, which illustrates the same trend as the results provided in [232].
Table 9.3 studies the effect of the trusted images being known to the detection framework.
For the baseline models, rather than comparing the representations of the trusted images
and the image in question, the representation of the image in question is subtracted from
the representation of the trusted image before feeding the difference to the SVM. For the
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Figure 9.5: D-EER% for different variances of δl values in Equation 9.1.
MorGAN

VISAPP17

AMSL

(4,1)

10.91

6.97

4.72

(3,1)

9.64

6.57

4.12

(2,2)

8.75

5.84

3.83

(1,3)

10.32

4.69

3.11

(1,4)

10.89

5.12

3.54

Table 9.4: The D-EER% for differential morph detection performance considering different
scaling values (βa and βg ) in Equation 9.13.
proposed framework, we consider an additional algorithm, denoted as ”Ours∗ ”, in which
two dedicated instances of the framework are constructed for trusted images and images in
question. In this algorithm, which outperforms the algorithm for which only one instance of
the network is considered, we only train the network dedicated to the images in question.
Table 9.4 provides the performance for the proposed framework on the validation sets when
the scaling parameters in making the decision vary in Equation 9.13. As presented in this
table, morph images constructed using landmark displacement are better detected for higher
weights given to g(x), while the MorGAN samples are best detected when g(x) and a(x) are
given similar weights. In addition, Figure 9.5 provides the performance for three datasets
when variance of the normal distribution to generate δl samples in Equation 9.1 varies from
0 to 6.
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9.5

Conclusions

In this chapter, we presented a novel differential morph detection framework which benefits
from disentangling landmark representation and appearance representation in an embedding
space. These two representations which are disentangled but complementary, are constructed
using a disentanglement network trained using triplets of face images. Each triplet consists
of two real images and an intermediate image which inherits the landmarks from one image
and the appearance from the other image. We demonstrated that appearance and landmark
disentanglement can be boosted using contrastive representations for each disentangled representation. This property provides the possibility of accurate differential morph detection,
using distances in landmark, appearance, and ID domains. The performance of the proposed
framework is studied using three morph datasets constructed with different methodologies.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
10.1

Summary

In this dissertation we have considered these problems: multimodal person recognition,
quality-aware multi-sample person recognition, text-independent speaker verification, adversarial iris examples, and morphed face images.
Multimodal person recognition: we proposed joint CNN architectures with feature
level fusion for multimodal recognition using multiple modalities. We proposed to apply
fusion at fully-connected layers instead of convolutional layers to handle the possible spatial mismatch problem. These fusion algorithms result in no loss in performance, while the
number of parameters is reduced significantly. We demonstrated that the multimodal fusion
at the feature-level and joint optimization of multi-stream CNNs significantly improve unimodal representation accuracy by incorporating the captured multiplicative interactions of
the low-dimensional modality-dedicated feature representations. The first algorithm presents
multimodal generalized compact bilinear pooling. In this algorithm, utilizing tensor sketch
projection, single modalities and all possible 2-,3-,..., n-compact bilinear products are concatenated to form the joint representation. Then, we proposed a multi-abstract network to
fuse the modalities at different feature-level abstractions.
Quality-aware multi-sample person recognition: we presented a quality-aware fusion with feature-level fusion for multi-sample multimodal recognition using modalities of
face, iris, and fingerprint consisting of two blocks to handle different multi-sample multi-
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modal scenarios. The first block provides high-level representation of each modality considering the quality of the samples in that modality. The second block provides a multimodal
representation for the input multimodal sample set, while utilizing the inter-modality quality of modalities. The network is trained using the proposed multimodal separability loss,
while the multimodal network compactness loss alleviates the over-fitting caused by the
over-parametrization of multimodal networks. To study the performance of the proposed
framework and loss functions, we consider three real-world multimodal and eight unimodal
datasets. The proposed framework is trained end-to-end in a weakly-supervised fashion
without any quality score supervision. The expectation of the inter-modality quality on
each multimodal test dataset represents the importance of the modalities in the recognition
task and is aligned with the unimodal performance of the framework.
Text-independent speaker verification: We proposed a novel cross-device textindependent speaker verification Siamese architecture, where Mel-frequency spectrogram coefficients are used to benefit from correlation of the adjacent features. In addition, prosodic
features were deployed to enhance the spectral features fed to CNN. A MLP network is
trained to represent the prosodic features describing words, fundamental frequency, jitter
and shimmer. The joint representation fusing two networks, trains the network through
contrastive loss. The proposed end-to-end verification architecture performs feature extraction and verification simultaneously. The proposed architecture displayed significant improvement over conventional classical and deep algorithms for forensic cross-device speaker
verification.
Adversarial iris examples: We generated physical adversarial examples for codebased iris recognition systems. However, conventional iris-code generation algorithms are
not differentiable with respect to the input image. Generating adversarial examples requires
back-propagation of the adversarial loss. Therefore, we proposed to deploy a deep surrogate
auto-encoder network to generate iris-codes very similar to iris-codes generated by conventional algorithm. The adversarial network uses the trained surrogate network to generate
the adversarial examples using fast gradient sign descent algorithm. We examined the possibility of generating non-targeted and targeted adversarial examples. Considering three
white-box and black-box attack scenarios, the proposed network was able to deceive the
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iris recognition system, while the perturbation added to the benign examples remain in the
acceptable range. Then, we presented three defense strategies to detect the adversarial iris
examples. These strategies investigate each wavelet sub-band in order to denoise the input
examples. Through defining these defense strategies, we remove the sub-bands that are the
most affected by the adversary. The first proposed defense strategy reconstructs multiple
denoised versions of the input example. Then, this strategy decides about the input example
through the classification of the denoised examples. The second proposed defense strategy
denoises each wavelet domain sub-band. The sub-bands that are most likely affected by the
adversary are determined by the L2 distance between the wavelet domain sub-bands and
their reconstructed version. Finally, the third proposed strategy, focuses on removing the
sub-bands that are most effected by the adversary, while reconstructing the other sub-bands.
Morphed face images: First, we proposed a deep Siamese network architecture to
detect morphed faces using contrastive loss. We compare our model’s performance with
baseline models constructed with common classical and deep methods employed in the literature, where our model outperforms the baseline models. This is attributed to the proposed
framework learning to distinguish between images with small differences while training on
WVU Twins Day dataset and learning the nature of the corresponding morph dataset by
training on the training portion of the dataset. Next, we presented a novel differential
morph detection framework which benefits from disentangling landmark representation and
appearance representation in an embedding space. These two representations which are
disentangled but complementary, are constructed using a disentanglement network trained
using triplets of face images. Each triplet consists of two real images and an intermediate
image which inherits the landmarks from one image and the appearance from the other image. We demonstrated that appearance and landmark disentanglement can be boosted using
contrastive representations for each disentangled representation. This property provides the
possibility of accurate differential morph detection, using distances in landmark, appearance,
and ID domains.
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Future Works

• For the multimodal person recognition frameworks, the study of mislabelled and missing samples provides the opportunity to expand the proposed frameworks. In these
frameworks, we have considered that all the samples in a multimodal sample set belong
to the same subject. However, the possibility of some of the samples being mislabeled
can be considered as a feature work. Similarly, in our frameworks, we do not consider
the case when the recognition framework, for few of the subjects, does not have access
to samples from a specific modality.
• The text-independent cross-device speaker verification framework can be extended to
various other applications such as spoof detection. The detection of speaker spoofing
is critical to speaker recognition systems that can be integrated with existing multibiometric recognition platforms. In addition, performing spoof detection with and
without text will improve the detection performance. Short-term spectral features,
prosodic characteristics, and high-level features reflecting language content and speaker
behavior. These features can be utilized for the detection of speaker spoofing.
• The contrastive representation learning presented in this dissertation for morph detection on disentangled face images can also be applied on the multimodal person recognition and text-independent speaker verification. In the proposed morph detection
framework, the contrastive representation learning is applied on the appearance and
geometry representations of the face. Similarly, the contrastive representation learning
can be applied on different modalities of a multimodal person recognition framework
or different representations of the speech signal.
• The adversarial examples can be generated in a self-supervised learning fashion to
improve the performance of contrastive representation learning. In this setting, these
adversarial examples can be utilized in self-supervised learning. This setup can be
considered in multimodal person recognition, speaker verification and defending against
adversarial examples.
• Morphing techniques allow attacker to combine images from two subjects to get a
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single image that resembles both face images. The proposed frameworks in this dissertation can be expanded in two different directions. First, we can focus on generating
new morph datasets from look-alike images using different generative models such as
ALIGAN and StyleGAN, in addition to landmark-based algorithms. These datasets
can provide a better training set for the morph detection problem. Then, we can consider different orthonormal transforms to detect morph artifacts in the corresponding
domains.
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